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

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Also by Menno Hurenkamp

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THE POLITICS OF HOME: Belonging and Nostalgia in Western Europe and the United States

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Menno Hurenkamp
University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

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University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

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Preface and Acknowledgments

For centuries, citizenship has alternately been understood as a way to secure individual freedom and as a way to guarantee collective harmony. A citizen has the right not to be constrained by unsolicited powers but also has the duty to contribute to keeping that liberty alive. But in countries such as the Netherlands and the UK, this debate has mainly been undertaken by academics. Citizenship was not part of the everyday vocabulary. Politicians and citizens had other concerns. In this book, we document the rise of citizenship as a policy strategy, against a backdrop of rising individualism, globalization, and declining trust in politics. Clearly, citizenship now has a function of reorganizing some collective harmony again. But this comes with several dangers, the biggest being government telling citizens what to do instead of the other way around. This book is an empirical attempt to avoid this normative danger, without neglecting obvious and current problems in modern citizen behavior.

Society is not a comfortable home, nor is citizenship a home decorating strategy. Living together is not a cozy affair. Resistance and ambiguity are instructive experiences, in the words of Richard Sennett: rather than fight them, we can learn from them. We present citizenship as a craft rather than as something that can be dictated, as a commitment that needs to be kept up to date instead of as a prescribed performance. It is generally acknowledged that around ten thousand hours of practice are required to become an expert in anything, whether writing books, playing a musical instrument, curing people or performing a sport. Yet nowadays a mere few hours a week over the course of a few years in school, a naturalization program or even a government initiative are considered sufficient to create citizens, as if citizenship were a wardrobe from Ikea (just follow the instructions . . .). Disappointments are waiting to happen in this dramatic flattening of civic interaction.

The vast majority of citizens care about one another and about society, but they wonder frequently how to express this, given pressure of time, inept bureaucracies, or cultural miscommunication. Instead of leading citizens toward a fixed social or political goal,

putting the development of civic dexterity at the heart of our institutional thinking would greatly improve social cohesion.

Experiments with co-production of policy or with new political parties or with the internet are just as important as routine interaction on the streets or at a desk of the social services, in which the not too ambitious citizens can fine tune and gradually master their public performance. Show, don't tell, is a crucial element of this program. The masters of the craft, the experienced participants, the professionals, and the politicians have to perform good citizenship, not prescribe it. Value not love for society or love for strangers, which never really exist in the first place, but just the enjoyment of skillful interaction. All in all, doing things right rather than doing the right thing is what crafting citizenship is about.

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1
Society as a Productive Space

In the early 1990s, 'citizenship' had made a successful entry into the academic debate. It had become a 'buzz word among thinkers on all points of the political spectrum', according to Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, who carried out an overview of the academic literature at that time (Kymlicka & Norman 1994: 352). On the level of theory, the notion of 'citizenship' integrated community membership on the one hand and justice on the other. On the level of society, interest in citizenship was ignited by developments such as the rise of multiculturalism and nationalism, the backlash against the welfare state, and increasing voter apathy. And, indeed, quality and attitudes of citizens matter, the authors noted: without a sense of identity, the ability to get on with and work with others from different backgrounds, a desire to participate in the political process and a willingness to show restraint and responsibility in the public domain, democracies become difficult to govern. The authors were not too hopeful about an overall theory of citizenship arising, as they saw all attempts to create 'good citizens' succumb under good intentions. But they did stress the need for shared citizenship, to supersede rival identities based on ethnicity, as a source of unity in a multinational country (376).

This book documents the rise of the buzz word 'citizenship' in real life. We look at developments in welfare states in general, with the unique case of the Netherlands constantly in the background. We do this while looking at citizenship practices, even though we take into account the public debate and use the different political interpretations of citizenship as a background for our analysis. But we focus

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mainly on the way citizens practice their trade, how and why they unite, how and why they disperse, and to what extent they manage to forge unity of one kind or another.

By taking a predominantly micro-sociological approach, we hope to estimate strengths and weaknesses of different theories of citizenship in a fruitful way. Somewhere, in between the ideas that a citizen is a passport holder and a good citizen is someone who votes, lies a set of citizen practices that make these technical understandings of citizenship easily accessible for some and not so easy for others. Citizens and citizens-to-be wrestle with these academic notions in daily life. They believe that these are provided by the government, media, or schools and combine them with their own ambitions. The result is seldom what anybody wishes for but is not necessarily unproductive. This book deals with citizens defining their idea of 'we' through a website or dealing with a difficult neighbor, moving toward greater participation when they recognize co-citizens and swiftly moving away when they meet strangers.

The Netherlands is a case in point to make this argument. It is not just any other country. Early in May 2002 *The Economist* reported that the country was 'A fine place to be, outward looking and open to new ideas'. The magazine portrayed the Dutch as 'consummate pragmatists'. The following week the Dutch were angry rather than pragmatic at the ballot box. They overwhelmingly supported an anti-establishment party, after its leader (Pim Fortuyn) was assassinated by an activist. Ten years and at least one financial crisis later, the Netherlands performs better than almost any other country in Europe in terms of employment and ranks as one the richest countries of the European Union (EU) (let alone in the world) in virtually any ranking based on gross domestic product (GDP). And yet anxiety remains. The support for anti-establishment parties has established itself. The question of whether the Netherlands is 'a fine place to be' is answered enigmatically by saying that the Dutch are happy with their own life but worried about society, that they are confident about their own future but not the country's, and that they see their own environment thriving but collective environment suffering (SCP 2009a, 2009b).

'More citizenship' has been one of the policy responses towards this unease. This came up late in the 1990s and has since become a relatively firm notion in public debate. Drawing predominantly on

research in the Netherlands but also comparing data from neighboring countries, we make an inventory of the meanings and consequences that the word citizenship has come to convey in the early twenty-first century. We identify three developments prominent in public debate. These are 'globalization', 'individualization', and 'delegitimation'. Globalization has introduced cultural tensions into urban neighborhoods and political debates. Unleashed individualism has undermined solidarity within welfare states and their traditional associations. The declining authority of politicians and government has generated growing discontent and anger towards leaders and elected officials. The degree to which these somewhat borderless phenomena actually 'exist' in a measurable sense is debatable. But that is less relevant to our current perspective.

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is renowned globally for her exclamation that 'there is no such thing as society, there are only individuals'. Some 25 years later, no politician would dare to repeat this sentence in public, however conservative or liberal or right- or left-wing they may be. Rather, they will search for phrases to express their concern for a 'big', 'good', or 'just' society. 'Keeping things together' is a phrase that has recently became well used in the Netherlands. It has become a goal that any public figure will aim for. Everybody has to be part of something, not just in school or at work but part of the nation, feeling at home in one's city, participating in public life. The ideology of individualism is in the back seat the coming years.

Citizenship is regarded as a relatively neutral way to fill the gap created by the decline of individualism. It is supposed to correct the balance between rights and duties in debates on the welfare state, to resolve the conflict between collective and private identities in debates on multiculturalism, to reconnect subjects and their rulers in a democratic fashion. 'More citizenship' has become a panacea for the early twenty-first-century lack of social cohesion. We examine how and to what effect citizens put their spin on this political mandate. We examine how people think about and practice citizenship, and how citizenship binds us together. We look at the activities initiated by citizens and when they quit them, and we also look at how they discuss citizenship and what they might hear or read about it.

By unraveling citizenship in everyday expressions and behavior, we attempt to show where it is working and where it is faltering,

where social segregation is being overcome and where communities are most under pressure. Modern understandings of 'belonging' are complex, involving traditional categories such as family, friends, work, and neighborhoods, but also clothes, TV programs, and more important symbols such as the nation, its flag, and its history. What exactly do people do when they attempt to mold to their conceptions of good citizenship? And while the structures of our societies – their laws and institutions – of course also determine how we think about and practice citizenship, we believe that how citizenship is regarded by citizens and how it is portrayed in society are largely overlooked.

Our research brings two claims to the fore. The first is that the greater part of the citizenry will assist others, though not always and not everyone, but, on average, people are not totally unwilling to spend time or money on somebody else's well-being. We tend to forget that despite how much multimedia, borderless travel, and individual households we have, humans flock together, and like it. The notion of a 'late', or 'post', or 'second' modernity producing unpredictable, atomized, or highly personalized behavior is not particularly compatible with the repetitive character of active citizenship. And yet it is always the same people participating. Newcomers often report feeling unwelcome at local initiatives. Good intentions of public officials apparently are insufficient. They regularly fail to achieve their targets, or achieve something quite different from what was initially expected. There is also ineptness in other prominent political issues of the last decade. When decent people employ a 'norms and values' offensive against those they disapprove of, or when they require foreigners to adapt to a culture that nobody can quite define, can they reasonably expect more social cohesion? This brings forward the second claim of this book. Citizenship is about sharing status and rights, hence it is divisive. However, in both practice and in policy, this political dimension is severely under-rated. There is and will remain a substantial willingness to (every now and then) donate money to charities like the Red Cross, to monitor the accounts of the local sports club, to support a decent politician, to teach a new language to a group of neighbors, even to organize a party for them. It is when citizens encounter strangers that things easily get out of hand. And the three forces identified above generate a continuous stream of strangers.

It is not the disappearance of connections between people but difficulties in handling the pressures of daily life that evoke the longing for a more conscious more citizenship. In various surveys, citizens report having a sense of duty towards each other and to society more widely. Solidarity within society is valued and appears reasonable by almost any standard. We are not malicious or lazy, but inept with public questions, and at a loss as to how to proceed productively when conflicts arise. This is reflected in the title of this book: *Crafting Citizenship*. Citizens and government are in need of strategies to negotiate and even foster lasting differences of opinion and life style. Seeing citizenship as a craft clarifies the fact that it means being invited to join a professional association, appreciating that one learns through one's mistakes, and fostering people's talents. It is a continuous process, not a matter of passing an exam or fulfilling a set of duties. This is by no means a new concept but is rooted in a republican tradition where freedom from domination and citizen participation are crucial features, and in a pragmatist one where experience is seen as crucial. As we shall show, the current understanding of citizenship is a disciplinary one, suggesting adaption and submission instead of liberation and experience. The revitalization of a somewhat political idea of citizenship is quite legitimized.

The second claim of this book should keep the first in focus – the fact that citizens do not naturally involve themselves in political activity does not mean that they do not care about society. The complaint that 'real citizens' are lacking, is a result of age rather than study. It can be found throughout history, uttered by philosophers of great standing. The citizen – the free and autonomous individual who participates in making the laws he himself obeys – has to be a universalist, someone whose eyes are constantly open with an enthusiasm for public affairs. But now, alas, owing to TV, modern citizens supposedly stay at home rather than participate in society (Putnam 2000: 283). All in all, the phrase 'social cohesion in decline' has the evolutionary strength of the crocodile. By the time Émile Durkheim had demonstrated that such a thing as 'society' existed, it was already in decline, according to the Polish philosopher Zygmunt Bauman. A group of people with a shared past, residency, and occasionally some conversation were indeed captivated by the term,

but emancipation, commercialization, and the demise of ideologies rapidly replaced society with disparate individuals linked only by their quest for their own selves (Bauman 2005: 360–381). In the same vein, the British historian Eric Hobsbawm stated that the word 'community' had never been used so meaninglessly as at the end of the twentieth century (Hobsbawm 1991: 428). Nostalgia, in the title of the French actress Simone Signoret's autobiography, is not what it used to be. We beg to differ.

Neither contempt for people preferring a more private life to an active public one nor striving for mere status for individual citizens help in understanding the current predicament of citizens. Debates on citizenship are not only about the minimal amount of public support one is entitled to, or about what one should do in public life, but also about who is entitled to support, who is entitled to give out this support, and who has the right to speak. Expectations of good citizens change but the world changes faster. In 2011 we work longer and the workforce is more variegated than it was in 1950. We communicate faster and more often than 60 years ago. We consume more and we know more. In the early 1990s the concept of a 'good citizen' had barely adapted to the possibility that different cultures could attempt to live side by side, whereas in the early 2000s hundreds of relationships can be maintained via the internet without having actually met the people concerned. It is not surprising that there is an awareness of decline. The frameworks in which we practice citizenship are not always instantly recognizable. In this book we understand citizenship as a culturally defined notion, historically shaped on the one hand but constantly under pressure on the other. Do's and don'ts of citizenship are prescribed by existing practices and co-opted and disputed by living citizens, whether they be policy makers, critics, politicians, or active or passive citizens.

1.1 Delegitimation of authority: citizen or customer?

Citizens today are not easily led; nor do they readily participate in the governance of society. In short, political representation has been delegitimized. This challenge to citizenship is evident in two overlapping spheres: the crumbling authority of traditional institutions and uncertainty over the relationship between citizen and consumer.

First, the authority of traditional institutions has come under fire. The rebellion against authority in the late 1960s and early 1970s ran deep in the Netherlands. The power-holders at the time were quick to accede to many of the demands for greater democracy (Kennedy 1995; Duyvendak 1999; Tonkens 1999). Since then, the informal democratization of Dutch society has continued apace – evident in, for example, the lack of distance between parents and children, teachers and pupils, doctors and patients, and politicians and citizens. Dutch citizens believe that they are mainly autonomous individuals who need no lessons from anyone (Tonkens 2008b; Van Stokkom 2010). While skepticism was first directed at the institutions of governance, it now even extends to the authority of scientists – whose opinions are regarded as one among many. Institutions with years of experience and prestige can be reduced – by admitting to error, or on the basis of a citizen's personal experience – to 'also' having an opinion, as was evident in 2010 regarding vaccinations and climate change.

This development is often seen as an unintended consequence of successful emancipation, of someone somehow omitting to teach basic decency to the political community. Emancipated subjects have become a different, bolder, and more selfish species. Aggressive behavior towards civil servants has become widespread. Citizens behave as 'citizen kings' (Van der Lans 2005), and even as 'louts' (Van Stokkom 2010). A recent study in the Dutch city of Leiden found that around 80 percent of citizens were offended by aggressive behavior directed at civil servants, while 40 percent were offended when the representatives of commercial firms were the targets of aggressive behavior (Hilhorst 2010). Ambulance personnel regularly report bystanders at accidents not stepping aside, and, when asked to do so, responding: 'I am not in the way' or 'I won't be able to see' (Hensbroek 2010). When asked which is more important, the right to free speech or the obligation to listen to the opinions of others, 71 percent of a reasonably representative sample of 134 Leiden residents indicated free speech. Among a group of 98 active citizens from the same city, 52 percent thought that people who 'govern' thus seem to be more open to persuasion. As market forces continue to gain ground and the distinction between public and private services weakens, aggressive behavior may be tolerated more.

Second, citizens increasingly see themselves as customers. This has been encouraged by recent policy. Customers do not participate in governance; they only need to make their preferences known and pay for services. The result is that citizens no longer consider the public interest (Keat *et al.* 1994; Marquand 2004; Clarke & Newman 2010); politics has been reduced to media spectacle (De Beus 2001) and citizens supposedly act only when their own interests are at stake (Dekker & Hooghe 2003). Above all, customers want their preferences to be attended to and to be well-served. 'We pay for it anyway' is often heard when an ambulance is sent needlessly (Tonkens 2010). Higher levels of education, expectations, and confidence make deference to authority problematic (Tonkens 2009a; Van den Brink 2002: 22–40). The increased demands placed upon citizens to be responsible for their own lives have had a similar effect (Tonkens 2008a). Since 2003 the Dutch Council of State in its annual reports has warned of confusing citizens with customers. 'The office of citizen now comes without duties', writes political scientist Rudy Andeweg in the national daily *NRC Handelsblad* (10 October 2007). That's the fault of the same government that is now complaining about the lack of citizenship. Compulsory voting in elections, military service, and jury service no longer exist in the Netherlands. The only obligation is to pay one's taxes. But this again emphasizes the customer relationship. The government says that the only thing it needs is one's money.'

There are several kinds of communities that citizens create or maintain under these conditions but they are mostly temporary in nature. Examples include demonstrations against public policy or marches to show outrage directed at dramatic events, such as instances of child abuse or a one-day commemoration of the death of a famous artist. It is important to note beforehand that all these communities perform some sort of unifying task. They are not necessarily meaningless or void. The 'traditional' community of a people standing in line at the polling station is in the end also somewhat temporal.

The dominant response to this delegitimation of public authority can perhaps best be summed up as the 'popularization of politics' or populism. Politics, more than the government, reaches out to listen to the people, claiming to follow their preferences and to speak on their behalf. Though often packaged as a dialog, the deligitimization of political authority implies a passive form of citizenship. Politicians

say what citizens want to hear. At the same time, they expect greater support from citizens to implement policies against public nuisance and crime, to keep neighborhoods safe, and to act as points of contact for local government. There is great uncertainty over the appropriate role of the citizen. Alongside their well-known social, political, and civil rights, do citizens have a right to effective, transparent, and responsive governance? Besides their duty to follow the law, do citizens also have duties to be active within political parties, to vote, to participate in meetings and assemblies, and to (temporarily) accept unwelcome decisions? How and when do people commit themselves to public affairs? What do they expect? What encourages their participation and what keeps them away? We take up this matter in Chapter 3.

1.2 Individualization and the public interest: citizen or individual?

The second phenomenon for which more citizenship is deemed the solution is excessive individualism – when people place their own interests above those of society. Twentieth-century emancipation from the authority of the church, the state, and one's parents led individuals to put themselves first. People have been taught to do this (Bauman 2001: 7–9) as our culture prescribes calculating behavior. Government agencies and private companies expect nothing less, with the social services, insurance companies, health-care institutions, and housing corporations now expecting individuals to shoulder many of their former responsibilities (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002). This 'individualization' revolves around choice: the 'right to exit' from traditional social bonds on the one hand and the unwanted demise of the institutions of the welfare state on the other.

Parallel to the social trend of individualization is the trend towards 'responsibilization', to promoting self-reliance – the shifting of responsibility from (withdrawing) government to (empowered) individuals (Garland 2001; Ilcan & Basok 2004). This accountability comes in two forms. First, restoring the public sphere must begin with a restoration of basic morality – with an emphasis on respectability, order, discipline, and cleanliness, and calling to account the welfare state's free-riders. It seems that politicians have a kind of immaculate

citizenship in mind, with good behavior magically emerging on cue, though correct behavior springs from the right mentality. The other form of accountability involves stimulating active citizenship in the neighborhood, at work, and at school: social work placements, various forms of social service, volunteer days, and local district budgets are all meant to stimulate citizens' initiative. Citizen involvement will deliver better results and is moreover morally necessary. 'Do it yourself', 'initiative', and 'personal responsibility' are the keywords in this effort to increase social cohesion through active citizenship.

Finding employment, housing, and education, choosing the right health care, child care, and pension schemes – all have become individual responsibilities. Citizens are deemed most empowered when they are self-reliant. The rights based on T.H. Marshall's notion of social citizenship (Marshall 1964) – which informed citizens' rights in the welfare state – only fostered dependency; the poor were invited to claim their rights but not to improve their life chances (Mead 1986). The unsung virtues of citizen initiative, self-sufficiency, and entrepreneurship have been rediscovered.

While promoting self-reliance was initially part of a neoconservative agenda, it quickly gained ground among progressive politicians as well. Some believed that a globalized labor market posed new threats to the less skilled, the elderly, and single-parent households, while supporters of the 'Third Way' (*die Neue Mitte*) argued that to better anticipate the unknown, the vulnerable had to be empowered (Giddens 1998). Others believed that bloated government bureaucracies only obstructed initiatives from below (Offe 1996). Promoting personal responsibility and choice among citizens thus found adherents across the political spectrum and has been a rock-solid part of virtually every Dutch government policy since the 1980s.

Citizens' communities that are connected with this development tend to be small rather than large, and informal rather than highly structured. As the cultural message is that independence is important, people will make an effort to define their activities in terms of social assistance to others rather than as protest or as a political activity, and in terms of self-deployment and fun rather than in terms of lifelong commitment. These light communities come in many shapes. Overlapping with our first theme, extreme individualism can also find expression in anti-social or selfish excesses, such as violence against

service providers and care workers, or refusing to participate in civic activities. We address this matter in Chapter 4.

1.3 Globalization and the culturalization of citizenship: citizen or native?

'You should feel at home.' This commandment is increasingly directed at immigrants and their descendants living in Western Europe, who are required to demonstrate their loyalty to the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, or Germany. In the words of former Dutch Minister for Integration and Immigration Rita Verdonk, immigrants continue to 'hang on to their own culture because their own Turkish or Moroccan bakers and butchers allow it' (*Metro*, 29 March 2007).

This development has everything to do with globalization, the third macro-sociological trend that has placed citizenship firmly on the political agenda. Social cohesion here is not threatened by the erosion of public authority or the atomization of society, but by the alleged lack of shared identity and loyalty. Immigrants in the Netherlands (and elsewhere) barely recognize the national anthem, let alone other residents as co-citizens. Politicians claim that people no longer feel at home in the country or city of their birth (Duyvendak 2011). 'More citizenship' is again bandied about as the solution. But good citizenship then comes to depend not so much on working, on paying taxes, or on voting, but on criteria such as religious and cultural practices, women's clothing, feelings of belonging and loyalty, experiencing the correct emotions at the appropriate moments – what we term the 'culturalization of citizenship'.

In many countries, including the USA, majority opinion is divided on controversial issues such as gender, sexuality, and family values. In contrast, almost the entire Dutch population supports progressive opinions on these issues. After a period of intense cultural polarization during the 'long 1960s', the Dutch majority adopted remarkably uniform, progressive values – as found by Eurobarometer, the European Social Survey, the European Values Study, the International Social Survey Program, and the Continuous Tracking Survey (SCP 1998; Uitterhoeve 2000; Arts *et al*. 2003; Duyvendak 2004; Halman *et al*. 2005; Mepschen *et al*. 2010). More than elsewhere

in Europe, most Dutch people believe that divorce is acceptable and homosexuality is nothing out of the ordinary. More than other Europeans, the Dutch disagree with conservative propositions such as 'women need children to be happy', 'children must respect their parents', or 'we were better off with a traditional way of life' (Duyvendak 2004). The gap in values between well-educated and less well-educated groups is moreover smaller in the Netherlands than in the rest of Europe (Achterberg 2006: 55). While such secular-progressive positions may be rare among the working classes in other countries, they permeate all social classes in the Netherlands (Duyvendak 2011).

The values gap between Muslim groups and the majority population is slightly larger in the Netherlands than it is in other countries, such as Germany (Demant 2005). In this respect the Netherlands is similar to Denmark, which can also boast of an 'enlightened' moral majority. But in Denmark as well, the secular-progressive consensus has (to put it mildly) not brought about the appreciation of diversity (Brouwers 2010). As Buruma aptly states, tolerance has its limits, even – or especially – for Dutch (and Danish) progressives. It is easy to be tolerant of people similar to ourselves (Buruma 2006: 128). It is much harder to extend the same principle to strangers in our midst who have different opinions and lifestyles.

Blaming liberal multiculturalism as a failed political strategy that did not bring 'integration' fueled a new search for cultural cohesion. What do different ethnic and religious groups within nations, cities, and neighborhoods truly have in common? How can they shape together the public domain and its democratic values? The most popular answer in the Netherlands in the past decade is culturalization of citizenship: the aim to increase a sense of belonging, of feeling at home in the Netherlands. What is stressed is not so much the traditional elements of citizenship – political, social, and juridical rights – but participation in the public domain, and knowledge and practice of Dutch traditions and customs. This type of culturalism seeks to strengthen the shared identity of both natives and immigrants through national citizenship. The view is not necessarily xenophobic; it asserts that grounding citizenship in the nation as a continuous entity is the best strategy to overcome cultural tension (Scheffer 2007: 401).

Next to popularization and responsabilization, this culturalization of citizenship is, in essence, a strategy to contain social tension.

We discuss this in chapters 5 and 6. The argument so far is summarized in the Table 1.1):

Table 1.1 The quest for citizenship

Citizenship as an answer to	**Globalization and the culturalization of citizenship**	**Individualization and the public interest**	**Delegitimation of authority**
Dominant unease among citizens	Struggle to feel at home: who belongs here, do I belong?	Struggle with freedom of choice: whom do I help, who can help me?	Struggle with authority: whom do I believe, who believes me?
Communities sought by citizens	Imagined communities, connected through shared symbols, history, language (the neighborhood, the nation, the Umma)	Light communities, connected through shared interests or beliefs (civil society, neighborhood committees, websites)	Volatile communities, connected by events (elections, commemorations, protests)
Direction of citizenship policy and politics	Culturalization: emphasis on shared culture; goal: national pride	Responsabilization: emphasis on individual responsibility; goal: self-reliance	Popularization: focus on speaking on behalf of the people; goal: obedience

1.4 Crafting, not dictating

Campaigning for 'more citizenship' or 'better citizenship' (in whatever form) by government hardly inspires lingering politicization of citizenship among citizens because this notion was not really present in the first place. Instead the more active citizens get closer to government because both their ideas appear quite congruent and the less active citizens remain at a distance from both government and active citizens. The lack of enthusiasm for productive conflict, fear of social arguments, and awkwardness when dealing with dissent keep citizens at a more than safe distance from one another.

The ambition to correct or steer citizens and keep clear of any confrontation is overwhelming compared with other options within the tradition of citizenship. Hence when asked for an alternative solution to matters of social cohesion, it is tempting to argue against the claims of government and the claims of decency, in favor of a hard-wearing 'republican' intervention in society, focused on the ancient tradition of dialog, interaction, debate, and the love for differences (Van Gunsteren 1998; Pettit 1999; Sandel 2009). As we shall demonstrate throughout the book, the political element of citizenship in policies, in public opinion and among citizens is indeed under-developed. This is not necessarily a new insight – political theorists have been warning about 'the political' being pushed aside by 'the social' for some time (Wolin 1960; Mouffe 2005). And when making their inventory of citizenship theory on the rise, Kymlicka and Norman already noted that they only saw two focal points among the scholars, 'the responsible citizen' and 'identity and difference' (Kymlicka & Norman 1994). At that time it was already as if citizenship had better things to do than make people argue. There were allowances to be reclaimed from lazy citizens and there was cultural diversity to be settled.

But any notion of good or decent citizenship will be a contested product of its time. Take, for instance, the social herd behavior mentioned previously: the fact that by far the majority of citizens willingly participate in some communities calls into question whether extra instruction can be demanded from them. With education already making a difference to active citizenship (the better educated make the bigger decisions), we might just focus carefully on more frequent or longer citizenship education lessons. The ideal of politically literate citizens can turn into another form of tyranny. Contempt for the life style of average citizens, who can prefer a barbecue with their friends or even a soccer match on TV to a city council meeting and still be in their right mind, does not contribute to making them more active. To what point do we really want, or need, to educate citizens as citizens? What is needed according to citizens to get along? Is it more social talent, more awareness of the political, or some ambition to set clear goals?

Crafting citizenship focuses on citizenship as a means of flourishing in society. In neoliberal and communitarian politics, citizenship is predominantly seen as a goal, the status of an individual, or as

a community member, but as we shall see shortly, results are sub-optimal. Demanding that people do things just for others (or for competition) has a demoralizing effect on them, whether it is about work or about belonging to society. Doing a job or caring for the community for its own sake is what craftsmanship is about. The American sociologist Richard Sennett points at the practice of combining efforts of body and mind to master one's work. Craftsmanship is a way into good citizenship, according to him (Sennett 2008: 268). The dialog between hand and head, master and apprentice, and between colleagues takes time and effort. There is no direct following of the rules in becoming a craftsman. One has to enter the workshop, go through stages of learning, and finally get to a point where one actually enjoys the techniques one has mastered to the degree that problems seem attractive rather than threatening. This workshop is not a comfortable home, but 'a productive space in which people deal face to face with issues of authority', where the 'unresolvable conflict between authority and autonomy plays out' (Sennett 2008: 53, 80).

So it is with citizenship. Understanding the art of dialog, knowing when to express certain emotions, finding one's way round bureaucracies – it is not like 'slow boring in hard board', as Max Weber maintained. It is a process of now taking a right, then a left turn, waiting for a while – whatever, as long as a straight line is not stubbornly followed. It is not surprising that the respondents in our research who proved to be the most skilled at different citizenship practices (and also enjoyed them more) were most of the time public servants. They often had vocational or academic training in that field, felt confident with even the most technical language, and could oversee other peoples' agendas. They were more or less 'proto-citizens' (Van Gunsteren 1992: 111).

In the following pages we try to reduce some of the high-minded notions about politics and social trends down to the point where they can be meaningful additions to a crowded, but rather uniform, debate on citizenship. To understand what citizens actually do and what can be asked of them from both a democratic and meaningful point of view, crafting stands opposite, dictating on the one hand and idly drifting on the other. Prescribing behavior in either social or political terms will reinforce existing practices rather than unite citizens under new conditions. Relying on individuals to define their idea of citizenship will give even more room to the energetic, if not

openly loutish, semiprofessional 'participants', while encouraging all kinds of socially isolated citizens to stay out of touch.

Crafting citizenship is a process, just as dependent on individual motivation as on imaginary outcomes on offer, on the language, ideals and techniques that masters of the trade express. Tacit knowledge has to be recognized. Throughout this book we see introverted citizens avoiding contact with strangers. They do not help a neighbor in trouble or attend meetings to discuss public matters. They expect the outcome of their action to be useless since they cannot imagine themselves doing such a serious job, and regard themselves as being too busy with work or the family. They do not lack a sense of duty or a desire for debate, but they lack the slow initiation into the permanent negotiating of city life and the different tools that can be used in these negotiations, or have experienced how their effort to do good was prevented by a public servant pressed for time. They lack the dialogue between hand and heart, the routines to confront tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge from others. Endowing these citizens with a (minimal or maximal) set of norms and duties will make little difference to their actual behavior. These inactive citizens have to come to believe instead that their efforts will make a difference, and that their suggestions will be taken seriously by more experienced citizens. When citizens see that they are needed, most of the time they will act.

Crafting citizenship is not just a job for apprentices. The decision to help out, vote, or march has to be safeguarded by the larger community. At least in two ways, through good institutions and public oriented politicians. The first can make it reasonable to act. The second can produce visions of the near future, which make it attractive or appealing to act. When citizens are invited to have a meaningful say, acting becomes a logical step together with the call to stand for election as a councilor and to make a difference. In a historical sense, this is vested in traditions older than modern parliamentary democracy. In a more practical way, this element of the past has created predominantly honest track records of public servants, people in the caring or welfare professions, or co-citizens. When local government organizes an opportunity for public discussion and does not digest the comments but proceeds as expected before, cynicism among participants increases. Although this is as predictable as the sun rising, it is still a reality in 21th century politics. Listening to

citizens is something more than taking them seriously, and crafting citizenship demands the latter. In our research we find citizens struggling with bureaucrats and vice versa, both with high expectations. Setting the track record straight, convincing citizens that they will be treated fairly, and almost literally inviting them over is a second crucial element in the crafting of citizenship.

Finally, the imagination of citizens or prospective citizens has to be aroused, just as craftsmen learn to fantasize about what they can do with their tools. It requires an outright assurance that difference of opinion is at the heart of every act of citizenship and that disagreement is acceptable. Just as crafting demands individuals to be receptive to the initiation rites of a craft association, it also demands that well-versed citizens create a horizon of tools and goals in terms of citizenship, rather than simply a target. Are citizens invited to participate as co-members of government or are they merely treated as passive recipients?

The lack of political elements in the current concept of citizenship is due to long-standing unease in societies like that of the Netherlands. Politics is to a certain extent presented in a somewhat negative way, as something underhand or the pastime of elite groups. This contempt for politics is echoed in the ways citizenship is discussed. In mid-2011 the Dutch Minister of the Interior, Piet Hein Donner, sent a revised review of citizenship to the Dutch parliament, in which he said: 'Government will have to confront citizens with behaviour contrary to the opinion on cohesion and citizenship and if necessary strengthen this opinion with legal obligations.' (Nota 'Integratie, binding, burgerschap, Ministry of the Interior, June 16, 2011: 13.) There was little dispute about his insight that citizens need instruction by government on how to be a good citizen. In a united movement away from neoliberal politics, policy makers from the left and the right found one another in a strong, culturally defined, and socially oriented idea of citizenship.

Crafting citizenship is about taking charge of one's life in society rather than taking care of the government's problems. From this viewpoint there is little reason to demand previous loyalty. One has to internalize the prescriptions of society, test what goals they serve and what they make impossible, and gradually become their owner. Our understanding of crafting should not be read as a prescription nor as an attempt at theory building, but as a way to understand

success and failure in bringing many people together in highly complex circumstances. Crafting citizenship is a process with strong elements of motivation and learning, but inclusion and exclusion are also heavily involved. There is no way that it can be understood without looking at clandestine or overtly visible power.

This book deals with this issue by examining beliefs and behavior of citizens themselves. In Chapter 2 we focus on the public climate concerning citizenship: dominant as well as minority opinions, and where they can be found. Against this background, we enter into conversation with citizens. Chapter 3 explores citizens' responses to the delegitimation of political authority and their views on their rights and obligations. Chapter 4 examines citizens' answers to the individualization of society and how they organize themselves. Chapters 5 and 6 examine how citizens respond to the globalization of cultural conflicts. Chapter 7 is the conclusion. It is not love that binds these citizens together, far from it. It is an honor that rests in mastering the work with resistant material – that is, their co-citizens.

Our approach is thus empirical as well as explicitly local. While the study of media and international comparison gives this work a multi-dimensional character, our focus remains on literally down-to-earth-citizenship. What people think and do about citizenship is, of course, not the whole story. And citizenship cannot end socio-economic envy, nor can it teach a national canon, nor deliver total freedom. But it might make citizens get along in public, which would be a great achievement.

2
The Construction of Citizenship in Public Debate

Citizenship means different things in different languages. The French *citoyen* (a participant in political life) needs to be distinguished from the *bourgeois* (someone who is satisfied with the status quo). In French, 'active citizenship' is at best redundant (Tonkens & Newman 2011). Americans use the term citizenship most often in the context of civil rights – of protecting citizens' freedoms from government encroachment (cf. Conover-Johnson *et al.* 1991: 812). In UK usage, 'citizenship' is close to 'nationality', while in German and Dutch the citizen is most often a decent person, someone who will be regarded as someone who is perhaps well-mannered but somewhat dull.

The Dutch critic Menno ter Braak (1902–1940) wrote in *The Carnival of Citizens* (1930): 'The citizen is on one hand a "citoyen", and on the other, a "Spiessbürger". He has "civil rights" and is also a "bourgeois". He is entitled to respect as well as to contempt' (1950: 20). In times of revolution and insurrection, citizens gain stature as the liberated, autonomous bearers of inalienable rights, equal to all others around them. But in daily life, the citizen is mostly a bourgeois: compliant and obedient, mindful of those duties that are generally expected of him or her. Perhaps dignified, perhaps simple, but above all decent, ordinary and realistic – the antithesis of the poet.

Until recently, most politicians and policymakers outside France and the USA made scant reference to citizenship. If one wanted to discuss cohesion within society, terms like community, solidarity, involvement and participation were more appropriate. But today, as we have shown in Chapter 1, the term is widely used by the media,

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governments, politicians, non-governmental organizations and citizens themselves. Before we turn to how citizenship is practiced in chapters 3–7, we first want to find out more about the exact meanings of citizenship in the public and political debate. It is against this background, by using vocabulary developed in the public sphere, that people define what it is to be a citizen. By analyzing the public debate in newspapers, we get a better understanding of these contexts.

2.1 The newspaper as an imagined community

The Irish historian Benedict Anderson describes how reading newspapers is one of the ways in which nations exist as 'imagined communities'. Because newspaper readers are simultaneously confronted by the same issues and events – and know this to be the case – they imagine themselves to be connected to each other, to be part of a larger community. All communities larger than villages are imagined, argues Anderson, and it is the style in which they are imagined that distinguishes them, not the question whether they are 'real' or not. Print languages added strongly to the self-consciousness of nations, fixating vernacular speech, creating meaning by covering daily social and political events. The newspaper structures a community through shared language and its coverage of events that are deemed important for 'us'. If the newspaper states something, it is not necessarily true but important enough to discuss.

> The significance of this mass ceremony – Hegel observed that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers – is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands or millions of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?
>
> (Anderson 1991[1983]: 35)

Of course, newspapers have given way to television and different kinds of electronic media as a means of communication. But the

imagined print community is far from extinct. Some 70 percent of the Dutch population over 13 years of age read newspapers on a daily basis; only 7 percent never read them, according to the 2008 Printmonitor of the National Research on Multimedia Institute. In the UK, 48 percent of the population read newspapers daily, while 74 percent read them weekly, according to the 2011 figures of the Newspaper Marketing Agency. In this chapter, we aim to show the public image of citizenship, not how average people think about it but the shape citizenship has when politicians, policymakers, ordinary citizens, and journalists meet in the public debate.

In what situations does citizenship come up as a solution and when is it a problem? What characteristics are mentioned as crucial to citizenship and what elements are not mentioned at all? Out of the public debate an image can be constructed, not a one-dimensional, unambiguous photograph, but a defined shape. When one reads constantly about the duties of citizens to help their co-citizens and seldom or never about the duties of citizens to fight a corrupt government, this creates a part of the image. When the duty to speak the national language is often emphasized but the right to use this language to express antagonistic opinions hardly rises to the surface of public debate, this adds to the image. When citizenship is invoked in debates on norms, values and education but hardly in debates on financial regulations, this again adds to the image. The resulting contours are a useful means of understanding the crafting of citizenship: the context in which citizenship develops.

To understand better why certain citizens are mobilized and others not, it is useful to look at the material they are actually working with; at the clay, so to speak, that is handed out to them when thinking about their rights and duties. The imagined community constructed by newspapers gives us a way to get hold of this culture, to pinpoint the vocabulary and agenda that are connected with citizenship.

We made use of the online newspaper archive Lexis Nexis, which can be searched using keywords. This method has its limitations: we do not know who has read the articles and what they thought of them, or how reporters and editors decided what was newsworthy. We also miss the articles that are dedicated to the rights and duties of citizens without mentioning the word citizenship. But we examine a period of 17 years and hence we can identify trends if there are any. And because we also examine the proceedings of parliaments, we can

see to what degree the trends in media coverage are random or driven by 'media logic' or by politicians. There is no point in trying to pinpoint one national or local understanding of citizenship via whatever means, be it a survey, be it a set of qualitative interviews. The notion will always consist of a rather broad set of ideas and emotions, some vague and some substantial, and the summary of this set can always be debated.

What matters to us are the questions invoked when citizenship is brought up as a solution. What claims are prominent and hence have certain legitimacy in the public domain and what possible claims are not so prominent or even missing and hence have little or no legitimacy? There will be no one-dimensional answer. The notion is moving in different directions at the same time. Whether fierce debate on the question of citizenship should be granted to immigrants or not can result in the more or less shared opinion that after a defined period or after certain test, immigrants do have a right to citizenship. At first sight, one could argue that citizenship has been broadened in terms of rights: there is more citizenship. But on another level, the whole idea of citizenship has been drawn in the direction of cultural adaption and degrees of similarities needed to share a certain right. In theory, at least, the debate could also have focused on, for instance, the enrichment of citizenship practices different cultures might realize or citizenship could also have been totally left out of the discussion. Hence one could argue there is more shared meaning of citizenship, but it has become more culturally defined and possibly other meanings have not been developed. As a tool, citizenship has become more defined.

We examine the UK and the Netherlands, two countries with broadly similar backgrounds in their discourses on citizenship. On Howard's Citizenship Policy Index – mainly consisting of different criteria for admitting immigrants – both countries converged between 1980 and 2008, when they were both characterized as 'liberal' (Howard 2009: 27). In the Migrant Integration Policy Index from the Migration Policy Group and the British Council, the Netherlands scores somewhat higher than the UK, but the differences between the two are smaller than, for example, between the Netherlands and Germany or France (www.mipex.eu, accessed 6 June 2011). And even though we might be skeptical regarding

some of the indicators of these indexes, such convergence makes the comparison interesting.

2.2 Just a word

Over the years, a marked increase in the use of the word 'citizenship' can be observed in all the newspapers (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). The peaks and troughs for the dailies are more or less similar. Apparently there is a larger force at work than the mere individual fascination of journalists.

When trying to understand this rise, we follow at some distance in the footsteps of Kymlicka and Norman (1994), already mentioned in Chapter 1. They show how the emergence of citizenship as an academic buzz word in the 1990s can be attributed to the rise of



Figure 2.1 Mentioning of the word 'citizenship' in Dutch newspapers and in the Dutch Parliament, Our sample included De Volkskrant, Trouw, NRC Handelsblad, and Parool between 1995 and 2007. A fifth newspaper, De Telegraaf, was added in 1999



Figure 2.2 Mentioning of the word citizenship in UK newspapers and the UK parliament

'republicanism' and 'communitarianism'. These are the two major responses to the impending bankruptcy of 'liberalism'. Both have a stronger developed idea of civic duties, against liberalism's central claim that individual rights are the core business of justice. According to critics, liberalism fails to address duty and it fails to address community.

Republicanism focuses on the political side of citizenship, on participation in local or national decision-making. A sense of shared meaning has been lost both in the relationship between citizens and their representatives and in the relationship between citizens and each other. Highly emancipated citizens consider the public realm as a part of their own sphere at best or do not give the public realm any thought at all. Reinstating the role of citizens in maintaining these relations will overcome the shallow heritage of liberalism, as far as republicanism is concerned. Communitarianism focuses on the

social side of citizenship, on the consequences of membership of the community. In this view, the liberal state impinges too much for citizens to follow their calling. When the state aims to solve all problems, it will suffocate citizens' initiative. On top of that, identity groups (immigrants or sexual minorities) use their rights to isolate themselves from society. Restoring the duties of a national or local community and those associated with these communities will overcome the loneliness and self-centeredness produced by liberalism. Liberalism's critics share a strong cultural undertone. Republicans assume that a minute yet crucial part of culture should be shared, namely that of political dialogue. Communitarians assume that a rather broad cultural program should be shared.

Can the recovery of citizenship in public debate be understood in the same fashion? Here we side step a bit from Kymlicka and Norman (1994). Rather than use broad theoretical categories to filter day-to-day articles, we evaluated the articles against the questions driving the policy focus on 'more citizenship' already mentioned in the first chapter: citizen or individual; citizen or customer; citizen or native. Is citizenship mentioned because there are problems with consumer-like behavior instead of conversing as a citizen, or on the other hand, with government obsessively dictating to citizens? Is the government too preoccupied with individualist behavior rather than encouraging citizens to help others or is it concerned that citizens have too few rights? Does it feel that citizens rely too much on an imported culture with few opportunities of bringing culture in the public domain? When other concerns were mentioned as important for promoting citizenship, the caption and introduction of the article was important. After all, it is the texture of the imagined community that we want to capture.

The category 'citizen or native' was present in topics such as immigration and the integration of immigrants, European integration, European convergence in laws, and the use of welfare policies. Under 'citizen or individual' we identified articles pleading for norms and values, but also the need for empowerment (of women and psychiatric patients), the right to independence or autonomy of individuals. Under the heading 'citizen or customer' we identified articles addressing mandatory voting in elections, the internet as an alternative arena for decision-making, corruption among politicians, the art or necessity of debating. Articles that only mentioned

the word citizenship in passing – for example, those that focused on foreign independence movements or the nationality of athletes and celebrities – were excluded from the analysis.

2.3 1995

A quick glance at the results (Tables 2.1 and 2.2) does not directly confirm the suspicion that in 1995 public debate on citizenship was more or less the same thing as in academia. The cultural question is more prominent than the social question and the political question is quite underrepresented. Especially in the Netherlands, one can question whether the whole mentioning of citizenship is meaningful at all, because the frequency is rather low. The word might occur in a newspaper twice a week. It appears to be just a word, not a concept that anybody can count on to communicate meaning. But the fact that the numbers go in the same direction as in the UK is worth a closer look.

At first sight, the most important thing to say about the use of citizenship in the newspapers in 1995 is that it is rather arbitrary.

Table 2.1 Interpretation of citizenship in Dutch newspapers, 1995

Thematic trend	Citizen or native	Citizen or individual	Citizen or customer
Number of articles	36	38	4

Note: 11 articles fell outside the above categories.

Table 2.2 Interpretation of citizenship in UK newspapers, 1995

Thematic trend	Citizen or native	Citizen or individual	Citizen or customer
Number of articles	136	51	21

Note: 211 articles fell outside the above categories.

It is only in comparison of the amount and direction of attention devoted to different social problems that we can discern the roots of citizenship's current characteristics.

The debate on the question of 'citizen versus customer' is clearly fought by other means. It is not that either government or society is unconcerned about their mutual interaction at that time, far from it. But they scarcely admit it publicly with the use of citizenship as a concept. The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) carried out a survey in 1992 study that presented an explicitly 'republican' idea of citizenship, to function as a 'barrier against unchecked power' (Van Gunsteren 1992). It is a categorical attempt to preserve citizenship as a political rather than a social concept. However, the claim was almost entirely ignored by the media the following year. A Dutch exception was the former Green-Left Party's campaign manager Maarten van Poelgeest, who stated that visions of citizenship would in the near future be the distinguishing feature of political parties, and who endorsed the WRR study (*Volkskrant*, 8 April 1995). Every now and then, the connection between 'the republic' and citizenship is made, but invariably in connection with either France or the USA, which are regarded as examples where citizens do know what their duties are.

In UK papers we found a letter to the editor in the same vein, written by Sue Christie: 'I was infuriated to read Nick Tate's political piece about education for citizenship. Education for citizenship should facilitate a critical awareness of the relationship between the citizen and the state. Its function, like that of education in general, should be to encourage independent learning and informed choice' (*Guardian*, 12 September 1995). It is not for the schools to promote social cohesion through citizenship lessons, but the task of government (Tables 2.3 and 2.4).

The debate on the question 'citizen or native' is more widespread but also not really easy to pinpoint on exact perimeters. The extent to which does one has to be loyal to the country one is living in, and the extent to which one can one be loyal to particular or (said to be) universal principles is not a very important matter at this moment. In both the Netherlands and the UK, citizenship was used in 1995 as a means to express concern for the rights of minorities in multicultural societies to live their own life. But it is more or less in a similar

Table 2.3 Interpretation of citizenship in Dutch newspapers, 2005

Thematic trend	Citizen or native	Citizen or individual	Citizen or customer
Number of articles	133	72	20

Note: 8 articles fell outside the above categories.

Table 2.4 Interpretation of citizenship in UK newspapers, 2005

Thematic trend	Citizen or native	Citizen or individual	Citizen or customer
Number of articles	268	236	44

Note: 366 articles fell outside the above categories (the majority concerned Guantanamo detainees with British citizenship).

frequency used to express the duty of immigrants to adopt certain practices of their new country. And next to this 'multicultural' topic, citizenship is regularly connected to membership of the European Union (EU) and the fact that citizens have to attempt to be members of both their own country and the EU. But nobody is really publicly claiming citizenship as a conduit for their message and that there is a choice to be made in terms of loyalty. There is also a policy problem that can be solved by having people adapt a more culturally developed idea of citizenship.

The debate is already a bit different with the question 'citizen or individual'. The ideal of individualism and its counterparts are played out every now and then in terms of citizenship. After all, these are the years of the 'Third Way', of 'New Labour' and in the Netherlands of 'the purple coalition': individual responsibility is cherished and to have responsibility one has to have rights as well. As of old, citizenship is one of the conduits of individual rights, most famously in the work of English sociologist Thomas Marshall, and it is inevitable that writers will use it in that sense.

The Dutch journalist Anil Ramdas, for example, understood citizenship to be 'based on work and study, career and property, family stability, respectability, decency, entrepreneurship, independence, responsibility, in short: individuality' (*NRC Handelsblad*, 9 September 1995). Anna Coote, Deputy Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research, likewise wrote: 'Health care should be a "right" of citizenship rather than "matter of privilege or luck", and a national commission must be set up to make decisions consistent across the country' (*Independent*, 22 November 1995). But these scant remarks arguing in favor of rights are not sufficient to draw any conclusion based on them alone. However, in 1995 quite a number of critics of exaggerated individualism used citizenship as their platform.

But the critics of individualism already have the upper hand in using citizenship. There is only a vague thread in the arguments already made, but it amounts to the reasoning that family and school should prepare citizens (to be) for responsible lives, implicitly or explicitly in contrast with the idea that the state should provide individuals with sufficient standing to take responsibility themselves. In the Dutch newspapers that we surveyed, sociologist Micha de Winter was the only one to explicitly advocate 'more citizenship' – by which he meant community-building, community self-management, and education for citizenship (*Volkskrant*, 9 January 1995). In the UK, Alan Beith, the Liberal Democrats' deputy leader and home affairs spokesman, stated:

> If our society is to be ordered, civilized and free, it requires resources for education, to end the failure and the sense of hopelessness which turn so many youngsters off society and into crime; and resources in education can be used to make sure that parenthood, citizenship and drug awareness are among the things on which young people get guidance
>
> (*Guardian*, 5 September 1995)

In a similar, more or less communitarian vein, the leader of the Dutch Christian Democratic Party, Enneus Heerma, pleaded that the family should be recognized as 'the cradle of citizenship'. Only there can virtue, thrift, and honesty be transmitted (*Trouw*, 21 September 1995). His critics at that time said that this was nonsense and the family is only one possible form of living together. But the claim

that a cradle for good citizenship was required and that citizenship consists of virtues such as thrift went undisputed. Parliamentary discussions at the time did not question the content or meaning of citizenship.

Earlier that year, the *Independent* had expressed its support of a UK government policy that basically agreed with the Dutch Christian Democrat: 'The ideas that Mr Blair was trying to express have been so unfamiliar for so long that even he struggles to put much flesh on them. They are represented by such words as duty, responsibility, public virtue, citizenship, civic pride, community. They were perhaps best expressed by Jane Jacobs in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*: "People must take a modicum of public responsibility for each other even if they have no ties to each other". When a child is scolded by a strange adult for running into the street or swinging on the straps of a tube train, he learns something that can never be learned from teachers or child-minders or social workers. Those people are paid to supervise children and 'the essence of public responsibility', wrote Jacobs, 'is that you do it without being hired'. At some point during the past 30 years, Britain lost touch with those ideas' (*Independent*, 27 March 1995).

Nicholas Tate, chief executive of the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority, agreed:

> Identifying the deeper social purposes of the curriculum helps to ensure that education for citizenship is an integral part of everything a school does. This insight is, of course, not new. It was there in ancient times. Plato's education system in *The Republic* ensured an appropriate preparation in 'citizenship' for his philosopher rulers. But it focused on poetry, music, geometry, arithmetic and dialectic, not on 'end of module' tests about voting rules in the Athenian Assembly or work experience with the Council of Five Hundred. As John Stuart Mill put it, 'men are men before they are lawyers, or physicians, merchants or manufacturers; and if you make them capable and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible lawyers or physicians'. In other words, education for citizenship consists of mastering the basics, acquiring sufficient knowledge and above all having a set of attitudes which emphasize the community as much as the individual.
>
> (*Guardian*, 5 September 1995)

All in all, looking backwards, one discovers the seeds of an idea of citizenship that would become more prominent over the following years. It is already far more social rather than political, much closer to Alexis de Tocqueville's 'habit of association' than Aristotle's ideas about governing and being governed. It is framed more prominently in critiques of the welfare state rather than contemporary critiques of multicultural society.

In terms of an imagined community, the newspapers do provide society with a well-developed notion that the relation between individuals and the state has to change, that people have to take both their own destiny and that of their co-citizens more into their own hands. But citizenship, as a means to an end or an end to a means, did not play a meaningful role in 1995.

2.4 2005

Ten years later, in 2005, the appearance of 'citizenship' in the newspapers has almost tripled. Readers now encounter the term in discussions, reports and commentaries on society and policy. This is the case even in popular newspapers like the Dutch *de Telegraaf*, which unambiguously shies away from abstract terms. The language of citizenship now informs concrete policies. Two thousand and five was not just any year in the Netherlands and the UK. In late 2004, a radical Muslim activist assassinated the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and emotions were still raw in 2005. In London, homegrown suicide bombers attacked the London Underground on 7 July 2005, causing 56 deaths and 700 injuries. (That same year, in France, pitched battles took place between the police and youths from immigrant backgrounds.) The multicultural debate has become one of the most prominent political topics.

Several new institutions to promote citizenship were also founded in 2005. While the projected Dutch Centre for History and Democracy never got off the ground, university chairs were established for Active Citizenship and Citizenship and Security. Innumerable local initiatives with names like 'Building Citizenship' sprang up across the Netherlands. Legislation and recommendations (by, among others, the Education Council, the Council for Culture and the Scientific Council for Government Policy) instructed Dutch educators and broadcasters to contribute to citizenship education. Citizenship was

also topical in the UK in debates about constitutional reform, the devolution of powers, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, and an elected mayor of London.

Two things stand out. First, the rising number of references to citizenship in the newspapers parallels developments in the Dutch second chamber and the UK parliament, suggesting that our sample of articles is broadly representative of the evolving discourse on citizenship at that time. We furthermore found newspaper coverage to be following politics, and not vice versa. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Education's 'course documents', the reports of the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau and the Scientific Council for Government Policy, the manifesto of the Liberal Party VVD, the European constitution, and the proposal for a day of celebrating democracy, all attracted media attention. 'Active citizenship' routinely featured on the agenda of the second chamber and was reported in the newspapers. The British government was similarly involved in commissions and proposals to bolster citizenship education: through the implementation of the 1998 Crick Report that called for the inclusion of citizenship in education; the conclusion of the Home Office that more citizenship was necessary to promote volunteering and social participation; and since 2004, the requirement that new citizens pledge allegiance to the sovereign and vow to uphold UK democracy within citizenship ceremonies. The many debates on 'governance', 'network governance', and 'the end of the nation-state', in spite of national governments and their institutions remaining key players in 2005.

Second, patterns that were only latent in 1995 had developed by 2005 into a recognizable vocabulary in which concerns about culture and duties were central. The question 'citizen or customer' has only benefited slightly from the rise of citizenship. But the questions 'citizen or individual' and 'citizen or native' are often answered in terms of citizenship. It is not the relationship with government that is at hand but the relationship with other citizens or the relationship with culture. And the reasoning of people using citizenship will not always allow them to make a rigid distinction between the topics that they are addressing. Fear of individualism and fear of cultural disintegration travel more often than not hand in hand. Shared emotions, history, religion, and subjective feelings of solidarity now define communities rather than legal status.

We see numerous calls to establish and teach norms and values and 'active citizenship' – increasingly directed at minorities and immigrants.

Citizenship is a fashionable term, susceptible to numerous interpretations. 'What does it mean in practice?', the *NRC Handelsblad* asked the chair of the Education Council, Fons van Wieringen. He replied:

> In primary and secondary education, it . . . is part of how we do things at school. It is for example reflected in codes of conduct, including, among others, the dress code. Students learn not only about rights but also duties. They enjoy the benefits of this society. By contributing to society, these benefits are realized. The knife cuts both ways: life at school becomes more pleasant and social cohesion is encouraged.
>
> (*NRC Handelsblad*, 17 January 2005)

'Active citizenship' is touted as the solution to too much freedom in society, understood simply as people doing only what they want. Left and Right agree on this point. 'Individual emancipation', wrote researcher Bas Stokkom in an article on the positive aspects of religion that the Netherlands once knew, 'is no guarantee of involvement and active citizenship' (*Trouw*, 26 February 2005). 'We stand for freedom, not individualism', explained Geert Dales, author of the VVD party's manifesto. In explaining what citizenship meant for his party, he explicitly referred to 'a long tradition' (*NRC Handelsblad*, 25 February 2005). 'We cannot continue with general references to the Judeo-Christian and/or humanistic roots of Dutch society and non-committal references to "good citizenship" ', wrote Andre Rouvoet and Egbert Schuurman, Members of Parliament for the ChristenUnie party (*NRC Handelsblad*, 12 January 2005). Instead, they advocated a 'Charter of Citizens' Duties' – the crux of which transcends self-interest.

Immigrants were rare among the Dutch authors and interviewees who had something to say about citizenship: only 25 in our sample, and then usually the more or less professional spokespersons of interest groups. The foundation Islam and Citizenship, for example, frequently offered its opinions when issues of citizenship were raised. 'Islam in the Netherlands, besides being a source of radicalization for

a very small group, is for most Muslims a source of inspiration for active social participation, responsible citizenship and charity', wrote Ramha Bavelaar (*NRC Handelsblad*, 15 November 2005).

In the UK, a commission to advise the government on the integration of minorities was set up in the wake of the July 2005 attacks:

> The task forces, set up after the July bombings, were asked to come up with ideas to help prevent British Muslims turning to terrorism, which would also counter a sense of alienation some Muslims feel from British society and institutions. The task forces consist of seven groups of Muslim MPs, peers, academics and community leaders . . . One proposal is that Islamic schools, or madrassas, should teach 'citizenship' in an attempt to tackle the conflict some young people feel between being British and Muslim'.
>
> (*The Times*, 20 September 2005)

Citizenship classes are often held up as the solution to the gulf between (radical) Muslims and the rest of society. Schools are required to teach 'active citizenship and social integration'. This ambition reaches far and wide. Head Teacher Janice Coomber explained:

> We felt that it was important for the children to learn about diversity and the issues faced by disabled people . . . From 2006, public authorities, including state schools, will be under a statutory obligation to promote positive attitudes towards disabled people. This may prompt more schools to include disability in citizenship lessons.
>
> (*Guardian*, 19 November 2005)

Citizenship should form an integral part of geography and history lessons to rejuvenate both subjects, the Chief Inspector of Schools said yesterday. In a lecture at Liverpool John Moores University, David Bell said that despite addressing the core skills, attitudes and values of young people, headteachers undervalued citizenship. In an attempt to restore interest in both humanities and embed the new subject in the curriculum, he called on teachers to link global news and historical events with citizenship teaching (*The Times*, 5 November 2005).

Those who want to see more culture in citizenship, school classrooms, and public life make short shrift of the reigning cultural permissiveness. As in this editorial:

> Citizenship is something we shy away from. It's not seen as terribly British to have citizenship days. But it does seem to have some value. 'We all belong to Canada' is their big slogan. When you move there, you receive a big pack stating, 'This is what you can expect from us and this is what we expect from you.' That is valuable. This rethink on citizenship was one of Cantle's main recommendations to the UK government – one that it has failed to take up.
>
> (*Guardian*, 21 September 2005)

This culturalization is not entirely a one-way street of prescribing to minorities how they should adapt to the majority. David Lammy, at that time Minister for Culture: 'I am very nervous at the haste with which multiculturalism is being sent to the knacker's yard, as if it had achieved nothing for this country'. He went on to say:

> It is all well and good to call for greater integration. But people from different backgrounds cannot integrate unless they have some sense of where each other is coming from, and they cannot acquire that unless they live in a society in which preparation for citizenship includes learning about the cultures and histories of others.
>
> (*Independent*, 23 October 2005)

The language of equality in the public domain and how to deal with differences can still be seen against pleas to adapt to the *Leitkultur*. Salman Rushdie writes in *The Times*:

> This is the question of our time: how does a fractured community of multiple cultures decide what values it must share in order to cohere, and how can it insist on those values even when they clash with some citizens' traditions and beliefs? The beginnings of an answer may be found by asking the question the other way around: what does a society owe to its citizens? The French riots demonstrate a stark truth. If people do not feel included in the

> national idea, their alienation will turn to rage. Chouhan and others are right to insist that issues of social justice, racism and deprivation need urgently to be addressed. If we are to build a plural society on the foundation of what unites us, we must face up to what divides. But the questions of core freedoms and primary loyalties can't be ducked. No society, no matter how tolerant, can expect to thrive if its citizens don't prize what their citizenship means – if, when asked what they stand for as Frenchmen, as Indians, as Britons, they cannot give clear replies.
>
> (*The Times*, 10 December 2005).

And James Harkin, columnist for the *Guardian*, says: 'The latest wheeze to come from the Home Office, the British citizenship test unveiled this week, will give candidates as many chances as it takes and a handy crib sheet… Citizenship was never supposed to be about facts or even common sense. But when something is in danger of becoming sclerotic, it pays to keep it frenetically active. One of the latest buzz words to emerge on both sides of the Atlantic is 'active citizenship'. According to the Home Office, active citizenship 'is about taking part'. Taking part in what? It is not entirely clear, other than to say that active citizens should make a 'direct and positive contribution to their communities'. This keep-fit theory of citizenship is all about doing your bit – part information junkie, part social worker, part activist, part nosy parker. It is a little exhausting, and I am not sure that it teaches us much about what it is to be a citizen. Just as it would make a mockery of the idea of a social contract between the government and its citizens to write it down and sign it, citizenship is not about facts but values and aspirations. The immigrant hordes who arrived in early 20th-century America, on their way to Ellis Island but with a hopeful glint in their eyes lit up by the Statue of Liberty, would hardly have needed multiple choice to express what they saw in their new home. Neither is citizenship about altruism. The revolutionary French who in 1789 appointed themselves citoyens did not do so because they wanted to do their bit. All this jumping through hoops – tests, ceremonies, geeing us all up into active, informed citizens – may be our way of distracting ourselves from the real problem. What we need is something to be a citizen about' (*Guardian*, 5 November 2005).

Also, the jargon of rights focused citizenship is still visible in the European debate and the place of citizens in the European Constitution. The emancipation of women and psychiatric patients also return with the same tone and frequency as before. More than in the Netherlands, UK newspapers make references to global citizenship – the idea that people, regardless of their origins, are part of the world community and that their rights and responsibilities derive from their humanity, not their passports. Christopher Wade, Director of Communications at the British Council wrote:

> The oppression of the Roma, the antagonism towards Turkish entry to the EU and growing support for the anti-Semitic Ataka party in Bulgaria and the anti-migrant Vlaams Belang in Belgium are all 'our' issues in a world community which looks beyond national borders to justify segregation at home. We need to bring the world into our classrooms, to develop a model of citizenship which is genuinely global, and to bring together our young leaders to find common cause in discussions about faith, identity, culture and modernity which their elders may lack the courage (and compass) to explore
>
> (*The Times*, 25 October 2005).

But these are the most explicit defenses of a more critical understanding of citizenship. What is all the more telling is that articles that doubt the usefulness of citizenship as such are scarce. In our sample of thousands of articles, only one states: 'Communism is back, now dressed in the fashionable jacket of "citizenship" . . . The idea is that all problems will disappear when all residents of the Netherlands are molded in this citizenship. This is an illusion' (A youth leader of the VVD (the conservative liberal party), *Trouw*, 26 April 2005).

2.5 A hardly contested concept

Citizenship has entered the public debate at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a response to migration and individualization, as an answer to questions framed around 'citizen or individual' and 'citizen or native'. Politics – not the media or society at large – has been in the driving seat with citizenship a vehicle for cultural or social cohesion, not for a democratic rebellion. This is hardly

'contested' in the sense that social scientists like to talk about 'essentially contested concepts', ideas one can reasonably never agree upon because they have a too deep history and a too large influence on individual life for everybody to agree on the same definition (Gallie 1956). Democracy, war, law, abortion are notions that qualify. But the argument on the public meaning of citizenship is contained in a more or less set domain. It is about the cultural and social behavior of individuals rather than about the political behavior of individuals or the behavior of institutions. It is about citizens relieving the government of trouble.

When the Dutch queen, speaking on behalf of government, mentioned citizenship for the first time in 1999, responsibility for good citizenship to take effect lay with the government: 'Good governance inspires active citizenship. It encourages involvement in public affairs. Reciprocity and trust will strengthen the foundations of the constitutional state into the next century'. But only a few years later, this responsibility had been placed on the shoulders of citizens alone, explicitly to discharge government. What was needed according to the government in 2003 were citizens who are 'self-reliant, mature and engaged, who do not in the first instance come to the government with their demands, complaints and appeals, but who take the initiative in self-organization' (Becker 2005: 66–69). In 2007, the Dutch center-left government expressed in its coalition agreement the intention to draft a 'Charter on Citizenship' in which 'accepting the basic values of society' and 'the willingness and ability to be part of a community and actively contribute to it' are central.

Citizenship has rarely been invoked to argue that people should become freer and think more critically, or that the discussion of differences may be the most viable solution to the problems of living together. In our imagined community, we work with an understanding of citizenship to discipline people rather than to set them free, to organize them rather than to emancipate them, to have them listen rather than to have them speak. 'Active' citizens are to relieve government of trouble rather than cause more trouble. Or as Bernard Crick wrote: 'Some government ministers are jolly keen on volunteering. Who dares deny its benefits? The Millennium Fund certainly increased the numbers of young volunteers, and anything measurable is, of course, valuable. Brown and Blunkett, in rare harmony, set up a Russell Commission on volunteering. But their interim

report had nothing about training volunteers in citizenship skills to act together. It is all about good citizenship rather than active citizenship . . . People feel far too secure and complacent about British democracy. That is why it is so unhealthy; why a few can get away with so much; why the gap between rich and poor is increasing (leaving not a protesting but a depoliticized underclass); and why market values, in the sweet guise of consumer values, stunt civic values' (*Independent*, 7 January 2005).

Americans often invoke 'individualism' to explain their behavior, even when such behavior is collectively sanctioned: for example, antipathy to higher taxes (Wuthnow 1991). Individualism thus stands for who Americans are, not what they actually do. Citizenship becomes similar in this respect. It is not so much a description of a practice, but an expression of what Dutch and UK people value, whether it be clean sidewalks or predictable behavior of strangers. Citizenship comes to the rescue of people who might sense a certain moral homelessness rather than of people looking to drill overactive public servants.

It is not that different meanings are disallowed or not brought up. But their numbers are too scarce to make an impression on the people pressing for more citizenship. Schools are a case in point here. Recently citizenship has been introduced in the legislative programs of both the Dutch and UK governments. Research is unambiguous. Its introduction is embedded in a discourse of anxiety over excessive individualism, undisciplined and apolitical youth, tensions between natives and immigrants, and urban violence (Leeman & Reid 2006) and critical-democratic conceptions of citizenship have fallen by the wayside (Veugeler 2007: 118).

Hidden in the imagined community we portrayed above, is a widely shared feeling that liberalism in its broadest sense has failed to bring about responsible citizens, a reproduction so to speak of what Kymlicka and Norman (1994) found among academics. Maybe too many different tools were handed out to citizens, and perhaps there was too little instruction, but in any case citizens have to be called to order again.

Nationalist, conservative, social democratic and republican thinkers, policymakers and politicians alike find themselves uneasy over lack of citizen activity, migrants, pupils, urban dwellers, parents, voters, teachers, and athletes. However, enthusiastic advocates

of local activism and conservatives arguing for the introduction of an obligatory national canon might despise one another; they are united in the idea that citizens have to do something, to eventually become active. It is not that they are against freedom, but passivity is ruled out as an option. Dialogue, yes please, but dialogue on the continuity of our culture, on the continuity of our policy plans, on the continuity of our community.

From a perspective of crafting citizenship, this set of tools leaves something to wish for. 'Citizens talking back', more or less the mirror image of 'the citizen as customer', is hardly touched upon in the current debate and hence omitted from the public image of citizenship. But the crafting of citizenship requires that the arguments be made possible in that domain – of citizens disagreeing with their activity in society in the first place, because they prefer to stay at home. There are some citizens who disagree entirely with society, because they think no one should be in charge or God should be in charge. There are others who distrust government on a very emotional level, because they have only had only negative experiences so far.

One might call it the 'republican' element of citizenship or the political element in the spirit of Hannah Arendt or Jürgen Habermas. One can also see it from a 'pragmatist' perspective, in line with John Dewey or Richard Sennett. But the point more or less remains the same: citizens have to learn to negotiate their environment. Conflict, disappointment, disagreement, and tension are unavoidable and durable elements of this process. The fact that these elements are more or less filtered out of the debate is at least harmful in theory for two reasons. It sets the citizens apart who disagree at large with their surroundings and it hinders the practices of the active citizens. The first group finds itself more or less delegitimized because their opinions are at best undervalued but most probably ignored and the second group will consider social rather than political strategies to channel their common ambitions. In the next chapters we shall look more closely at these phenomena, of citizens actually arguing with one another (or not).

The inevitability of societal stress, or the 'steady diet of conflicts' (A. Hirschman quoted in H. van Gunsteren 1998: 178) is all the more important to form part of the citizenship equation when one longs to leave behind the trivial focus on liberalism interpreted as

forever enlarging the rights of citizens. There are good reasons to think seriously about citizens' duties or about the stability of the community. But when defining ourselves as 'story-telling beings' in contrast to mere profit seeking individuals, as Alisdair MacIntyre (1981) does, discontent and anger inevitable will be a part of these stories. When talking about ourselves as 'democratic citizens' in the sense that Michael Sandel (2009) does, an continuous struggle about abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty, and other important questions are the bread and butter of public life. But these critics of liberalism apparently fail to bring forward an attractive or a productive take on politics, as what remains of their good intentions in public debate is predominantly a call to adapt.

3
The Delegitimation of Political Authority

3.1 The end of duty

Bridging the gulf between citizens and politics – or government and the governed – is an old theme. Free citizens who alternately exercise the art of rule and thereby become fully human was the core of the classical Aristotelian notion of citizenship (Aristotle, *Politics*, III). For Aristotle, the essence of citizenship is to both rule and be ruled. A proper citizen both commands and obeys. The qualities of the ruler differ from those of the subject, but good citizens practice both. Citizens exercise both rights and duties to maintain the polis; they weigh disparate interests and make their decisions on the basis of what is good for the political community. By exercising their rights and duties to govern and to execute the decisions of others, citizens acquire virtue and wisdom, while only those who have learned to follow can themselves become good leaders. It is well known that the governance of society through public meetings, juries and the city council was not for women, children, slaves, laborers, or foreigners. Full citizenship was reserved for propertied men. Today, we think of citizenship in an all-inclusive manner, with everyone having the right to be a full citizen. Citizens do indeed claim the right to rule, but how about being ruled? Political authority is contested. It is, of course, no longer based on gender or property, but are newer bases for authority such as representation or expertise contested too?

Two developments complicate the exercise of democratic authority. First, a general trend of further societal democratization, with

M. Hurenkamp et al., *Crafting Citizenship*

more horizontal relationships, and an increased demand for the accountability of authorities. Second, there is the rise of the citizen-consumer. Governments have been customizing their services to serve the citizen-consumer (Newman & Tonkens 2011). Citizens, in response, position themselves as customers of government services. They demand to be helped first and fast. They tend to see the connection between themselves and government in terms fulfillment of particular desires. Authority apparently evaporates and not only elected representatives experience difficulties in exercising authority, but also bus drivers, police officers, teachers, social workers, and other professionals. Loutish behavior (Van Stokkom 2010), selfishness, and the overly-emancipated citizen predominate (Kunneman 2005). Citizens now have less sense of duty than previous generations. They are used to claiming their rights but unwilling to fulfill their duties toward the public good, of which respect for authority and participation in decision-making are prominent characteristics.

The political answer to this delegitimation of authority is twofold. The first is to popularize politics. Local councilors attend citizens' breakfasts or citizens' dinners to hear what is really going on in their lives. Many politicians cultivate an image of being one of the people, distancing themselves by word and gesture from the negative images citizens have of politicians and government and criticizing elites for ignoring the needs of ordinary people. Some elites are represented as pursuing some hidden agenda instead of the public good. These elites are not part of the citizenry but a clique merely interested in power. Immigration policies are the most prominent target here but housing, income and environmental policies also feature. 'Real citizens' suffer from multiculturalism, crime and rising prices, whereas, in the vocabulary of a prominent populist politician like the Dutch Geert Wilders, a small elite profit from them. It is by no means a strategy reserved for anti-immigration politicians. Alexander Pechtold, while he was Minister of Interior and considered to be a somewhat liberal politician, disclosed in an interview that politics was merely a dirty game. 'Ministers are more dreadful with each other than anyone else. Behind each other's back . . . it's all much dirtier than people think' (*Opzij*, February 2006). The assumption here is that average citizens are intelligent enough to see that politicians fool them. Straight talk and distance from the murkier parts of decision-making are the solution and this resolution is in the hands of politicians, not of citizens.

Once the message is clear and the process is just, citizens will follow again.

The second response from politics and policy-makers to consumerism is to put citizens in more responsible roles: to set up practices that demand responsibility rather than consumerism. Policy interventions since the 1980s have focused on pushing back citizens' claims of rights. Both the Left and Right (in the Netherlands as in the UK) emphasize that citizens have duties and must be willing to contribute to their communities. Interactive and deliberative experiments are carefully designed to have citizens have their say in decisions on the location of airports or the building of new neighborhoods. Sometimes they are designed carefully, sometimes not. Events such as the annual 'Democracy Week', the 'House of Democracy and the Rule of Law', and the translation of the Constitution into everyday Dutch are put on to bring high politics to normal people. Such listening and translation, it is thought, will bring about greater citizen commitment, and will bring greater esteem for government authority, which in turn will stimulate greater citizen involvement. Recent years have witnessed more attempts to encourage citizens to organize themselves in citizens' initiatives (Hurenkamp *et al.* 2006; Tonkens 2010), with or without financial support from the government (Tonkens 2009; Tonkens & Kroese 2009; Tonkens 2010). Given the number of panels, public consultations, focus groups, information sessions, best practice sites and other attempts by local and national governments to develop transparent and interactive policy, it is perhaps no exaggeration to speak of an obsession: participate, participate, participate, or be silent forever.

So we find politicians and policymakers fine-tuning the message or fine-tuning the decision-making processes to stop citizens from being customers. Populist leaders hope that citizens will listen more attentively and re-inventors of democracy hope that citizens will decide to take more and take more responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. It is hoped that this will reconnect citizens to the public good, stop harassing officials and reprimanding politicians, and somehow revive their sense of duty.

But how exactly are these issues related in the minds of citizens themselves? What explanations are there for the customer like behavior that hinders appropriate practices of citizenship? Is it true

that 'modern' or 'highly emancipated' citizens lack a sense of duty, that they no longer care for public causes? Does the image of the 'too-demanding citizen' exhaust the issue of citizenship in the early twenty-first century?

3.2 Survey data

A caveat is in place here. When measured in large-scale surveys, trust in politics and government appears to be less problematic than often portrayed in media reports or in politicians' speeches. It is useful to compare some data from the UK and the Netherlands. The surveys differ and they took place at different times. The findings are only linked in indirect ways. Hence the comparison is meaningful for exploration rather than as factual statement. But this does not resolve the doubts the results cast on a completely negative view on the relationship between citizens and government.

Seventy percent of the Dutch population are satisfied with governance at municipal level, while half are satisfied with national politicians (SCP 2009b: 30). Among citizens in 2008–2009, only 61 percent had confidence in the church and 34 percent in the municipality (Citizenship Survey Empowered Communities 2008–2009: 39). The Dutch have greater trust in other institutions such as businesses, unions, newspapers, and the media than politics (SCP 2009b: 36). But while the Dutch have more faith in their politicians and government, they are less politically active: 37 percent were in some way politically active in the preceding five-year period, while 47 percent of UK citizens had involved themselves in politics only in the preceding year (Citizenship Survey Empowered Communities 2008–2009: 12; CBS 2011: 137–139). Over the preceding five years, 11 percent of Dutch people had tried contacting a politician, while only 4 percent had approached a political party or organization. In the UK, 31 percent of citizens had approached regional politicians, 29 percent local politicians, and 18 percent their Member of Parliament. Participation in government-organized meetings also varied significantly: 9 percent of Dutch citizens measured over the preceding five years, 30 percent of UK citizens over the past year. More UK citizens also took part in demonstrations. Only turnout in the 2004 European elections was virtually identical in both countries, at 39 percent.

Less than 2 percent of the Dutch population were members of political parties in 2008, a 30 percent decline since 1978, according to the Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties. Other European countries have witnessed similar trends. The UK had more than 3 million political party members in 1960, but only about half a million in 2008, or less than 1 percent of the population. The decline was evident not only in party membership but in election turnouts as well (Marshall 2009: 10).

While British citizens are more politically involved, the Dutch are more active socially. Here, the Netherlands is a leader in Europe, just below Sweden and well above the UK. Some 84 percent of the Dutch population belong to social organizations; the figures for Sweden and the UK are 93 percent and 56 percent respectively. Some 48 percent of Dutch and 50 percent of Swedes do voluntary work, compared with 33 percent of British citizens (SCP 2009a: 244, based on Eurobarometer 62.2). Of interest here is the discrepancy between Dutch citizens' reported satisfaction with their own lives and dissatisfaction with society at large (SCP 2009b: 29). More than 90 percent of Dutch citizens feel that their fellow citizens are egocentric. The leading social concern is safety, followed by concern for society (solidarity, tolerance, understanding, and discrimination), immigration and integration standards, and then other values (such as decency and selfishness). Some 72 percent of Dutch citizens feel that their compatriots are less and less respectful of one another (SCP 2009b: 34).

So in contrast with the UK people, we find the Dutch socially rather than politically active and suspicious of their co citizens. They stand slightly aloof from the political process but expect politicians to solve their problems nevertheless. In the same disconnected vein, they see themselves as rather social or oriented on the common good, but distrust their co-citizens on this agenda. Hence there is a strong suggestion that rather than an individual commitment to public causes, tension arises from relations between citizens or between citizens and officials.

3.3 Focus groups

We now turn to our research to focus groups. Due to the fear that the 'average citizen' has disappeared, classifying citizens into groups has been very fashionable in the Netherlands in recent years. Whether

this fear is justified remains to be seen – the following chapter will reveal the unmistakable herd behavior that also characterizes modern Dutch citizens. But the perception that citizens remain poorly understood has meant that in addition to the classic distinction between active and inactive citizens, further categories have been introduced, such as 'threatened', 'resigned', and 'industrious' citizens (Van den Brink 2002: 80) or 'responsible', 'conscientious', 'pragmatic', and 'detached' citizens (Commissie Toekomst Overheidscommunicatie 2001: 27). The problem with these types of classifications is that they are static. They describe groups on the basis of dominant traits, but reveal little about how people reason and how their arguments sharpen, soften, evolve, and change in their interactions with others.

In order to reconstruct these dynamics, we put together five focus groups in two cities, from among active and not-so-active citizens, religious and non-religious citizens, working and jobless citizens. We identified three broad lines of reasoning in how they approach public matters, ranging from relatively simple questions such as 'Would you knock on a neighbor's door when you have not seen him for weeks?' to 'What do you think your duties are?' The keywords that defined the different debates among participants are 'caring', 'talkative', and 'passive' – not necessarily because the people themselves were caring, talkative, or passive, but because these qualities were what they expected from their fellow citizens and the government. The 'caring' style was exhibited by those we term the 'doers' – people who gladly get involved in neighborhood affairs. They will help others and expect help back and have little trouble with government demanding their help as they might demand the same thing from others. The loquacious style was on display among the 'talkers' – people who are happy to discuss when differences of opinion arise, but who might be hesitant to actually do something. Finally, those individuals whom we term the 'divers' mainly want to be left alone, because they have other things to do than care about society and consider other people more competent to do the job.

3.4 Talkers

We begin with the loquacious group, that of the talkers. Respondents we identified in this group, saw many injustices in the different propositions made in the focus groups. Therefore they saw many

opportunities for action, however mostly through conversation. They did not readily identify with other people – in this respect they were detached, cautious and considered. They felt more at home within large or 'transient' communities than within established neighborhoods. They thought understanding preferably precedes action. Below and in the following pages we take some distinctive parts of the minutes of the focus groups to illustrate our claims. In the appendix, the whole list of questions can be found as well as the way the focus groups were organized.

Moderator: It is often said that citizens have both rights and obligations. What do you think these are?

– I don't think you can have one without the other, you can't only have rights as there are duties. And only duties would not work because you also have rights, there is I think a kind of balance. If that is not there, if there are only duties then you have a sort of technocratic, centrally run society and if there are only rights there would be too much freedom, too much freedom of choice. I think that some regulation, as we have in the Netherlands, is only natural. If several people need something together, I think some regulation is necessary.
– I think we are a country committed to many rights and obligations; as a Western country we are not much better than France or Germany or any other West European country. I think there are a lot of written rules containing all kinds of rights in various fields, from education to social benefits, and I think the public debate now taking place also concerns many other things besides the rights on paper that we all know, or don't know, about. I think that is more the story you're talking about, call it decent citizenship, how we interact, how we want it, whether or not we empty our ashtray at the traffic light, thinking it will blow away or that it will be cleaned up. All this has to do with the unwritten rules of decency. We all know of examples, from dog shit on the sidewalk to noise disturbance. That is all, in my view also, how people in a country with many people living close together heed the unwritten rules of interaction. How we communicate with each other, there arises the tension, the irritation, whether it is the dog shit or children kicking the ball against the window.

– That is because the unwritten rules are what your personal norms and values are . . . which may not be the same as one's civil rights and obligations . . . I can think that I must help an old lady cross the street but there will be ten thousand young people who will walk by and not help. So it very much depends on the norms and values that you inherit privately.
– There you're right, education is central. If you never learned that kind of behavior at home, it is not in you, you don't see and do it.
– Because it is unwritten, we have a number to call when people are fighting and for all such calls, and the advertising campaigns being conducted because it appears that there is a loss of norms and values associated with such rights and obligations.

Moderator: Make it concrete please?

– I completely agree, [with the previous speaker] I think norms and values are the basis on which a society is founded, and for these, you can see them very differently, I think the collective is dissolving, becoming more individualistic, each goes his own way, it's striking that everyone has their own rights and obligations derived from his norms and values, and what strikes me, because you yourself just quoted Ella Vogelaar, if you look at the whole Judeo-Christian tradition, and I am completely irreligious, atheistic, if you look at norms and values, if you look at the Ten Commandments, which are obviously unwritten rules that apply to a number of things, and look there to make the rules. Coincidentally, yesterday there was a small column in the newspaper about a driver who was pelted with eggs and who immediately took out his knife, it was only a very small column while a few years back it would have been front page news, that's a norm that has been a long time in the coming. For me, rights and duties begin with norms and values.
– My first inspiration is that when I think about rights, I think of legal rules, and when I think about duties, I think of unwritten rules that are culturally determined, not only when things go wrong but also when things go well, when norms and values are self-evident, are Dutch, maybe it is not a duty but you feel that you get to know your neighbors and that just happens in most places, this is my first hunch.

- I also see rights and duties as the framework for organizing society, and in my view it particularly concerns the interpretation of how far which people can make use of which rights, and which people have what duties, and I myself sometimes feel that there is a certain imbalance in that there are people who derive rights based on existing legal rights and impose duties on others based on the same framework, which in my opinion sometimes creates an imbalance in society where people do not feel responsible, and that might be the formal side of things but it obviously has to do with the feeling you have about the rights and duties which may or may not also apply to you . . . I sometimes find it difficult, for example, when you read in the Saturday Volkskrant that everyone has the right to work, but there are nevertheless many people who slip through, which I find harrowing.
- For me duties are something intrinsic to the people who choose them, so it has little to do with norms and values, and rights are something that you get from others, and that I think is a whole separate relationship between the two, and I get the idea that we are developing, have developed, much more of a legal culture, and from this derive all kinds of rights and thus the same obligations to others . . . The rights that are described as universal legally oblige others to me, while I have rights and an obligation to others.
- I indeed also think that they are very clearly linked, now . . . you have the right to work, which automatically implies a duty that you do your utmost to find work . . . I sometimes see in my workplace groups who believe they can receive their rights, but then sit back and wait for others to do the work.

The talkers underlined the necessity of dialog, consultation, and the showing of respect, and valued tolerance as an end in itself. It was hardly surprising that policymakers were prominent among them: Dutch policy in recent decades has been permeated by the idea that dialog with society is crucial, whether through referenda, public consultations, interactive policy making, or forcing public services and institutions to be more responsive to the public. Thus policy makers reproduce this language. The manner in which they approached the various social dilemmas we presented them revealed

three priorities: first, we need to keep talking to understand each other's motivations; second, we need to understand that not everyone is the same; third, as citizens, we are not only responsible for our neighborhoods, but also for the country, its institutions and culture.

It echoes the academic tradition of 'republicanism' or, as of recent, 'neorepublicanism' (cf. Pettit 1999; Van Gunsteren 1998; Sandel 2009). To be a citizen, this line of thinking is one's primary duty, solemnly stated as 'office of the citizen'. Natural persons and citizens are not synonymous: one is a father at home and an accountant at work. Only in conversation with people on the street or with the government does one become a citizen: morality is grounded in the public domain. Dialog is the highest good. Neither the state, the church nor the military can demand absolute loyalty. People living in neighborhoods, cities, and countries are only part of 'communities of fate', and must relate to one another, whether they like it or not. How they do this constitutes citizenship, which can be pursued anywhere – not just in the market place or in parliament, but also at work and in the street.

Reproducing citizens is at the core of what government does – ensuring, via education and public institutions, that the plurality of citizens is organized in such a way that allows them to pursue their own projects peacefully. On the one hand, there is appreciation for classical 'high politics' – of discussing matters of public good. On the other hand, there is concern for its dictatorial side, the possibility that someone or a group of people will prescribe what this general interest is.

> The stress on transformation is at the heart of a strong democratic conception of politics. Every politics confronts the competition of private interests and the conflict that competition engenders. But where liberal democracy understands politics as a means of eliminating conflict (the anarchist disposition), repressing it (the realist disposition) or tolerating it (the minimalist disposition), strong democracy also aspires to transform conflict through a politics of distinctive inventiveness and discovery. It seeks to create a public language that will help to reformulate private interests in terms susceptible to public accommodation.
>
> (Barber 1984: 119)

Hence citizenship at least in theory is highly situational. Republican conceptions of rights and duties are informed primarily by practical experience. Proximity to others requires a certain mastery of the art of living together. However globally oriented we may have become, citizenship arises at arm's length. It arises in the neighborhood through dialog, and is assessed by coverage in the media. And though the moral compass of traditional institutions like the church or political parties may have waned, greater authority is now in the hands of individual citizens.

And indeed, our talkers assume that they have a role to play in the community, that society must be well organized, and that to attain this, one must interact with others. Citizenship requires engagement. They believe that society requires dialog and commitment above agreement over language, nation, or history. They discussed at length civic obligations such as getting to know one another, the duty to work, and to observe the unwritten rules of social conduct. Neighborhood poverty, freedom of thought and speech, the right to protest, to vote, to be heard by government – although they were mentioned, these were not really issues that needed attention in their opinion. Talkers felt they had to emphasize the consequences of having rights, that one could conceivably have too many rights, and that they needed to be balanced by recognition of the rights of others.

The enduring criticism of republicanism is that it is much more accessible to educated white people than to groups deemed to be 'different'. The emphasis on common sense and rational deliberation is held up against impulse and emotion (Young 2011: 117), while the suspicion that others – fellow citizens rather than members of the government – do not know what their duties are creates distrust. This was indeed highly visible among the talkers who did not invest much energy in thinking about why other people might not like dialog. If the belief in the efficacy of dialog is not shared, their repertoire is quickly exhausted. Distrust and disdain for citizens less disposed to dialog takes over, favoring the more duty and action-oriented 'doers'. Actually attendance at neighborhood meetings was considered a bridge too far for several of the talkers, as they knew or suspected it might be a waste of time, Helping an isolated neighbor was not too popular because one could easily invade his or her privacy. The lesson to be assimilated this point is that mere desire for interaction will not create bonds with people who are afraid of

interaction or too busy for interaction or who simply dislike talking to strangers.

3.5 Doers

In the other meetings, both active and inactive citizens rarely managed to discuss rights for long. They were often unaware of them. The right to vote, to protest, freedom of expression – these were hardly mentioned, and only after prompting, never spontaneously. The discussions quickly gravitated toward duties: that people must abide by society's written and unwritten rules so that they can live together. Take, for example, the focus group of Amsterdam residents from immigrant backgrounds active in secular organizations. In contrast to the talkers, their loyalties clearly lay with their neighborhoods and ethnic communities, not with an abstract 'public'. They belong to the group we call doers – rather active citizens who want to get ahead in life and who willingly contribute to the lives of those close by.

Moderator: It is often said that citizens have both rights and obligations. What do you think these are?

– I think I must perform my duties to claim my rights. My duty is to pay taxes, pay for everything, so that I can claim my benefits. If there is a war then I can go to the front.

Moderator: And the rights that accompany duties?

– Right to my house and to medicines, doctors.
– Yes, right to education, right to medicines.
– Respect of my beliefs too.
– The duty to send your children to school.
– Yes, and you have a duty to work for society. If you can work then I think it is your duty to work. You have a duty as a citizen to do what you can and not to rely on others. Financially, but also in other areas, especially if you can contribute to society. I think it is your duty to do so unless that is not possible for some reason.

On average, the educational level of the doers was lower than that of the talkers; their dialog was certainly less wordy and

abstract. Their position is echoed in the academic literature by that of 'communitarianism'. Communitarianism's point of departure is discontent with modernity and the uprooting of people it entails. Urbanization, migration, industrialization have destroyed established communities without creating new ones in their place. This explains the frustrations of so many people, the rising incidence of crime, schools failing in their mission, lack of faith in the public good, people complaining about their rights without knowing their duties. The moral voice of the community has been lost (Etzioni 2001: 186–206). Communitarians criticize liberals for ignoring that people derive their identities, meanings, and goals from their families, neighbors, colleagues, and communities. Human beings, they argue, are not rational choice animals, but make their decisions based on our ties with significant others. It is never about justice in general or people in the abstract, but about private cultures, histories, and memberships (Walzer 1983: xiv, 5). Liberalism's incessant focus on individual rights has furthermore deprived us of the context that we need to do anything meaningful in our lives. Inevitably, there are people to whom we feel closer. The active citizens in our focus group, the doers, mostly would easily identify with the need to help people closest to them, whether neighbors or relatives. Actually asking why this was a duty was frequently answered by a shrug.

Again, the focus of conversation on the topic of rights routinely moved quickly to duties. At the time of research, public debate was raging over 'norms and values'; respondents were certainly aware that the (alleged lack of a) sense of duty among citizens was a politically charged issue. This may well have played a role. And while participants seemed to speak their minds, popular terms from public debate always seeped through. Nevertheless, the length of their answers, the examples they gave, and the spontaneity with which they approached one subject (duties rather than rights) made their answers meaningful for our argument.

These doers did not at that time exhibit the so called 'calculating behavior' – the claiming of rights for financial assistance, social housing, healthcare, attention, and 'air time'. Rather they were ill-prepared to discuss their rights – partly because they barely knew what they were, but also because they wanted to focus on duties (of others). The social discontent measured in surveys can at least partly be explained by this uneasy handling of citizens' rights. Having

rights but not knowing how to express them, having rights but knowing that one is not supposed to talk about them, having rights but fearing that they are undeserved, do not produce happy individuals. In a society where the leading criticism is that citizens are too demanding, persuasive, and selfish, it is relevant to note that the 'doers', like the 'talkers', are better able to articulate what is required of them than what they themselves would wish. The same sense of helplessness was also palpable among the 'divers', to whom we now turn.

3.6 Divers

If the doers already have a hard time formulating their rights and quickly change the topic of discussion to duties, how do those who are not involved in society fare? We term this group the divers as they plunge away from society, either because they are too busy with work and family, or because they feel threatened by it. If this reasoning holds, this group should also emphasize duties over rights. The following conversation ensued in one of our focus groups among people who

Moderator: It is often said that citizens have rights and duties. What, for you, are citizen's rights and duties?

- One of the most important duties is to behave normally. To not be a nuisance to your fellow citizens.
- I think charity, for as you love yourself, you want other people to be good and kind to you, then you will also be kind to other people. What you desire as a person yourself, you must also direct to society. But this is not always easy.
- That you treat each other respectfully.
- That is a great good, to show your respect for your fellow man. You don't even have to like him.
- In my opinion, that you get along well together.
- I also think sticking to community practices, putting your trash in the container, on the right day . . . not just haphazardly. Or damaging street fixtures, that sort of thing . . .
- For civic duties, that you treat each other well. If someone walks by, you don't slap him in the face.

The conversation on duties continues, and then takes a different turn when one of the participants ventures that allowing women to go first in a queue is a duty:

Moderator: You think that is an actual duty?

- Yes, that's right.
- If I'm in the supermarket, a woman should not take my place. She's welcome to stand behind me.
- I feel that I should have the right to cross on a red light when there is no traffic . . . and if I get a fine that is not logical. I think, logically, there is no traffic, so I cross. But then I may be arrested, because suddenly there are too many police and they have nothing to do . . .

(laughter)

When asked about rights and duties, we again see the tendency to focus on duties. Rights are mentioned later, but only in response to alleged duties that are found to be objectionable: giving the right of way to women, or waiting at a red light when there is no traffic. When explicitly asked to do so, socially inactive Amsterdam residents offered the following:

Moderator: Once more, what are the rights of citizens?

- That you can live and work, and that if you cannot work, that you will be helped financially.
- Good health.
- Training.
- Social assistance.
- Education.
- Right to life.
- A good life.

Moderator: And?

- Also your opinions, that is also important.
- That you are listened to. Your views do not always have to be heeded, but that you can make your voice heard.

Besides the right to be left alone, inactive citizens also suggested other rights. Compared with the other groups, they had a more developed vocabulary about things that can or should be permitted, often related to bad experiences or negative images of the government. The much-discussed lack of trust in public institutions was evident here. Some defended their right to self-defense and vigilantism, even toward the police.

– I also think that we can speak boldly, like the police, because if you are rude to them, they can simply say: we can arrest you.

Moderator: Why do you think this is allowed?

– Because they act tough, the police. If you are rude to the cops, they just say: we're going to arrest you.

What we witness is a 'passive liberalism' focused on freedom and bereft of positive action – a passive notion of citizenship that is limited to the duty to follow rules and regulations prescribing decent behaviour. The quotation from John Stuart Mill in the previous chapter ('when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself . . . ') is clear, although one finds not too much of the philosopher's idea on personal ambitions. When the divers do think about rights, they often entail situations where one is not obliged to honor duties. That they can so readily identify their duties suggests that, at worst, prevailing concerns regarding calculating and selfish people have been internalized to the point that they can be reproduced on appropriate occasions. More favorably, it suggests that these groups also share the view that citizens are responsible for more than their private lives.

– Together we are strong, everyone needs other people. I need the farmer, and the baker who bakes bread for me. I depend on others, everyone, no matter how small their role in society, whatever they do. Also at work, or when you say good morning to someone. These are the things that show you're not alone in the world, that there are other people and that we form a society.

The divers have the least crystallized ideas about what a good citizen is. A good citizen is someone who does not give offense to

others, does his or her best in society and opens the door for others, are examples given. People who volunteer are 'extra good' citizens, according to one participant. The undertow is: good citizens help others; public life and civil liberties take a back seat.

– I find myself to be a good citizen. I intend every day to do my best. If I see someone or something on the street, which I think needs help, then I will.

3.7 Going to a meeting

With conceptions of duty more prominent in the minds of citizens than conceptions of rights, it is useful to turn to a more practical case. How does this relatively imbalanced view on rights and duties play out when citizens actually are confronted with trouble? We presented a set of daily life cases to the focus groups. Reasons to (not) participate in public discussion were expressed in the following example concerning youths causing a nuisance in the neighborhood.

Suppose that a group of boys hanging around in your neighborhood are constantly harassing the girls passing by. In the mail you find an invitation from the municipality to a meeting to discuss the problem. Will you attend?

- If YES: Why? It doesn't concern you, right? Do you think that everyone who receives such an invitation must attend?
- If NO: Why? Who do you think should go to the meeting? What would you do if it happens in front of your door?

Quite predictably, the talkers had a more political understanding of citizenship than the other groups. Almost every question that allowed one to join a platform, participate in a demonstration, or attend a neighborhood evening was answered in the positive – not only because one hoped to exercise influence or because it was considered a civic duty, but out of professional interest. They were

familiar with society's problems, knew that the government was often powerless, and were curious about the outcome.

– Yes, I think I would go. Because I find it interesting to watch, how the municipality deals with it, and also for what you can get out of it. It is a difficult issue and I hope I would be able to contribute to the discussion.
– And besides, you get to know your neighbors better. So social cohesion can develop.
– Yes, I would definitely go. In fact, in my neighborhood there is such a group of boys. And I am really appalled by the powerlessness to do something about it.
– Especially as in this case a girl, or a very vulnerable group is deeply affected, I think that it really matters, then at this moment you know you must go and you must tell them that it is not allowed, what the limits are . . .

A few saw little value in political citizenship, though this was an attitude they were ashamed of. There was oblique reference to the two 'usual suspects' behind the failures of local democracy: the 'neighborhood leaders' beloved by the local media – generally older residents despairing over the policies of local politicians – and the format, location, and timing of the meetings, which more or less predetermined their conclusions. Here it is not really about the failure of politics, or the dislike of fellow citizens, but about the human condition in the public domain: discussions are seldom truly enjoyable, inspiring, or helpful.

– Here I'm sure I would be a bad citizen. If I was not a field coordinator, and I was not affected, the issue would pass me by completely. Only if I was really bothered by them, or if I had much contact with my neighbor, and knew that she had a big problem, I would go along. Now as a field coordinator, from a professional viewpoint it is very interesting to go to such a meeting to see what happens. But as a citizen, who is not affected, and doesn't know anyone who is, I would not be present, no. And I see that also in my work. It is always a very small group that suffers from nuisance. There are hundreds of people living on the street, on the square, all with the same

problem. But still a relatively small group of people come to the residents' evening, which I find striking.
– It also has to do with the format of the meeting: from eight to eleven. Yawn. Another format would be better. I can't get enthusiastic about meetings for discussion. Another format would be better to involve people, to make them enthusiastic, to stimulate their own initiatives . . . People who work during the day think, 'another meeting in the evening?' Young people will think the meeting is boring anyway, if it is dominated by older whites. Anyone who is not white and not elderly will not feel welcome.

Many doers also thought it natural to attend such an evening – but for different reasons:

– Yes, I will go. It is my street, it concerns me, I have kids.
– Previously I sat on a housing committee. Naturally I will go.
– Yes. Obviously, it concerns me, but I also have a duty towards others, to stand up for them.
– I'd go. It concerns the neighborhood. The municipality will give its opinion and we must testify if necessary. Not going and then complaining is not good.
– There are enough people who will not come.
– That'll always be the case.

The talkers expressed higher expectations concerning these meetings than the 'doers': they desired influence, wanted to get to know their neighbors, or to become wiser professionally. To attend such a discussion evening merely to be present was often not enough. For the doers, it mattered that it was their street and neighborhood. It was also widely felt that one forfeits the right to complain if one does not attend such meetings; one has to do things for others if one wantsthem to do things for one. At the same time, they were more irritated by the endless meetings without results, civil servants' false promises, and discussions on decisions that had already been taken. We also need to remember that people in these discussion settings can veer toward socially desirable answers, giving the impression that they will surely attend when they would rather not. For this reason, the veiled criticism can be all the more important. The

talkers' criticisms of the format (that the meetings are boring and appeal only to a narrow demographic) and of their results (that they make little sense) weighed less heavily among the doers; nevertheless, the fear of being cheated (the decisions are taken elsewhere) was prominent.

From this critique to the notion that the government is responsible for dealing with this type of neighborhood friction is a small step. When people do not believe in the relevance of their own role in the process, they leave it to others, often to an anonymous government. The divers in particular made this very clear.

- No, because I never go to such things, for me it is already a big step that I'm here. I don't quickly get involved in that sort of thing.
- I would first try to resolve things on my own.
- I don't know, I normally don't go. I'm not used to it. I can imagine they will pressure me to join a neighborhood association or something.
- No, because I am sometimes myself [hanging around on the street].
- I think not, because I don't have much faith in the whole thing.

Here again we see that questions are not easily debated. There is a certain clumsiness just like the inability to articulate rights and to discuss them which also appears in how public affairs and the public interest are represented, and the atmosphere in which collective notions are discussed and conflicts resolved. These citizens, often young people, know the adage 'every man for himself' better than anyone. But with each to his own, there is nothing for us all.

3.8 Conclusion

To get a better understanding of citizens' responses to the delegitimation of authority, we looked at senses of rights and duty and at reasons for (dis)engaging in deliberation on local issues. Rights appear to be less prominent than duties, partly because rights are taken for granted, partly because people want to please the public, and partly because participants just did not have a clear vision of what rights actually are. The message from politicians that citizens

must be conscious of their duties and be willing to contribute to their communities, fully resonates in our respondents' discussions. They fully concur. They are happy to point to the duties of others, feel decent public behavior important, and easily become annoyed when other citizens fail to fulfill their obligations. The limited enthusiasm of the Dutch – much more so than the British – to take part in public conversation suggests that the anger that at times surfaces is not due to any strong sense of rights being violated, but the suspicion that others are not taking their duties seriously. Citizens agree with the message that citizens should take their duties seriously and take responsibility, because they think this message needs to be delivered to other citizens. They distrust other citizens' willingness and capability to be an Aristotelian citizen who both rules and is ruled.

Moreover, we witness a rising political repertoire of cynicism, consisting of three components: feelings of distrust, skepticism, and superiority. We find distrust among divers, who have no experience working with political institutions, who do not identify with public affairs, and who have little confidence in their ability to exert influence. We find skepticism among doers: active citizens that do not trust other citizens to have a proper sense of duty. We find superiority among talkers who take pride in the idea that that they know the rules of society while others do not. This amounts to a cynicism toward public affairs that has rapidly gained ground. Sometimes the emancipated mind prescribes it; sometimes experience proves it right, and sometimes it is just fear, but the underlying assumption is always cultivating aloofness is a judicious move. Rather than ruling or being ruled, citizens step aside and keep a watchful distance, thereby fuelling their own mistrust.

The two dominant strategies to beat the customer out of the citizen fail to address this development. Populist politics merely fuels distrust of politics, government, and elites without ever suggesting that the reasons for this mistrust can be overcome. And experiments with participation suffer from well-known problems of failing representation: citizens who have been through higher education are almost by definition over-represented (Verba *et al*. 1995: 2). And particularly among the divers, there was doubt over the legitimacy of the whole process – that the semblance of democracy was a sham and that the real decisions were taken elsewhere. This is a familiar finding. Those who

assume that politics is for 'others' will only participate under exceptional circumstances, if they are explicitly invited or accompanied (Fung 2004). People regularly find their interactions with government discouraging, with the authorities either being indifferent, too controlling, or quick to take over grassroots initiatives should they be successful (Kampen *et al*. 2010).

The bar to participation is high and the temptation to stay aside is strong. Crafting citizenship demands on the one hand taking politics as process seriously, to treat it as a craft like any other, in which mistakes and misunderstanding are an opportunity to learn rather than to reprimand. On the other hand, crafting citizenship takes citizens seriously, to depart from the knowledge that it is not mere self-interest that gets people going, but fear of failure that feeds their suspicion.

4
Individualization and the Public Interest

Individualization has been a popular topic in public debate for a long time. The belief that the freedoms given to citizens have gone too far is remarkably resilient. In the introduction to a current version of Tonnies' *Community and Society* we find the remark that '(E)very intelligent person knows that the hidden weaknesses of our society, ruled by merchants, are coming to the fore', and that society is thus collapsing (Sorokin 1957: viii). That this was written more than 50 years ago – and that society in the intervening period has not collapsed – hardly lessens the force of the argument, judging by the regularity with which the complaint returns in the rhetoric of political parties (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp 2004: 9–17). The underlying fear is that people no longer think they need each other. Have individual freedoms been stretched to the point that communities are disintegrating? What keeps citizens united in an increasingly individualistic society? Again, the familiar response is 'more citizenship' – of strengthening the ties between individuals and society.

What exactly is this individualization that requires 'more citizenship' as the solution? Have citizens become uncooperative, only getting involved when it serves their own interests? Or have they become alienated from society's institutions that they can only be organized, at best, on an ad hoc basis?

4.1 Four types of individualization

To shed some light on the issue, we first distinguish between four different kinds of individualization. Are we referring to (1) the

M. Hurenkamp et al., *Crafting Citizenship*

individualization of interests and thus to the breakdown of collective or public interests, often expressed as concerns over selfishness and lack of solidarity in contemporary society? Or are we referring to (2) the breakdown of bonds between people, often heard in the laments over declining associational and family life? Individualization may also refer to (3) increasing differences in individual lifestyles, the quest to be original and unique in terms of material and cultural consumption, or (4) that citizens are increasingly making their own choices as responsible, self-reliant individuals.

4.1.1 The individualization of interests

That 'the public interest' is no longer heeded is an often-heard refrain in contemporary politics. In his much-discussed lecture 'What is living and what is dead in social democracy?' historian Tony Judt (2010) gave a good example of 'in search of lost time'.

> Sixty years after Churchill could offer only "blood, toil, tears and sweat", our very own war president – notwithstanding the hyperventilated moralism of his rhetoric – could think of nothing more to ask of us in the wake of September 11, 2001, than to continue shopping. This impoverished view of community – the "togetherness" of consumption – is all we deserve from those who now govern us. If we want better rulers, we must learn to ask more from them and less for ourselves. A little austerity might be in order.

We are too prosperous and demand too much; we have too little mutual respect and think too little about the collective.

'More citizenship' here means responsibility toward the public interest, higher expectations placed upon politicians and citizens curbing their own demands. It is a reaction to the victory of the 1970s ideal of self-fulfillment, understood by many to mean the individual freed from all external constraints, whether it be patriarchal families, authoritarian religions or paternalistic bureaucracies (Tonkens & Weijers 1999). By the early twenty-first century, with economic crises coming in rapid succession and tensions between cultural groups on the rise, the triumph of the individual was no longer a cause for celebration. The welfare state, its critics argued, had created a monster: people, without working, could count on an income, housing, health care and subsidies. These criticisms, in lamenting the lack of a public

ethos, echoed earlier criticisms of excessive individualism voiced in *The Culture of Narcissism* (Lasch 1979) and *The Quest for Community* (Nisbet 1953).

4.1.2 The individualization of lifestyles

Another type of individualization concerns lifestyles. With so many different tastes catered to for homes, cars, clothes, holidays, media, political parties and what not, everybody seems unique. This is of course the message of any self-respecting advertising agency. 'No one chooses subordination to family honor and the patriarch's authority, the obligation to live according to a model prescribed by tradition, or the inability to choose one's own partner or profession' (Schnabel 1999: 7). People no longer work from nine to five but choose their own hours. They do not only live in nuclear families but in all sorts of new relationships. They no longer follow the dictates of the church but create their own moralities out of a hodge-podge of spiritual tenets. The rich can dress sloppily while the poor wear designer clothes.

People make and remake themselves – a feast for the creators and producers of the goods they consume. But politics and institutions cannot cater to each and every individual preference. The fear is that citizens' increasingly differentiated needs are placing society under such great stress that the social glue of old – honesty, paying taxes, solidarity, and respect toward others – can no longer be taken for granted.

But empirical research has found that this form of individualization hardly occurs. Few people lead entirely unique lifestyles; individuals are in fact aping each other more than ever when they choose their homes, cars, clothes, and professions (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp 2004). There is widespread agreement within the Dutch 'progressive majority' on issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and gay marriage (Duyvendak 2004; Mepschen *et al.* 2010) while age and income remain better predictors of marriage patterns, voting behavior and career trajectories than the 'individualization of lifestyles' would lead us to expect (De Beer 2007). While religion and the traditional family may have disappeared, they have been replaced by education, therapy, and mass media (Elchardus 2009). All in all, there is good reason to be skeptical of any radical claim of an 'individualization of lifestyles'.

4.1.3 The individualization of social ties

A third type of individualization concerns the ties that bind people together in society. What is allegedly missing is the sense of community, of people's involvement in one another's lives. While American research sets the tone here (Fukuyama 1995; Etzioni 1998, 2001; Putnam 2000, 2007; Bellah *et al*. 2008), there is no reason to assume any kind of American exceptionalism. The concern over declining communities has been loudly proclaimed by numerous European politicians (for the Netherlands: Bos 2007; Germany: Schauble 2008; the UK: Blunkett 2002). Because individualization leads to unbridled selfishness, governments must summon individuals to be socially responsible behavior.

The American political scientist Robert Putnam has argued that TV, long working hours and commutes, women's emancipation, the need for dual incomes, and generational changes in attitudes have caused people to withdraw from associational life (2000: 283). Greater ethnic diversity also reduces the desire to meet others and to join in common activities (Putnam 2007). While people previously joined a bowling club, they now go bowling on their own; family members watch their favorite programs on their own TV sets. The result is reduced contact with peers and strangers alike. Society suffers from this declining mutual involvement in terms of security, happiness, employment, and trust.

The analysis reveals a desire for authentic relationships – for human relationships as they once (allegedly) were. We now lack 'real ties with real people' (Putnam 2000: 158). 'More citizenship' here means that citizens must reinvest time in forming and maintaining the ties between them. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni for instance, emphasizes the importance of durable contact, dialog, consensus-building, and mutual assistance – a traditional notion of community that applies to relatively small groups, based on interdependence and a common way of life. Only in such communities do people make sensible decisions, with enough social and spiritual support to counteract the authorities, mass media, and demagogues. Only in durable communities – in neighborhoods, villages, associations, and among colleagues – can we learn what is good and bad (Etzioni 1998: xi).

'Real' ties require effort, even sacrifice. They require investment of time and the putting aside of individual pursuits (Putnam

Table 4.1 Active and Leiden residents' views on good citizenship (%)

	Very important		Important		Unimportant/ very unimportant	
	Active ***N*** **= 95**	**Random** ***N*** **= 126**	**Active** ***N*** **= 95**	**Random** ***N*** **= 126**	**Active** ***N*** **= 95**	**Random** ***N*** **= 126**
Social citizenship						
Help family, friends, neighbors, and colleagues	52	45.5	45.9	53.8	2	0.8
Help less fortunate strangers	18.8	22.3	80.2	71.5	1	6.2
Polite and decent behavior toward others	63.3	70.7	36.7	27.8	0	1.5
Follow laws and regulations	42.7	45.9	52.1	51.9	5.2	2.3
Political citizenship						
Vote in elections	49.5	42.3	43.3	49.2	7.2	8.5
Attend consultation evenings	18.8	4	65.6	53.2	15.6	42.9
Interest in political developments	14.7	10.7	70.5	72.5	14.7	16.8

2000: 22). Temporary networks, fleeting protests, associations based on self-interest, therapy groups, and civil society organizations with paid staff are neither real communities nor examples of good citizenship (Schudson 2006: 591–606). The dominant idea is that good citizenship is loyal, engaged, long-term, and faithful.

4.1.4 The individualization of choices

The fourth type of individualization concerns choices. While much recent discussion has focused on whether individual citizens should take more responsibility, we are primarily interested in the empirical question of whether people have been given more responsibility,

Table 4.2 Active citizenship among Leiden residents ($N = 98$) by educational level (%)

Citizenship practices	**Educational level**		
	Low	**Medium**	**High**
Social citizenship			
Helped colleagues in the past year	83.3	76.5	75
Helped neighbors in the past year	88.9	81.8	94.6
Helped strangers in the past year	61.1	59.1	77.8
Did voluntary work in the past year	83.3	81.8	75
Gave to charity in the past year	100	86.4	96.4
Is an organ donor	33.3	47.6	46.4
Political citizenship			
Voted in recent elections	76.5	86.4	92.9
Participated in a consultation process in the past two years	33.3	31.8	50
Filed a claim, complaint, or appeal against the government in the past two years	38.9	13.6	41.1
Participated in a protest against the government in the past two years	16.7	31.8	32.1

particularly for their own life choices. In the words of former Prime Minister Tony Blair:

> Choice puts the levers in the hands of parents and patients so that they as citizens and consumers can be a driving force for improvement in their public services. We are proposing to put an entirely different dynamic in place to drive our public services; one where the service will be driven not by the government or by the manager but by the user – the patient, the parent, the pupil and the law-abiding citizen.
>
> (Clarke 2005: 449)

Traditions and normative prescriptions fall away; we now design our own lives. But people can still lead traditional lives; most people in fact do so, though they are now forced to defend this as their own choice. When everything is left up to the individual – career, relationships, health, appearance, sexuality – every decision needs to be defended, even if one is only following the herd. The modern housewife who raises her children to be aware of their own choices;

the salesman who picks out his own grey suit and tie; the Muslim woman who chooses to wear a headscarf – all are held responsible for their own choices.

'Casting members as individuals is the trademark of modern society', writes Polish philosopher Zygmunt Bauman (2001: 45). We are *Homo optionis*, sentenced to a tyranny of possibilities. What makes matters worse is that we do not feel that we are the architects of our own lives: our society is a labyrinth of rules and regulations that we did not create, while new external influences such as globalization have a strong but elusive influence over our lives.

4.2 Individualization and active citizenship

In the first two interpretations of individualization – of interests and lifestyles – the main problem is that individualization creates unwilling citizens: people who are indifferent to the public interest and collective values. The desire to restore 'norms and values' and to create a 'new us' is often rooted in such diagnoses. It is too easy for citizens to withdraw from society: the welfare state allows them to contribute nothing while pursuing their own desires. People no longer value community membership, which they see as coercive, disciplining, and depressing. Any program to promote citizenship must therefore make people realize their need for community – which can only be sustained through their own contributions. Crafting citizenship would somehow amount to teaching people the good life, with the risk that they do not believe the message.

The other two interpretations of individualization – of ties and choices – assume that citizens are not unwilling but inept, incapable of making complex social choices and entering into meaningful relationships. They may long for community but remain divided with micro-communities. Powerlessness, insecurity and lack of skillful means are, in this view, the main obstacles to building meaningful communities. Crafting citizenship in this dimension has more to do with having people master the trade of organization and strategy, of communication and persuasion.

The question is whether people are unwilling or unable to connect to others and to society. Do people want to remain self-absorbed, or do they not know how to break out of their relative solitude? Below we examine how citizens organize themselves and view citizenship and community building. How apparent are the different types of

individualization recounted above? To what extent do we encounter (un)willingness or (in)capacity in their efforts at modern community building?

4.2.1 Social ties

To gain insight into the individualization of social ties, we examined informal citizen initiatives – small communities that hardly resemble the ideal of the large, stable, and anchored communities that feature so prominently in fears of social dissolution. At first glance – and certainly compared to the large associations of yesteryear with their governing boards, membership lists, club houses, private sports fields, and walls bearing the portraits of past presidents – these small informal clubs seem to exemplify the individualization of social ties. They often consist of less than a dozen volunteers bereft of a clear command structure, meeting occasionally at someone's house. They come in many shapes and pursue very different goals: committees to install or remove speed bumps on the street, charitable gatherings to collect clothes for a village somewhere in the world; friends who maintain a website offering tips on how to squat judiciously; artists beautifying neighborhoods with their murals; neighbors and friends maintaining telephone help lines for lonely people. The freedom to participate is central.

We collected a dataset of small-scale citizen initiatives in the first half of 2006 (Hurenkamp *et al.* 2006, 2011) and subsequently interviewed members about their goals, motives, complaints, ideas about citizenship, ties to other civil society groups, the amount of time they invested, and whether or not they had contemplated ending their involvement. As indicators of different forms of citizenship, we gathered data on the initiatives' aims and participants' educational levels and reasons for founding the groups. We also asked respondents whether they thought their community was working well, whether they had difficulty recruiting new members, why they would leave the group, and about the level of contact between group members and with other clubs and organizations.

By studying these grassroots groups, we can learn something about how individualization works on the ground: first, who is willing and able to forge new ties, and what facilitates or hampers such reaching out to others; second, whether there really is a discernible individualization of interests – that is, whether these groups are pursuing the interests of their own members, or those of third parties. Third, we

can see the extent to which citizens are willing and able to shoulder responsibility for their own social involvement.

4.2.2 Interests

The policy response to the individualization of interests is to make citizens more accountable to the public good; the hope is that people will spontaneously transcend their own self-interests (Doheny 2007; Tonkens & Newman 2011). But what is the actual relationship between self-interest, the public interest and the interests of others? To what extent did self-interest drive the behavior of our active citizens? The literature tends to portray small-scale citizen initiatives as being driven by parochial interests, focused on participants' immediate problems rather than on broader society or even neighborhoods (Putnam 2000: 152; Wuthnow 1998: 18). Support groups for drug and alcohol abuse serve therapeutic purposes; old and new religious groups search for self-realization; many others strictly pursue hobbies and individual happiness. Unlike the large, long-term membership organizations of yesteryear dedicated to serve some collective good, these new forms of citizenship are merely a continuation of selfishness by other means. It is an accusation directed not only at small citizen initiatives, but also at professional interest groups supported by thousands such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International. Checkbook activism hardly involves individual donors while the professionals who do the work can barely be distinguished from regular civil servants (Skocpol 1999).

Our research did not confirm such egoistic motivations for involvement. When we asked our active citizens whether they had joined due to an 'experience in their own life', in their 'immediate environment' or something they had learned 'from the media', two-thirds stated that they had been spurred to action by the experiences of those around them or events reported in the media. Less than a third cited personal experience. The claim that people who participate in informal and temporary groups are primarily concerned with their own self-interest is hard to substantiate. Nor did we find small-scale citizen initiatives to be obsessed with 'not in my backyard'. In fact, the dominant motif was 'helping others'; 'quality of life' was a clear second and 'self-fulfillment' third. 'Helping others' was an umbrella term for non-site centered activities, such as collecting clothes for the poor, organizing dances for the disabled, and looking for ways to

counter violence on TV, to help ethnic minorities break cultural and sexual taboos, and to educate mothers about child drug use. While the initiatives were often local, some respondents decided to help particular villages or groups after a trip abroad. They were, in short, the 'good citizens' of classic lore. Their activities also often served some personal or individual interest, whether it was the developing of news skills or simply killing time.

The second motive – promoting 'quality of life' – was prominent within initiatives focusing on the neighborhood. These often involved informal councils working with local authorities or housing corporations to address parking or security issues or the creation of new venues for socializing. Here, individual interest was clearly present as one's neighborhood is the focus of commitment. Activities directed at 'self-fulfillment' were less prominent and were often artistic or sporting in nature: skating, football, painting, or film. Meeting people rather then than changing things was the aim.

All in all, citizen initiatives are not vehicles for private ambition but communities of (mostly highly educated) citizens seeking to improve the lives of others as well as their own. The light communities that we encountered did not define the lives of their members; they were, in a word, loosely organized. Nevertheless, they clearly met the wish of policy makers that citizens should take interest in the public good.

4.2.3 Choosing modern community building

There was sufficient interest in these grassroots initiatives; 72 percent of respondents reported no or only minor problems in finding new members and volunteers. Nor were the social ties that their members forged superficial. Six out of ten respondents had not contemplated ending their involvement while two out of ten considered stopping 'maybe in a few years'. Continuity was thus not a problem. Extrapolating from the number of initiatives we found in the rural village of Smilde, the Netherlands as a whole would contain between 200,000 and 300,000 such 'light communities' (Hurenkamp 2009). As active citizenship is more the norm in villages, this number needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. Nevertheless, there is no shortage of citizen initiatives.

The majority of our respondents were highly educated: 25 percent had university degrees and 35 percent had completed higher

vocational training. These initiatives are thus largely the domain of the educated: people who have imbibed the arts of citizenship, whether negotiating with other citizens and officials, thinking strategically, fund-raising, or attracting public attention. This over-representation of the educated in civic engagement is a well-known phenomenon (Verba *et al*. 1995: 305–307; Bovens & Wille 2009) and suggests that modern community-building requires skills only gained through higher education and professional employment. It also suggests why people do not develop new forms of community. Active citizenship takes not only practice, but also the tacit knowledge of the right tone when speaking to a public servant or politician, knowing the right people or knowing how to approach the right people, things more or less unconsciously learned during higher education. Handling a non-cooperative bureaucracy or a bureaucracy all too eager to take over one's initiative has proven to be a very negative experience for not too well-educated citizens trying to become active. Citizen ineptness answered by bureaucratic ineptness, is a serious factor when explaining public anger or distrust.

We found very different types of ties among our active citizens. To gauge the level of social contact between group members, we asked about the frequency and intensity of their contacts: face-to-face, over the telephone, and by email. To gauge contact with the outside world, we examined cooperation with other civil society organizations and with local councilors. Their responses allowed us to distinguish between four types of initiatives.

Some groups had little contact between their members and with the outside world – what we term 'feather-weight' groups. These people are, to varying degrees, pursuing their own pet projects. Many consist of little more than a website or telephone help-line maintained by two or three friends. Education levels here are slightly lower than our respondents' average. There is little money involved and usually not very much time spent. Outside the sphere of civic engagement, we see these groups organized around sports and hobbies (Hurenkamp & de Groot 2006). Both the socially and strictly leisure-oriented groups stand or fall with the commitment and abilities of their individual members.

There were also groups where members had less contact among themselves but more contact with the outside world. These 'networked' groups tended to focus on practical action; on average their

members were highly educated. Socializing among themselves was of lesser importance; what mattered was achieving results. The 'social reflexivity' (Lichterman 2005: 15) of these groups was relatively high; their members tended to be aware of the need to reach out and discussed with each other how other people, clubs, and institutions could be drawn in.

Other groups had much more contact among themselves but relatively little with the outside world – what we have termed 'cooperative' groups. These often organize around local festivities or around specific groups (the elderly, immigrants) in particular neighborhoods. The level of education here is slightly lower than average. Socializing, not the attainment of specific goals, is what matters; community is more the end than the means.

These three groups represent half of the total: the feather-weight groups 12 percent, the networked groups 19 percent, and the cooperative groups 20 percent. The remainder consists of initiatives where participants have extensive ties with both each other and the outside world – what we call the 'nested' groups, representing slightly more than half of our dataset. They most resemble Putnam's ideal of 'small groups in larger organizations' where participants expand their web of interpersonal relationships by being members of multiple groups (Putnam 2000: 278). As these groups are most likely to possess both 'bonding' and 'bridging' capital, their members are more likely to have ties with people from other (socio-economic, ethnic, or cultural) backgrounds. These groups are again dominated by the educated; the range of their goals and motivations is broad. They tend to meet regularly and have ties to local authorities, private companies, social organizations, community centers, churches, and mosques.

For all of these groups, the individualization of social ties is not leading to social breakdown but to the creation of new ties in new communities, though perhaps most problematically for the feather-weight groups whose members were not always satisfied with their relative isolation. This again suggests that inability rather than unwillingness is the more important factor inhibiting the creation of functional and sustainable modern communities. Members of the feather-weight groups are on average less educated than their counterparts; they were often unfamiliar with the workings of local politics and did not know how to communicate their project to others. When asked what they most desired from government, their

demands were modest: to be listened to and to have their ideas recognized as relevant. But the smallest initiatives often sought contact and recognition in vain. What hampered them was not the extent of their individualized demands. Nor was it the plethora of choices in their personal lives or the selfishness of others. It was the inability to find like-minded citizens and to effectively reach out to civil servants and professionals.

This can be seen when we compare citizen engagement in urban and rural areas. Feather-weight and nested initiatives are prominent in Dutch villages, where networked and cooperative groups are under-represented (Hurenkamp & Rooduijn 2009). The distribution is more even in cities, with a slight over-representation of networked and cooperative groups. The feather-weight rural initiatives often remained so not out of choice, but due to their inability to connect to local civil society. Gert, in his 60s, recounts:

> I organize an annual badminton tournament for children. They should get off the streets a bit. But it is hard to find people to help me. My wife does the accounting. I do not know why it is difficult, perhaps because I'm an import in this village, perhaps because not many people live here, and at great distances from each other. The people here help when there is a problem with your house or something, then the spirit of mutual aid runs strong. But for my badminton club, this is not the case.

It is easier to be an active citizen in the city where there are more institutions and services to work with, without first having to win over fellow citizens. A larger proportion of urban feather-weight communities are small because their participants want it that way. But when the density of citizen initiatives rises, so too does their desire for recognition. The aim then is no longer to be recognized as active citizens, but to be taken seriously by civil servants and professionals. Well-educated citizen groups – with bookshelves full of information on gratuitous violence or multiple sclerosis – want their plans and expertise heeded.

Only the nested initiatives expressed a clear desire for financial support. They often already command social capital and see access to funding – for a new computer, to reimburse travel costs – as the way



Figure 4.1 A citizens' initiatives piramide of needs

to increase the reach and quality of their work. Even so, they rarely predict large amounts.

The pattern we found can be summarized in the hierarchy of needs shown in Figure 4.1. Self-confident citizenship revolves around social opportunities rather than individual ambition; it is also aided by institutional abundance. These initiatives are not trying to function autonomously; they borrow office space, telephones, sports fields, meeting rooms, and email lists from churches, schools, businesses, and neighborhood social services. They are more 'informal' than 'temporary' – their members do not flit from one initiative to the other. And while the values of freedom are reflected in the way people organize, this does not threaten the continuity of their initiatives. Participants in these citizen groups form new ties. But unlike what the ideal of government withdrawal assumes, the government does not disappear from their view: as citizens create new ties, they also wish to develop stronger ties to the government.

4.2.4 Choice

What about the fourth type of individualization, that of choices? Do citizens find increased responsibility for shaping their own lives a burden? The majority of our respondents did not consider ending their social involvement in the foreseeable future. The recruitment of new volunteers, except for the tiniest groups, was rarely seen as threatening to their future. While it was not always easy to find support, respondents seemed to accept that this was part of social commitment. Nowhere did we sense that they were struggling with

the requirements of individualism. In large part, their activities did not require great originality; they could easily join existing practices of active citizenship which they themselves gave meaning to.

The goals of these citizen groups were highly social: helping others, improving the livability of neighborhoods, and social cohesion. They were at times critical, sometimes indifferent, but rarely actively opposed to the established order. They legitimized government, either by quietly ignoring it or by working with it. They were more focused on helping rather than fighting, on meeting rather than self-expression, on complementing government than attacking it. This lack of hostility toward the government and elites is hardly exclusive to the Netherlands. Civic engagement is usually mundane, initiated by relatively privileged segments of society, and does not involve major conflict (Sampson *et al*. 2005: 675). It is more 'reformist tinkering' than 'revolutionary reform' (Fung 2003: 339).

As policymakers had hoped, the individualization of choice among active citizens leads to social responsibility. But this responsibility is of a particular kind, directed much more toward social participation than political involvement. If citizens dedicate themselves to society, they primarily collect, comfort, celebrate, and play. There are also the thornier 'not in my backyard' groups opposed to asylum seekers, incinerators, and transport corridors, but their numbers are small compared to the many people who cooperate willingly. When asked about their ideas of citizenship, they also stress the social component of their commitment: looking after each other, behaving decently, keeping the environment clean. This view is not limited to active citizens, but echoes understandings of good citizenship found by Social Cultural Planning Bureau surveys of the Dutch population (Dekker & De Hart 2005) and by research among residents of the city of Leiden (Hilhorst 2010). As seen below, there are no major differences here between active citizens and a random sample (See Tables 4.1 and 4.2).

The rarely used answer category 'don't know' is a missing value.

Policy and citizens thus find each other in their shared conceptions of good citizenship. While this may seem promising, the dissatisfaction of many citizens is more policy-oriented and focuses on 'self-serving' politicians – a disaffection that is moreover independent of citizens' social participation.

4.2.5 Clumsy institutions

The individualization of ties and interests seems to have little bearing on citizen initiatives though this, of course, tells us little about how individualization takes shape elsewhere. People active in civic initiatives easily form new communities; individual responsibility, in terms of what policy prescribes, comes easily to them. The majority of participants in civic initiatives have been through higher education; the study in Leiden therefore differentiates between respondents by level of education. It shows that active citizenship is not the preserve of the highly educated. Due to the small sample size, the differences are not significant. Within this limited group, educated respondents were more active politically, the less educated more active socially.

Nevertheless, citizen initiatives are fragile as those people who are most active in society can also turn against the government. While relationships with authorities can be good, they can also go badly wrong, as has been shown in earlier research (see also Tonkens 2009; Van Stokkom 2009). One-on-one interviews proved helpful in better understanding this relationship with the authorities (see Hurenkamp *et al.* 2010). Respondents were also asked about cooperation with nearby institutions and communities. Whether or not citizen initiatives were embedded within a cooperative environment turned out to be a clear predictor of continued commitment.

Mathilde, in her 50s, explains:

> I started organizing illegal work for asylum seekers when I worked as a translator at the center where they live. At that time, these centers had libraries, sports facilities and other things we considered normal. But they increasingly came to be seen as too luxurious for asylum seekers. They were bored and lived crammed in small spaces, causing a great deal of stress among them. Some asked for work and I realized that there were small things that could be done in my house. It was quite easy to maintain a small network of people I knew from church to share small jobs and errands in the neighborhood.

Mathilde's work takes little effort while the use of cheap labor can be seen as self-serving. Its five or six active members met at church but

do not attend each week; they call each other and meet infrequently to strategize. 'Helping each other' to do what they think is possible, they discover that the local council (of a different political persuasion from the national government) is secretly pleased with their activities and encourages them in various ways. Such a community does not have a clear picture, does not fit a clear scheme. The group works against the national government, receives help from the local council, has no policies, but succeeds in its aims. It is a small initiative perched atop existing institutions, so economical that it makes no demands and can easily survive.

Another such community is an initiative to give the public a glimpse into the world of the blind. Visitors to the exhibition 'Seen in the Dark' experience through sound and touch what it means to be blind. As the organizers, Jan and Tina, are themselves visually impaired, their eight year-old initiative can be seen as self-interested. 'Seen in the Dark' does not try to influence local politics and does not claim that the visually impaired have rights that must be protected. 'We want to educate people in a way that was not done before', explains Jan. 'But we also use the exhibition for team-building.' Jan and his wife are occupied more or less full-time with their initiative. They maintain a network of about 12 (visually impaired) volunteers, working as guides, to help with the huge number of visitors. But volunteers leave quickly; they may be young or come from far away. Jan and Tina regularly have problems filling vacancies.

The informal community around this exhibition could be termed weak. The ties are loose and self-interested while continuity is far from guaranteed. But Jan and Tina remain confident about the future of their small information center. They do not require more meetings, more events, or more results. They want better ties with local politicians to access funding, and to social organizations to help find new volunteers and fulfill complex regulations. They seek contact and continuity. Special skills and ties to local government and institutions are necessary for citizen initiatives to be successful.

John, a middle-aged resident, wanted to set up a cooking club with people from the neighborhood. He tried for over a year, coming to the town hall to fill in forms that were subsequently lost, and for meetings, only to find that the application coordinator had forgotten the appointment. Fatma, a middle-aged woman, wanted to set up a tea house for neighborhood women. Her contact with

the officer responsible for resident initiatives was likewise hardly inspiring:

> She asked if I had been to ZINA. I said the name ZINA means having an affair in Turkish. It was an unfortunate name, and difficult for me to get women to go there. She then responded: 'Yes, but I don't do this for myself!' . . . The neighborhood already has two women's organizations looking for members and they want to push us there. But they should not do that from above, it is also about what we want.

Active citizens are particularly affected by official indifference, or when initiatives take root, officialdom's tendency to control and co-opt (Kampen *et al*. 2010).

The effective embedding of citizen initiatives is crucial for success (Kearns 1992; Maloney *et al*. 2000; Szreter 2002; Sampson *et al*. 2005). Citizens above all desire flexible institutions, but ironically it seems that the larger budgets for citizen participation have diminished the ability of local governments to respond with flexibility. While publicly funded welfare organizations may seem logical places to turn, they are subject to stringent performance requirements: they must prove that they do useful work, which is difficult to combine with an invisible supporting role for citizen initiatives.

Effective embedding is difficult to achieve. When it exists, relatively traditional notions of citizenship can come to the fore in new ways. Rather than growing in size or obtaining more funding, the main aim of many initiatives is to improve their external ties. They can remain small as professionals, existing infrastructure, laws, schools and churches can assume part of the organizational burden. In forming ties among themselves and with broader society, citizens prefer relatively loose organizations that enjoy regular contact with other clubs and with established civil society.

The willingness to be involved in society is apparent, not only among active citizens but among currently inactive people. We found little evidence of unwillingness. But we found clear signs of incapacity, in navigating complex bureaucracies, in commanding the many skills needed for modern community building. Good citizenship today requires more than good intentions.

4.3 Unwilling or unable?

The question of unwillingness versus inability deserves further analysis. By definition, citizen initiatives are comprised of people for whom the individualization of social ties does not hamper involvement in new forms of community. Nevertheless, we saw significant differences in the strength of their social ties. The smallest initiatives often remained small not by choice, but because their members were unable to access larger networks of other citizen groups and government bodies.

We found no evidence of the individualization of interests and limited evidence of the individualization of choices among our active citizens: their initiatives generally pursued traditional themes that easily fitted government aims. Our focus group discussions revealed that 'to help each other' was a central motif of their initiatives and was routinely seen as a cornerstone of good citizenship (Dekker & De Hart 2005). Under what conditions were citizens seen to be their brothers' keepers? The discussions around our hypothetical case of the neglected neighbor were telling.

Suppose that your neighbor, whom you do not know, appears to be neglecting himself. He smells unwashed, is never visited and rarely goes out. He is not bothering anybody. Would you offer to help him?

- If 'YES': How would you handle it? Would you ring his doorbell or talk to him when you see him? What would you say?
- If 'NO': Why not? Because you are unsure how to approach him? Would you contact an aid agency? What would you do if the agency replied that it was too busy?

The 'doers' did not see any need to wait. Ringing the bell to offer help and approaching neighbors to act together were conceivable courses of action. While urban circumspection remained, the desire to do something was palpable:

- I would keep an eye on him, but I would not address him …
- **Moderator:** You'd prefer to do something?
- If he has shown that he is open, but I'm not going to intrude. I'd keep an eye on the man and, you know, his routine.
- If I see him on the staircase or outside I would first just say 'good day, how are you?' That kind of thing. And then some deeper questions, not only hello, but if he needs anything, and then at some point, if he has any difficulties. I would not deal with it like this at first, by knocking and saying I noticed a smell or something.
- If I did not share a common door with my neighbor, I would normally leave it at that. But the smell would be bad if you live above him, perhaps you would suffer from mice, it would be different if he lives above you and you share a stairwell.

Taking action was likewise self-evident for the 'talkers', though they were more cautious and restrained. They preferred to maintain initial distance to determine whether the man indeed wanted to be helped. One should not just ring the doorbell; many preferred social workers to step in. One should not impose was the norm. It is, after all, a man in his own house, not a colleague or someone who deliberately seeks contact. Perhaps the man is fine and does not feel neglected. Then offering help would be intrusive, even a violation of his rights.

The general response among the talkers was to contact the appropriate authorities or to find some other indirect means to take responsibility. Citizenship for this group is not simply about helping someone; agencies exist to deal with such issues and it is logical to let them do their work. Social problems are the government's responsibility. Some talkers were highly skeptical of politicians' demands that citizens take more responsibility and saw policy failure instead of the alleged gap between citizens and politics.

- I have such a neighbor. But I would first contact an agency to see if it could help.
- I'd prefer to ask, I'm not sure about helping. I'd ask what's going on.
- As long as there's no nuisance, I wouldn't do anything. If there is, I'd call the social services.

- I say no, I can easily ignore the problem. My wife could do so too. That's fine, I have no responsibility. That's the problem, no one would act.
- But you still have obligations towards each other?
- What we have is total indifference.
- I find the question difficult, is this man deprived or not? If so, I would have to do something.
- This is not reflected in the description, but in the smell. If someone hardly comes out, it depends on the signals that person gives. Coming outside in tears or falling ill, but as you describe it, I say no.
- I have a neighbor who we believe neglects himself. But he does not think so. I always greet him but he doesn't respond. He would curse me if I went knocking on his door.

We have seen that the fear of individualization undermining the willingness to connect to others is generally unfounded: citizens can find new ways to build new communities. In contrast, the fear of social awkwardness leading to individualization seems more concrete. There is also a group of citizens who are socially or politically difficult or impossible to mobilize. Here, there may be clearer processes of isolation at work, resulting from either the effects of policy or cultural preferences to lead individual lives.

The people whom we previously described as divers find it sufficient to work hard and not disturb their fellow citizens; in one way or another, they find it difficult to involve themselves in society (Linders 2010). It would be tempting to label this 'live and let live' mindset liberal. However, there is a hierarchical dimension to their lack of social participation. The ability and willingness to address problems taking place outside one's own front door is far from self-evident, determined more by (perceived) circumstances than by deliberate choice.

If divers do not personally know the person in need, they will contact an agency rather than the person directly. A brief chat may be considered a possibility but offering help goes too far. They may dislike contact with strangers; in any case it is the responsibility of the government. It is worth noting that the neglected neighbor in the fictional story is immediately recognizable from real life.

– If he once comes to you saying 'help, help' then I can well imagine doing something. But on my own, I think I would be reluctant to offer help, because you never know how such a person will react, or perhaps he doesn't want outsiders to see that he is in a bad way. I would also be cautious because it is an unknown neighbor, you do not know him . . . If he asks on his own, then of course, but I would not offer myself.
– I agree, in such a situation something must happen, for example, he falls down in the street, that should be a trigger for you to directly intervene. But if it is only that your unknown neighbor is alone and is not looking after himself . . . I would not want to insist, there must be some trigger to get involved. Yes, this is perhaps egocentric and antisocial, but . . .

What prevents divers from becoming socially involved? We identified three barriers that stand between them and active citizenship. The first, anonymity, is the opposite of the social contact that the talkers hold dear. This anonymity may be intentional or unintentional. Either way, it generates fear: as one doesn't know one's neighbor, one doesn't know how he or she will react. One is safer doing nothing. One is uncertain where the involvement will stop and fears getting caught in a compromising situation. But it is not only social awkwardness, a dislike of others or selfishness that sustains anonymity. Anonymity is also perceived as a right to be left alone. City dwellers appeal to it regularly.

A second barrier is identity – divers do not consider themselves people who get involved. Attending meetings and expressing opinions may make them feel uncomfortable. Or they may be too busy. Either way, being an active citizen is not the image they have of themselves. If something really needs to be done, they may inform the relevant authorities. At other times, divers may feel themselves to be the object of social concern and conversation.

The third obstacle is mistrust, particularly of the government but also of the effects of social initiative. When the government states that it wants citizens to help each other, the suspicion is that this is to cut public expenditure. A variation on the same theme is that public agencies are not doing their jobs. They do not respond to

phone calls and even blame the citizen for interfering. While officials seek citizens' opinions, everything has already been decided elsewhere.

4.4 Conclusion

Our research found that individualization among Dutch citizens is not fueling reluctance to forge new social ties. It is instead leading to the creation of new kinds of ties. Claiming to be an autonomous individual is an initiation rite of Dutch society. But we also found that, particularly for the less educated who are less able to navigate the institutional jungle, individualization can make the forming and maintaining of ties more difficult. The Dutch majority experiences the policy push toward greater self-reliance as more or less self-evident; a (mostly less-educated) minority experiences it as a burden. The often-heard refrain that people are definitively, and en masse, opting out of society is therefore not supported by facts. Nevertheless, this fear largely determines government efforts to foster active citizenship.

In the 1950s, active, long-term membership within associations and political parties was the logical means to channel one's commitment to society. Such solidarity – within hierarchically organized associations and clubs with clear mandates that one joined for a lifetime – has indeed declined somehow but organized civil society is not in total decline (Dekker & Van den Broek 2005). And second, new kinds of ties have taken the place of the older ones. Citizens today are more likely to participate in ad hoc actions against injustices that they perceive with their own eyes. At the same time, we should be cautious of any over-optimistic reading of current trends. The internet as such does not really change the amount of so called social capital; rather, it helps the already knowledgeable citizens to broaden their repertoire (Wellman *et al.* 2001; Wellman & Hampton 2003). Studies of post-materialistic attitudes and activism among younger generations have reported on the emancipatory effects of education, the internet and struggles for justice beyond borders (Schudson 2006; Inglehart 1999; Dalton 2007). Other studies have shown how internet-based consumer boycotts, protest movements, and activist networks in which people work for years without

physically meeting each other are rendering the 'old' society obsolete (Zukin *et al*. 2007).

But these virtual groups are neither more critical of governments and power-holders nor more diverse than citizen groups were in previous eras. We see little evidence of non-conformity; the new clubs reach out to like-minded people, not to outsiders.

Active citizenship today cannot unambiguously be reduced to willingness or ability. Given the right circumstances, the doers can and will get involved. The talkers can but only want to under specific conditions, while the divers do not want to get involved as they lack the tools to do so. The more active citizens (the doers and talkers) are generally less 'anti-elitist' and 'socially critical' than the postmodern and post-materialist literatures suggest. Their practice of citizenship is not the sense of duty that we associate with the 1950s. Nor does it approximate the critical consciousness of the 1970s. For this, most citizens' initiatives are much too supportive of official goals.

There is ongoing fear that the welfare state crowds out citizen initiative, that because the state provides social security and assistance individuals will refrain from action. This thesis has been refuted repeatedly with large amounts of data (Rothstein 2005; Van Oorschot & Arts 2005). The reasoning of those who trace lack of citizenship to individual unwillingness ends in a vicious circle: participation within robust communities creates the sense of duty that leads to further participation, but once given the freedom to withdraw, people will only return to the fold through coercion. But neither is good citizenship solely a matter of removing barriers (by providing more support, simplifying procedures, offering rewards) as the diagnosis of incapacity assumes. Proponents of the latter underestimate the lure of alternative pursuits and the sincere dislike that people can have of social involvement.

Crafting citizenship demands a middle ground. Social involvement requires motivation – one must really want it. This requires less of a deep sense of duty but rather confidence. Confidence that one's efforts are useful, that others will not laugh or criticize. There must also be opportunities: to launch initiatives, to get feedback, and to meet like-minded people. Providing such opportunities does not require magic on the part of the government. From the perspective of the divers, inability is seldom seen as the problem. It is not just a

matter of skills but of culture. Passive citizens do not feel at home in the world of active citizens; the demands of active citizenship portray them as deficient while reaffirming the worth of their active counterparts. Their alleged incapacity to be good citizens is the view of others; divers see their own lack of involvement as rational.

5
Globalization and the Culturalization of Citizenship

What has happened to the Netherlands, a country once often admiringly described abroad as an oasis of tolerance? Did its policy on minorities create a segregated society? Numerous researchers (Koopmans & Statham 2000; Koopmans 2002; Ireland 2004; Joppke 2004: 248; Koopmans *et al.* 2005; Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2006: 15–20) have argued that this is the case. In their view, 'multicultural' policies promoting group rights encouraged disparate ethnic and religious identities, eventually leading to mutual exclusion and intolerance.

But were the Dutch really radical multiculturalists? Dutch policies on the integration of immigrants were much more varied than the critics suggest (Duyvendak & Scholten 2009; Duyvendak *et al.* 2009). The initial aim of the Dutch minorities policy was not to promote pluralism among guest-workers but to facilitate return to their countries of origin. In the 1970s, group identities were emphasized for some time as a means toward 'emancipation', but only for those minorities that were socio-economically backward (the assumption being that their self-organization would facilitate integration into society at large). The aim of group emancipation was then replaced by individual socio-economic integration in the late 1980s.

The recognition of the right to self-organization among minorities is quite different from the recognition of 'cultural rights' of equal citizens with different cultural backgrounds, as is the case in, for example, Canada. It is confusing to call both policies 'multiculturalism'. For the sake of clarity, it would be better if we called what

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prevailed in the Netherlands during the 1970s and 1980s 'tolerant monoculturalism': ethnic minorities were not forced to culturally assimilate into the Dutch mainstream, even though the native Dutch became a rather homogeneous, progressive, and self-congratulatory, monoculture in these years.

What happened to this relative tolerance that might explain the current tensions in the Netherlands? We argue that since the 1990s, we have witnessed a transition from tolerant to *intolerant* monoculturalism, in which the culturalization of citizenship has played a central role. Citizenship came to stand less for the rights and duties of a political community and more for the customs and tastes of a cultural community. There was too little 'native' in the 'citizen' according to public opinion. In this, the Dutch 'progressive' culture increasingly came to be seen as a product of timeless consensus that needed protection from external influence, a quintessentially Dutch achievement that immigrants must prove their loyalty to.

The current situation is thus very far removed from any semblance of pluralism. As in Denmark, the growing Dutch consensus around progressive values is considered as a wide, if not insurmountable, value gap between the native majority and Muslim immigrants (Brouwers 2010). The Dutch majority increasingly sees cultural differences as problematic (Entzinger & Dourleijn 2008). This fuels further polarization over the culturalization of citizenship – the process of making culture (emotions, feelings, norms and values, symbols, traditions, religion) central to the debate on social cohesion.

To simply dismiss culture as irrelevant or as an unnecessary threat to integration (a ritual among some leftwing politicians) ignores that in its broadest sense it plays a major role in determining an individual's opportunities in life. Citizenship is not only about socio-economic, legal, or political rights and duties; cultural rights and obligations are also part of any fair and equal membership of society (and have always been so in the past). Knowledge, and to some extent adoption, of cultural norms – such as shaking hands, infringing personal space, what is considered fair or confidential – is, for example, useful in finding and keeping a job (Veenman 2007). In periods of economic hardship, such 'cultural capital' becomes even more important. In a society where citizenship is explicitly defined in cultural terms, knowledge of its culture becomes essential – even to resist the culturalization of citizenship.

5.1 Four variants of the culturalization of citizenship

For clarity's sake, we need to distinguish between four variants of the culturalization of citizenship (see Figure 5.1). We do this along two axes: practical versus emotional, restorative versus constructive. The first distinction mainly concerns citizenship's content: can shared affinities remain on the surface, or must they run deep? The second concerns how people absorb this citizenship: is it given, or can it be acquired?

We first discuss here 'restorative' and 'constructive' cultural citizenship. The restorative version sees culture as a static phenomenon, as a set of given traditions, customs, and values that are either already known or need to be (re)discovered, for instance through established canons and by studying decisive moments in history. The constructive view, on the other hand, posits that culture is a dynamic process that arises through social interaction; culture builds upon traditions, but gains new meanings through outside influence. Culture is thus created, not excavated, and existing practices need to be examined for their inclusionary and exclusionary effects. Social cohesion in the constructive view cannot be restored, but must always be created anew.

Both the restorative and constructive forms may emphasize citizenship's practical or emotional aspects. 'Practical' cultural citizenship refers to concrete practices such as speaking Dutch in public and at home, or knowledge of the country's history and traditions. Citizens must be able to function within public institutions and know of, for example, the Dutch floods of 1953 and lost football finals. 'Emotional' cultural citizenship, on the other hand, refers to sharing what sociologist Arlie Hochschild (2003) terms a society's 'feeling rules': the implicit rules societies prescribe about how people should

	Restorative	**Constructive**
Practical	Teach heritage, canons, etc. to become part of the existing culture	Different traditions and customs meet and mix, creating a new community
Emotional	Feel connected to the given culture	Feel connected to what you have collectively created

Figure 5.1 Four variants of the culturalization of citizenship

feel in given situations. Examples include appropriate expressions of grief at funerals or joy at weddings and on national holidays. Feelings of solidarity and loyalty require emotion management – not necessarily the suppression of emotions but their control. One must consider if one is experiencing the 'correct' emotions, and if not, whether one should show them to others. Feeling rules apply to immigrants and natives alike; the rules are not neutral but are expressions of ideology, a conception of how a country should 'feel'.

Much of the debate (not only in the Netherlands but in similarly liberal countries such as Denmark) revolves around notions of restorative citizenship, which finds supporters among both conservative and progressive politicians. At that time Dutch Labor Party leader Wouter Bos stated:

> Take homosexuals and women, who thought they had achieved equal rights but now have to defend their rights and freedoms all over again, with the arrival of new communities with different values. Or take the ordinary, law-abiding citizen faced with the arrival of terrorism from other countries and cultures, who wonders why terrorists call themselves true Muslims and what this says about the next-door neighbor, who happens to be a Muslim too . . .
>
> (Bos 2007)

The restorative, emotional culturalization of citizenship holds that people must feel at home in the existing culture to achieve integration and citizenship. Loyal citizens are those who show commitment to the nation's history. When such loyalty is not apparent, national history must be re-emphasized, as the then leader of the free market liberal party Jozias van Aartsen argued:

> You need a society filled with emotion, as the French and Americans have. You have the old themes of equality between men and women, the right to property, protection of your property. But more is needed, a binding element. . . . Two hundred years ago, we impressed upon our synagogues to use Dutch. We have never done this for our mosques. We have neglected the transfer of values. There is a generation that has grown up knowing little about our history. The nation's essence must be taught at school. In history lessons, as far as I am concerned.
>
> (Interview in *De Volkskrant*, 31 December 2004)

This restorative, emotional variant of culturalized citizenship is the least accessible to outsiders and hence the most exclusionary in its effects. The idea that people in general – and immigrants and their descendants in particular – must show more commitment and loyalty to Dutch culture enjoys the staunch support of populist parties (Van Kersbergen & Krouwel 2003), which have made cultural issues their bread and butter, much to the chagrin of the established political parties. Impassioned debates over dual nationality, singing of the national anthem, allegiance to the flag, legal recognition of a national language, and the obligation to speak Dutch have thus followed one another in quick succession (e.g. Mendus 2000; Parekh 2000; Brubaker 2001; Favell 2001; Benhabib 2002; Gutman 2003; Joppke 2004; Duyvendak and Bertossi 2009).

Government attempts to make all citizens feel at home are frequently informed by this restorative, emotional notion of citizenship as well as hard and fast ideas about what is required to feel at home in the Netherlands. As we saw in Chapter 4, the media have played a key role in this: witness the discussions on the construction of mosques, the call to prayer, religious symbols such as headscarves, gender inequality, the anti-integration statements of ultra-orthodox imams, and Islam-inspired political extremism being threats to Dutch culture (EUMC 2002; Scheepers *et al.* 2002; Entzinger & Dourleijn 2008). Moreover, much of the public debate is infused with nostalgia: citizenship must help restore lost communities, while culture is a closed, timeless whole carried by citizens who share its beliefs, norms, and traditions. It is not a community of fate but a normative community through which ties are sought. In this context, the discussion often revolves around the actual or potential negative effects of the Muslim minority on Dutch society (e.g. Verhaar & Saharso 2004; Uitermark *et al.* 2005; Duyvendak & Scholten 2009).

The restorative, practical culturalization of citizenship tends to emphasize the teaching of democratic participation. It generally assumes that institutions, norms, and values are fixed, and focus on what individuals must do to become good citizens (cf. Putnam 2007). But as we saw, the Dutch progressive consensus emphasizes restorative notions of citizenship over constructive ones. The idea that better values and citizens will arise through inter-cultural learning is difficult to imagine: the Dutch in this sense are a self-congratulatory lot.

Finally, the constructive, emotional variant focuses on generating feelings of belonging and loyalty among citizens. This is often the explicit purpose of policy. The city of The Hague announced its annual lecture on citizenship as follows:

> The municipality considers citizenship to be very important. Everyone should feel at home in The Hague. Yes, we are all different, but that is good. Together we make up The Hague. The Citizenship Lecture fosters citizens' feelings of involvement with the city, an opportunity to deliberate together.
>
> (www.denhaag.nl, accessed spring 2010)

The city of Rotterdam initiated a series of dialogs in 2008 under the banner 'Citizenship, Identity and Feeling at Home' to explore how residents feel connected to the city. 'People feel alienated from once-familiar surroundings', stated Guusje ter Horst, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to parliament in 2009, and a 'citizenship charter' would offer an answer (Proceedings of (Dutch) Parliament document nr. 2009-280302). Compared with the restorative approach to citizenship, the constructive approach can handle disagreement more creatively. Culture is seen as something one creates with others, not as an established phenomenon that can be 'excavated'.

Incidentally, the contrast between constructive and restorative citizenship is not absolute. Dutch historian Paul Scheffer warned in his study of immigration in the Netherlands that 'citizenship is after all a sense that something has gone before us and that something comes after us. A society that no longer considers itself capable of conversation with its past will waste away' (Scheffer 2007: 415). The welfare state's contribution to the integration of immigrants was their 'subsidized isolation' (ibid.: 419). At the same time, he emphasizes that the past only makes sense if current discrimination (in employment, with respect to religion) is fought against, because discrimination fuels alienation. Until this understanding is broadly embraced, there is little possibility of 'full citizenship' (ibid.: 424). Restoration and construction thus can go hand in hand; the main question is one of emphasis.

Three of the subjects broached in the focus groups concerned explicitly cultural themes: the consumption of alcohol during Friday

afternoon drinks at work; a hypothetical government proposal to bestow national holiday status to an Islamic holiday (for instance, Eid, to mark the end of Ramadan) at the expense of a Christian holiday (such as Easter Monday); and whether one feels more a citizen of one's city or of one's nation.

Alongside the differences between the talkers, doers, and divers, we observed significant differences between how native and new Dutch participants approached issues of cultural citizenship. Perhaps this was to be expected, but the dynamics of cultural offensive and retreat revealed sensitivities among all participants. The native Dutch tended to feel that they had lost something – and however vague this something was, they felt a need to defend it. In contrast, some of the new Dutch emerged as the staunchest advocates of the most liberal ideas that justified their freedom of choice.

5.2 Friday afternoon drinks

The first issue we discussed in the focus groups was what participants would do if some of their Muslim colleagues did not join in the post-work Friday drinks. The organized, after-work drinking of alcohol is a Dutch institution, practiced by 38 percent of the working population. However, the proportion of those who drink alcohol among Amsterdam's native Dutch population is three times that of the city's Turkish immigrants, and six times that of its Moroccan immigrants. A study in Rotterdam likewise found that there were fewer drinkers among second-generation Turks than among Dutch natives of the same age (Monshouwer *et al*. 2008).

Interestingly, the presence of drinkers and non-drinkers in the same environment seems to affect their alcohol consumption. A study among students revealed that ethnic minority youths drink less than average and that alcohol use by non-immigrant youths decreases in proportion to the presence of pupils with Muslim backgrounds (Van Tubergen & Poortman 2010). A similar study in Norway found mutual influence between immigrant youths and their comparatively heavy-drinking native peers – the immigrants began to drink more and the native Norwegians to drink less (Amundsen *et al*. 2005). The question is the mechanism by which this happens.

Alcohol is always served during the Friday afternoon drinks at work. As a result, some of your Muslim colleagues are never present. Do you do anything about it?

- If 'YES': What would you do? Would you act on your own, or together with your colleagues? Would you approach your Muslim colleagues, the always-present colleagues, or the drink's organizers? Would you try to find a solution?
- If 'NO': Why not? Don't these drinks have a social function? Do you find it difficult to raise the issue, or is it merely not important enough?

The striking contrast between the native and new Dutch groups was the tone of the conversation. Almost everybody agreed that there should be room for choice – that both forcing people to attend as well as banning alcoholic drinks was pointless. The question was repeatedly raised by both practicing and non-practicing Muslims whether their religion really forbade them to be present in places where alcohol was consumed. Was it written in the Koran? Wasn't alcohol freely available in many Muslim countries? Native and new Dutch approached the issue with different degrees of seriousness, with Native Dutch remaining skeptical of the issue's importance.

Many native Dutch first laughed and then grew annoyed with the issue. The more thoughtful among them proposed occasional cake or ice cream instead of beer and gin as a solution. Others were not in a mood to make concessions. But eventually most participants, possibly under pressure from the more open-minded thinkers in the group, gave ground. The following dialog took place in a focus group of native Dutch doers:

– This is a weekly, monthly ritual with colleagues, people with whom we work. I would immediately propose that I appreciate your conviction, I accept that and I suggest . . . the first half hour without alcohol on the table, restricting ourselves to a cup of coffee or tea . . . then we consume alcohol because we like it, so then we can have it both ways.

– And what will you do with those who say 'if there is no alcohol, I will not come'?
– Alcohol will be served after half an hour.
– But our culture is that we like to end the week with a drink . . .
– Yes, they should respect this and if they don't, they should stay away, even good friends . . .
– My idea is that it is our culture and if they want to live and work here . . .
– I have a Moroccan neighbor with whom I drink beer.

And among the talkers:

– In any case I would want to make sure . . . Some people think 'you can drink your beer, but I will not' . . . so I would first still like to know is that really the cause, that there is too much to drink, that it is an unpleasant situation? And then see what to do about it.
– I think you are already biased because you assume it is the alcohol. If I did not see someone, no matter whom, I would ask, it is very nice, why are you not there? . . . If someone gives another reason, or alcohol as the reason, you can still ask nicely if they want to be there, and what could we do to devise a solution? Which may be different, for example, sometimes no alcohol, or no alcohol for the first three-quarters of an hour.

And the divers:

– The drinks' organizers should ask employees how they want to spend their Friday evening and whether they have problems with alcohol in the workplace, so that it can be a nice evening for everyone.

Moderator: And that may mean that there are evenings without alcohol?

– Yes, that could also be . . .
– Those are usually not so fun . . . (everyone laughs)
– But is it really the case, are there really signs that Muslims have problems . . . ?

Moderator: There are . . .

– If it creates problems because Muslims say they really dislike something, I think that the management must have a different approach to the evening.

The underlying tone suggested that the issue was being blown out of proportion. Even non-drinking respondents suggested that staying away from the drinks was largely a matter of posturing; the issue was thus not one for urgent action. That once begun, there would be 'no end' to concessions was an often heard complaint that we shall encounter more often.

– But if one group adopts tea and cake, the floodgates will be opened, you will get groups that say 'Yes, we are vegans and we want absolutely no milk and dairy products, so tea and cake, forget it, there is cream and milk' . . . There will be no end to it . . .

In the end, responsibility is displaced toward those who stay away or the management. Toward the end of the conversations, it was repeatedly suggested that keg banquets were perhaps not so great for others, and that after-work drinks without whiskey and gin could also be nice. Some acknowledged that there could be reasons to avoid drinking other than religious zealotry, and that there could indeed be broader cultural differences regarding the consumption of alcohol.

'My glass of white wine' and 'my five o'clock drink' are code words for socializing and for relaxing after work. The crucial Dutch concept of *gezellig* (usually translated as cozy) is difficult to capture in other languages. *Gezelligheid* (*gezellig*-ness) is closely linked to alcohol – it does not require much of it, and those who do not want to drink are not obliged to, but *gezelligheid* without alcohol is difficult to imagine for most people. The drink occupies a central place in Dutch culture, for special occasions in daily life (such as the after-work drink) as well as for festivities. Tampering with it makes people feel that something is being taken from them – and not just anything, but their right to enjoy and celebrate. There was a sense that foreigners with more austere lifestyles would not understand this. Repeatedly, participants joked that if only tea was served at the after-work drinks, giving them up would not be so difficult.

The joking tone stood in sharp contrast to what prevailed in the immigrant focus groups, where we witnessed the recounting of painful experiences – for example, of guests bringing alcohol to birthday parties against the wishes of the hostess. Immigrants placed greater value on their right to stay at home than discussing the matter or effecting change. Most Muslims argued that they were being stigmatized by the assumption that they were not attending due to the presence of alcohol. 'Perhaps I am collecting my children from school.' 'Perhaps I think the drinks stink.' There could well be other, individual reasons.

The Muslim participants felt misunderstood. They did not identify with the fictional, anonymous people in the example. Those concerned know best what to do for themselves; the Koran does not mention staying away from after-work drinks, where one could easily have soft drinks instead. No one liked the depiction of the workplace drink as an event that Muslims were not allowed to attend. The interaction of radical Islamic beliefs with the willingness of Dutch natives to latch onto them had, in the eyes of many participants, created a too-rigid view of their faith. The idea that people would think they could not attend the drinks because they happened to be Muslims infuriated several people. The sense of powerlessness was palpable.

– It would make me very angry if my colleagues assumed that I'm not there because alcohol is served.

Moderator: And if they ask, would you still be angry?

– Yes, like the Dutch taking potatoes on vacation, such assumptions no longer hold. I don't go to the drinks because I have my own life, when I finish my work, I'm done with work. . . . They automatically assume you are married . . . if you're not going to the drink, they say, oh yes, she does not come because there is alcohol.

Almost everyone had a personal experience to relate:

– If you do not enjoy drinking, they also have soft drinks. If someone is like this, and it is difficult to change his mind, I think he should not burden his colleagues. I regret the many things he misses, collegial contacts, but I would not persuade him to go, I would leave it there.

– In our association we take into account whether, for example, people eat meat or not.
– It stinks, so I won't go. I might on very special occasions. I'd say that there are other possibilities, such as a pancake house.
– They also serve beer there.
– Yes, but not so much. There are other possibilities that are the point.
– I would go once but not every week, to get my voice heard, tell them that we do not drink alcohol, and also for conversation. Example. When watching football they drink a lot, then I go away quickly, colleagues at the sports club know that.
– I would not try to change it, it's their own choice.
– Yes, free choice. Do not try to change it, but I also have rights.
– Usually there is a committee for the drinks, I'd say go to it . . .
– *Or serve alcohol only later*.
– I can agree with anyone proposing to serve alcohol later. I myself have no difficulty with it, so it would not change anything, but I would look at the wishes that must be considered, though you cannot please everyone. They must bring it up themselves, make some effort. So I encourage discussion about this.

In another focus group among doers with an immigrant background:

– The employer must look into this. Depending on the number of Muslims, say fifteen in a department, I have seen that there is no alcohol. The employer must ensure an open conversation with employees. I would ask people what they think. The two parties together. If there are only two Muslims, it is not such a big deal.
– Or alcohol only at the end of the party, when Muslims can leave.
– I've never seen a compromise . . . . There's always alcohol. Others find it very important that there is alcohol. I wanted my own party without alcohol, but some did not, and in the end they drank elsewhere.
– Within the company there is discussion about alcohol. We must seek a democratic solution. Alcohol at New Year's: believers

should accept that. I am not in favor of alternatives. In this society, alcohol is tolerated in moderation.
– If there is no alcohol there will be no Dutch. Then you have a problem.

We suggested other solutions such as alternating between alcohol and tea and cake, but these were rejected more often than in the other groups where few or no Muslims took part. The introduction of such alternatives would in one way or another contribute to their stigmatization.

Within the frame of the doers, respect means respecting the rights of people to make their own decisions. It is different from accepting what one doesn't understand in others from a position of strength (Sennett 2003: 255) or agnosticism (Swierstra & Tonkens 2005, 2008), which is closer to republican understanding. It is more the right to be left alone, the right to privacy, what the literature terms 'negative freedom' (Berlin 2004: 176–177).

A restorative understanding of culture among the native Dutch will be met by a tendency to retreat among the participants with an immigrant background. This will ensure continuity of the Friday afternoon drinks – at least insofar as it depends on intercultural discussion. They may at times begin without alcohol. But, beyond the initial discussions, lie concessions that will easily lead to resentment.

The constructive view of citizenship – the search for new standards rather than the imposition of old ones – can be threatening for everyone. Dialog helps, but not always. Sometimes it is no more than a ritual: the motives of others are inquired after, and then the situation is considered resolved. That hardly anything changes as a result is then no longer one's responsibility. And certainly in the case of the after-work drinks, this gives those who care about dialog a comfortable feeling. But such dialog can also function to impose an unwanted identity on its participants, in this case Muslims. Even if they explain their motives, they run the risk of others associating them with groups that they do not want to be associated with, for example, strict Muslim believers.

Constructive citizenship requires an ability to discuss differences, including asking questions about the motives and experiences of others in a non-aggressive manner. The exercise of such skills

assumes that one has power, or at least belief in one's agency. For those who feel powerless, placing oneself in another's shoes can be unattractive – empathy entails loss of certainty.

5.3 'They' shouldn't touch my holidays

'No society can exist that does not feel the need at regular intervals to sustain and reaffirm the collective feelings and ideas that constitute its unity and its personality. Now, this moral remaking can only be achieved by means of meetings, assemblies, or congregations in which individuals, brought into close contact, reaffirm jointly their common feelings; hence those ceremonies whose goals, results, and methods do not differ in kind from proper religious ceremonies. What essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians commemorating the principal moments in the life of Christ, or Jews celebrating either the exodus from Egypt or the giving of the Ten Commandments and a meeting of citizens commemorating the institution of a new moral charter or some great event in national life?' (Durkheim [1912] 2001: 322).

Building on Durkheim, Etzioni argues that public holidays, as social rituals, have an integrating function (Etzioni 2001: 113–141). But people no longer have the time to take the day off from work and collectively reflect on who they are, or on what they share with others. This has disintegrating effects for society. Everyday life, with all its bustle, temptations, and demands, has made us into a society of consumers, not citizens. Society must therefore reinvent itself through rituals that renew our faith in one another. Shared experiences create emotional ties, and because our emotional ties are weak, we need more shared experiences.

In line with Durkheim's functionalism, Etzioni distinguishes between holidays that confirm order through rituals (Easter) and those that confirm order through authorized chaos (Carnival). He points out that when festivals are 'privatized' rather than celebrated in public – as is often the case – they need not have an integrating function for society. But collectively celebrated festivals do: both the celebration itself as well as the recognition that it is an important day brings people together. The logic here fits neatly into our scheme of the four variants of the culturalization of citizenship: namely, its constructive practical variant. The focus groups discussed

a hypothetical proposal to introduce a new national holiday at the expense of an existing one.

The government proposes to establish the Islamic Eid as a national holiday. This will come at the expense of another national holiday. Could you support such a proposal?

- If 'YES': Why? Which existing public holiday would you be willing to give up? What advantages do you see for yourself, for those around you, for society? Is it the government's duty to ensure a holiday for Muslims?
- If 'NO': Why not? There are now approximately 1 million Muslims living in the Netherlands, don't they have a right to a national holiday alongside all the other predominantly Christian holidays? Shouldn't holidays consider all inhabitants?

Here we see the same frames as in the case of the Friday afternoon drinks. Under certain conditions, the talkers were willing to discuss an exchange, though desire for dialog was limited. The 'breach in the dam' motif – often heard among the usually more conservative doers when discussing the after-work drinks – was now heard prominently. In all groups, people with not-so-strong opinions spoke first; fiercer opponents waited, aware that their opinions could be considered politically incorrect. Until now, we had seen no major disagreements within the groups, but this question led to several serious confrontations.

This case clearly aroused anxieties: the exchanging of holidays, some feared, could easily become reality. The focus group participants often did not know what (Christian) festivals stood for. While laughing, they were uncomfortable; none were eager to celebrate Pentecost themselves but clearly wished others did – a comparable reaction to the distrust of others' understanding of duties encountered previously. People do not find it necessary to attend Christmas Eucharist themselves, but what will happen if everybody thinks like this?

It was, moreover, remarkable that those who supported exchanging holidays, or had little trouble with the idea, were the first to speak up.

Those who absolutely disagreed waited and then agitated from the sidelines; they were less likely to air their views as the holidays were, for them, an emotional issue. They were also aware that they were at a disadvantage in the conversation: the exchange itself, it had been established, was not an issue; raising it again could make them appear difficult or intolerant. We thus saw a reflection of the broader public debate – 'planners' with rational arguments sidelining the less articulate, who ended up grumbling, frustrated, and feeling powerless.

The responses of the immigrants were often the mirror-image of the divers. The new Dutch tended to argue against provocation, and for holidays to be private affairs. They were glad society did not accede to the more radical demands. Why become visible if one can already maintain one's own rituals? It does not belong in this country, one heard repeatedly. The tone was more timid than self-confident.

Among talkers:

- Yes, if Queen's Day goes away. Fine.
- Good Friday, yes.
- If I look into myself, there is a sense of, oh no, don't do this, I'm so used to the rhythm of how the holidays fit together. Not wanting a lot of change is very strong. Otherwise it's no big deal for me which religion it is associated with. For me there are no ties, Good Friday.
- All religions have their own holidays . . . I think all nationalities could find their way if we just highlighted a number of public holidays, and each could fill in its own details.
- Just enter non-working days and leave it there.

Moderator: There must be another national holiday to be exchanged.

- Queen's Day. I feel nothing for it.
- I also feel nothing for it.
- Ascension Day.
- A church holiday which no longer has meaning.

Moderator: You want to exchange a religious holiday, why?

- We don't hold those values anymore.
- As if anyone here knows what happened at Pentecost.

– That's true, but there is a cultural context. And I think that is certainly important, and then you come to education, and so on, and there is something to be done.
– What does the average Dutchman know of the holidays? The meaning of Christmas?
– Even that's hard, I imagine.
– What do we change then?
– Nothing!

Among doers:

– Well, we were all once forced to celebrate Christmas and Easter and Pentecost . . . (interrupted)
– We are a reformed country and celebrate a Catholic celebration . . .
– What is a Catholic celebration?
– Christmas.
– No, Christian, Dutch Reformed.
– It's a pagan festival.
– Carnival is a pagan festival.
– No, also Christmas.
– However you look at it, I would have no objection in principle.

Moderator: Are there people who object?

– Absolutely not.
– I have no objection with the celebration, I object to surrendering one of my holidays.
– Yes, they should stay away from my holidays.

Moderator: Who are they?

– They, they, they, they.

Among divers

– Ascension Day, Whit Monday, Pentecost, Good Friday, it doesn't matter, a free day is a day off, I'm not religious. I think it best if many Muslims are satisfied, why not?
– I don't think it is necessary, this is not the right answer, it may be necessary for some people but I think the Netherlands is

a country with a Christian character and much-talked about Christian norms and values, in which belong holidays, and that is a tradition, for some maybe not but for others it is, and then I think yes, if you live here as a Muslim you should be happy to be living in a Christian country though you are not free from work on your holiday. This is one of the consequences of coming to the Netherlands. Ultimately this will change when the group is so large that we can no longer say we're in a Christian country.

Moderator: There are 1 million.

- Yes, out of 16 million, that's not all that many . . .
- I don't know if it's good that it would be a national holiday, but when you are going to lose your own holidays, I see it as a piece of Dutch identity . . .
- I think so too, Eid for one out of 16 million, so you leave 15 million with nothing.
- Don't many Muslims get the day free from work?
- Yes they get it free.
- But they also get all those other holidays free.
- I have no problems. But I can imagine there are people who will do something about it.
- I think some public holidays should remain, but some people only think I have a free day, which is also fine. I would not return a day but would introduce an additional holiday.
- I think this type of discussion might be 100 years too early, it's hard to put into words, I wonder whether our positions are not emotional.

Little space remained for immigrants to support the proposal. They usually did not, preferring to keep the issue private. Celebrating Eid, they argued, was not a public issue; the collective bargaining agreement already stipulated that one could get the day free from work. That is good, and we should not want more. What was most feared was a native Dutch backlash.

- There is no need for a holiday to be specified. It is just one day where Muslims might celebrate Eid, or ex-Muslims partying in their own way because they have a free day. If the Netherlands is a Judeo-Christian culture, it is not a duty to ensure a holiday

for the non-Jews or Christians. In this case the Muslims. It is good like that. I have no problems. I just take a day off and this has never created any problems with my employer.

– I would appreciate it if Eid was a holiday. But I would not give up any existing holidays, because others would not like that. One must look at it both ways, we join existing festivals and find that nice and sociable, also Eid would have to engage other cultures, meaning that we as citizens of the Netherlands can become familiar with different cultures.
– Queen's Day. Eid is a religious festival. But the exchange should not be at the expense of other faiths. Queen's Day is general and last year I heard it had little meaning except as a day free from work.
– A free day for a national holiday is not applicable within the Dutch community. In addition to Muslims, there are also Roman Catholics, [Old] Catholics, Christians and others. Not all of these beliefs celebrate Christmas, Easter, Ascension, etc. So it's not necessary.

5.4 Loyalty

The native Dutch spoke smoothly about their multiple loyalties. The question whether one felt more a citizen of one's city, country, or the world was an easy one, though it sometimes triggered nostalgia. The situation was different for the new Dutch, whose sense of home was more restrained and local. The latter identified more with their city than the country; feeling Dutch was not really something they aspired to. There are thus significant differences between groups when it comes to loyalty felt toward different levels (local, regional, national, international). To understand this variance, we need to examine the nature of loyalty.

Loyalty originates from *loi* (law in French), but it is the law of the heart and of the will, not that of the state (Yu 2005: 6). Considered to lie somewhere between unadulterated self-interest and lofty ideals, loyalty depends on one's membership in one or more communities. Loyalty determines the distance over which one applies universal principles; it allows differential treatment of one's own children from children in the neighborhood, one's own compatriots from residents of the Third World (Oldenquist 1982).

Against the repertoire of active citizenship and that of the free individual, loyalty is seen as an ambiguous virtue: besides steadfastness, there is also the suggestion of servility, the lack of will and identity. In this context, it is not without significance that immigrants are told they 'must choose the Netherlands'. The paradoxical 'choice' here is to meet the requirements of loyalty without raising suspicions (Hurenkamp & Duyvendak 2008), suggesting that hiding one's loyalties may be the best strategy within liberal democracies.

The question is whether this is possible. Loyalty is based on unelected ties, to the place where one was born, the environment in which one was raised, the attitudes of one's teachers, the standards at one's school – all places where an individual has little or no influence. Alasdair Macintyre suggests that alienation occurs when reason tries to explain away these unelected ties. This often happens as the freely choosing individual has been the cultural ideal of the past decades. Loyalty to 'heavy' communities fits poorly here. We thus pretend that these unelected ties do not exist. Everyone is – or should be – free. Citizenship should be based on general principles (one is free to dress as one would wish) rather than on any sense of primordial identity (my father wants me to wear a headscarf).

Critics will counter that loyalty is a virtue. Macintyre argues that allegedly free individuals can only exist within communities sustained over time by the loyalty of their members. But loyalties, precisely because they are partisan and concrete, conflict with necessarily abstract ideals: one is not taught that one must respect one's parents; one is taught *how* to respect them. Loyalties can only be chosen to a limited extent; the real question is not which is chosen but how and where they were acquired. The requirement that citizens feel loyalty toward the Netherlands is thus much more complicated for immigrants than for native Dutch, as the former already often have other loyalties. Good citizenship as appropriate emotion is thus very different from good citizenship as appropriate practice: while the latter is not easily disputed, the former is not easily proven. Demonstrating 'good citizenship' by following the rules is much easier than demonstrating identification with the rules – as the culturalization of citizenship requires of immigrants. The latter requires one to constantly explain everything one does.

The following vignettes show how especially the new Dutch are wrestling with their multiple loyalties. We asked our focus groups

how strongly they felt themselves to be Amsterdammers/Arnhemmers and/or Dutch, and why. The ensuing conversations revealed the influence of unchosen loyalties as well as differences between the talkers, doers, and divers, as well as between the new and native Dutch.

Among the doers:

– I was born in Amsterdam, I lived in Haarlem for 20 years, I've wandered around the Netherlands and beyond for work, I am an Amsterdammer and remain an Amsterdammer . . . If you're asking me 'what about Amsterdam attracts you?' it's the . . . attitude. What I don't like is that people are not always honest. And then you have the problem between Amsterdam North and Amsterdam, they are very different . . . Amsterdam North is different from South, it's like a big family. . . . For example, they just had a protest about the houseboats. There were 300 people in the space to tell them to keep their hands off the houseboats. I find that in Amsterdam North, and I love it . . . But now Amsterdam North is not a pleasant place, it is completely impoverished. And it's a political policy making this happen, unfortunately . . .

Moderator: What has changed?

– Young people loiter on the streets, we warned 'you have to act, get in contact with youths, don't let it get out of control', but that they didn't do. Until they pushed out whole groups of people, the costs to save the whole thing, wasted money . . . They put five, six aid workers on a case until things calmed down. But then it begins again. So we are going to install cameras . . . I don't know what we are doing, but talk is not working. I think it is a pity that Amsterdam North has been left in the lurch, that is not what happened in the past. Previously we talked to each other.
– There was social control.
– O Jesus, that was good!
– Yes, I feel a Dutchman. I buy a foreign newspaper or install a satellite dish but I'm watching the Netherlands. I'm really not looking for anything else, I am very proud of the country where I am.

Moderator: Dutch and Amsterdammer are the same things for you?

– Amsterdam is a very mixed city . . . it is difficult to compare.
– Sometimes I'm ashamed that I am a Dutchman, especially abroad. Especially when I see how anti-social youths behave, how hooligans rampage . . . things like that embarrass me to death. When I am abroad I often hear from friends who ask: 'This is the Netherlands? You were so tolerant, you were so this and that, and then . . . ' (general hubbub)
– Yes, but this is also the Netherlands, and it is shameful.
– Every nationality does this.
– Well, I've spent the past year being really ashamed of Verdonk's policies. And in several areas, it's like, 'wow, is this really happening in this country?'

Among another group of doers in the city of Arnhem:

Moderator: Do you all feel more a Dutchman or an Arnhemmer?

– I am a Dutchman.
– Dutchman.
– Dutchman.
– I am a Dutchman from Arnhem.

Moderator: Dutch nationality comes first?

– Yes, I'm proud of it. (approving nods)
– I am certainly Dutch, but not always proud.
– Me too.
– I don't feel Dutch.

Moderator: Because?

– I believe the Netherlands is a country without an identity. The Dutch don't have an identity.

Moderator: Relative to people from Arnhem?

– No, no, relative to what I have experienced abroad, if I were Greek or Arab, a Frenchman or a German, then I'd talk about my country much more as a man proud of his country.

– Yes, but it's chauvinistic.
– As a Dutchman I would be a chauvinist, I would now say, yes I live in a country where many people are less happy than they were before . . . because there is so much imposed that is not from the Netherlands, the Netherlands of ten years ago when . . . smoking or whatever we did, was within the norms and values and I've lately felt that our values are defined by laws and therefore I feel less and less Dutch.
– Yes, but the world is upside down now . . .
– No kidding.
– Yes, with globalization, see, the world is upside down.

Among talkers, again in Arnhem:

– I always say that I'm a world citizen. I mean, I do not feel like a Fleming . . . perhaps Flemish the most, but not Belgian, not Dutch, Arnhem no.
– I feel more connected to the land, not so much a place but a part of the Netherlands, a region . . .
– That goes for me too, the region.
– For me it's hard, I feel the older I get, the more Kurdish I feel, when I was younger I did not think one day . . . I find the older I grow, the more I get homesick for my hometown, my country, your identity, your music, Kurdish music, yes I have these things.

Moderator: And within the borders of this country? Do you feel more an Arnhemmer or a Dutchman?

– Arnhemmer.
– Bluntly, mainly a Dutchman, not so much a world citizen, my primary frame of reference is the neighborhood, which is not Arnhem.
– Both, in some cases one, sometimes the other.
– Instinctively I still feel [the region of] Twente is the best place on earth. I find it very difficult to name anywhere else.
– I'm a Rotterdammer, I feel nothing for the Netherlands, I have a Dutch passport, I'm from Rotterdam, you hear it in my voice, I studied there, my family lives there, so I have an emotional

connection, but for the rest I could just as easily go somewhere else, if I find better weather.

Among immigrants in Amsterdam:

- I was born and raised an Amsterdammer . . . in Amsterdam East, I know the neighborhood. I feel secure there, though not many people feel that . . . when I go abroad on holiday I usually go to Turkey and it is nice for the first few weeks . . . but at a certain point it is quite different, the system is different, the lifestyle is different . . . because I was born here, grew up here, I know all the laws and rules. And I know where, when I must stop, I know my limits here, and for this reason I feel myself an Amsterdammer.
- I have also been in Rotterdam. When I came back to Amsterdam, I thought, great . . .
- I go camping with colleagues . . . to the Ardennes or something for a weekend, or a week. When I'm back in the city, I am very happy.
- This is very interesting. Once at a New Year's reception, with people from different immigrant Catholic parishes, I simply asked: who feels like me an Amsterdammer? All the people raised their hands. All. And then I asked: who feels like me a Dutchman?
- Myself, I don't know. All my colleagues call me a real Amsterdammer . . . Yes, the way I talk, the things I do and the contacts and stuff, it's when you're outside Amsterdam, things are totally different. The social contacts, it's not multicultural . . . when I am outside Amsterdam, I feel plain lost. If I'm in Amsterdam, I know where to go . . . so I feel an Amsterdammer.
- Perhaps because the first time I came to the Netherlands, I came straight to Amsterdam, I felt myself an Amsterdammer, like I would have anywhere else . . . One of my colleagues settled in The Hague when he came to the Netherlands, and says it's very different. You know what I mean, as an immigrant who comes to Amsterdam when I am 30 years old, I just feel an Amsterdammer, when I go to The Hague or Rotterdam or Friesland, I just feel it's different. It is like my hometown, so to speak. I can more easily be open to people in Amsterdam . . .

Among another group of immigrants:

Moderator: Do you feel an Amsterdammer?

Yes, I am an Amsterdammer.

– It depends. If you say you are an Amsterdammer, from what angle do you say that? . . . If you mean politically, I'm an Amsterdammer. When it comes to other things, I'm not.

Moderator: For example? What other things?

– For example, if we go and apply for a job, the two of us, and I'm not accepted, then I'm not an Amsterdammer.
– But do you feel an Amsterdammer?
– In the political sense I feel that I'm an Amsterdammer, I vote, I pay taxes . . .
– So in theory you are an Amsterdammer, but not in practice.
– No, not in practice.
– I arrived in Amsterdam in 1969, from the tropics. I have stayed in other cities but I always want to return to Amsterdam. That's within the Netherlands. I'm already 37 years in Europe, I am a European citizen, I've been out there. But I can well imagine how nice it is to be an Amsterdammer, because you have more chance the native Dutch accept you because you join in Amsterdam habits that can be nice. But I no longer especially feel an Amsterdammer. Twenty years ago, they asked, where do you live? Amsterdam. They say it is nice there, busy, multicultural, but Amsterdam is now ruined. If they ask now, I come from a different city.

Among another group with an immigrant background:

– Amsterdam is stronger, frankly.
– First I am Dutch and then I am an Amsterdammer, that's how I see it now.
– I am the opposite, first an Amsterdammer, then Dutch.
– I was in Amsterdam for the first few years and then became Dutch.
– Theoretically if you are an Amsterdammer you are also a Dutchman, but practically, Amsterdam has a whole different

> lifestyle. Amsterdam is very different, it is multicultural, very busy and East and West and when you're born here you have a whole different lifestyle and when you go somewhere else, to Rotterdam, as we just discussed, it is very different, it looks like a completely different country, a very different culture . . . yes I think I am more an Amsterdammer than a Dutchman. But in theory, I am just a Dutchman of course.

In contrast, the native Dutch express more loyalty toward the country (and to a lesser extent the neighborhood) than toward the city. The immediate living environment, the atmosphere of the neighborhood and culture are more important than the city and its institutions. While the city remains a frame of reference (whether it is deemed 'dynamic' or synonymous with 'drugs and porn'), for native Dutch there is little ambiguity: their loyalty is toward the national community. The country stands for the things one wants to be associated with and proud of, even if what they are is not always clear.

> I don't feel my identity as an Arnhemmer is determined by me coming from Arnhem or living there, but I think the fact that I grew up in the Netherlands and with Dutch norms is stronger . . . I agree with you that a lot is rapidly changing and everybody, including myself, has problems with what is going on now and the impact it will have on your life and your views, but if you talk about defining identity then I can readily say that Dutch nationality has a more important role in it than the city in which I live.

Loyalty often revolves around feelings that are hard to express. The welfare state and competition for jobs and housing were not so prominently discussed as the larger, more abstract issue of norms and values. This mirrors the discussion on the streets and on TV. Those with fewer social ties placed greater significance on commemorations and celebrations. To a large extent this is repetitive, with those lacking careers or neighborhoods to be proud of looking for something to publicly declare their allegiance to.

Only when abroad, when explaining it to foreigners, did people gain a strong sense of Dutch identity, of what the country stands for.

Pride in the Netherlands seemed more abstract than reality – a sense of loss and an indictment:

– And if I'm in Bos en Lommer, where I live, like my neighbor here, well then I think, the Kolenkitbuurt, it's 90 percent immigrants. There remain a few percent whites and the rest are all immigrants.
– Maybe this also has to do with my not feeling an Amsterdammer . . . You live in an environment with immigrants, many Dutch people still live on my street because the houses are privately owned, and that is another difference, rental or sale, but once I go around the corner I see more immigrants than Dutch . . . So maybe that's the feeling that you, well, if I lived in the city center with more Amsterdammers around . . . but that does not mean that I don't feel at home at all, only that I don't feel an Amsterdammer.

The 'imagined community' here is bereft of any sense of progress described in Benedict Anderson's classic work. Images of the 'nation' were then meant to unite different parts of a given territory for a greater purpose: empowerment of the poor, liberation from colonialism. But such is no longer the case. The imagined community now serves as a refuge. Social cohesion – or the current lack of it – animated the group discussions, whether in the form of greater tolerance toward all and solidarity in the neighborhood, or smaller differences in income and culture. But whether the image of a previously more caring Netherlands was true or not did not affect the argument. What is required is faithful adherence to the vision of a caring and orderly country: a warm, recognizable community which functions without too much friction, where loyalty to the nation is taken for granted. No one was prepared for this vision to be seriously questioned or challenged.

Many new Dutch recognize this. Experiences of discrimination notwithstanding, they soon declare their loyalty to the city, though they hesitate to do so with the country as a whole. The desire to feel at home, it seems, grows over the years, but this sense of belonging is often not found at the national level. Members of the second generation quite easily come to identify with the places where they live. While larger cosmopolitan cities such as Amsterdam offer more

opportunities for identification than lesser-known places, the place where one resides generates a natural loyalty that cannot easily be discounted – especially when one was born there, when one's children were born there, or if it was one's first new home after emigrating.

Local identification makes it possible to maintain both an immigrant identity and one that differentiates between co-ethnics from different parts of the Netherlands. Younger respondents argued that one must distinguish between 'Moroccans from Groningen' and 'Moroccans from Amsterdam', 'Moroccans from Amsterdam East' and 'Moroccans from Amsterdam West'.

– If you come to Groningen and you're a Moroccan from Amsterdam, it will be very different than if you were a Moroccan from Deventer. You should not come into contact with Moroccans from Amsterdam, it's dangerous. Really dangerous. As they say, crazy Moroccans.

Moderator: Moroccans from Deventer say that?

– Yeah, I think so, they have heard that image: the Moroccans from Amsterdam East and West are dangerous.

The above echoes the differences attributed to Arnhemmers from the city's North and South districts. Like others from their city, Arnhem's immigrants find Amsterdam 'too busy'. It reminds us that the differences between the new and native Dutch are not so much how fellow citizens view them – they make use of the same classifications – but the loyalties that they develop. If one is welcomed by a town, identification becomes that much easier. The new Dutch in our study were always enthusiastic about welcoming ceremonies. A letter or handshake from the mayor, councilor, or a civil servant was repeatedly mentioned as the beginning of an emotional connection. Thus loyalty is not necessarily as deep as communitarians like MacIntyre argue. Loyalty does not have to be restricted to what one absorbed in one's youth; it can also be generated by more recently acquired ties.

– When I moved to Zwolle I received a letter from the city hall within two days, inviting me to join the new residents of Zwolle

> for a drink and to get acquainted with the city, how things were done and where everything was. I was not there because it was a school day, but I heard from my housemates that . . . at this party you felt part of the municipality, you became a resident of Zwolle and thus a Zwollenaar . . . I felt very welcome in the city hall, receiving invitations . . . I think it's very important to create the feeling that you are a resident of a town or city.
> – I do not feel an Arnhemmer, or a resident, even my kids do not feel at home, because of discrimination in schools and universities: lower grades, more difficult tasks, problems with immigrant children coming late, in university they said, 'we do not want immigrants to come here to study'.

Incidents of discrimination (incidentally more violent in Arnhem than in Amsterdam) took a heavy toll on loyalty and identification. Concrete experiences – of feeling discriminated against, of being evaluated differently, of being gazed at icily by passers-by – made new Dutch feel like foreigners. The more one identified with the neighborhood or city, the harder it was when one was shunned by it. This was the case for both socially active and inactive immigrants. The fear of rejection was palpable among those who doubted they belonged as well as those who easily declared that they were Amsterdammers or Arnhemmers.

The Netherlands and Dutch citizenship were less meaningful for the new Dutch in our focus groups. Nobody explicitly rejected the Dutch identity as such – which was probably prevented by the setting. But their responses to the question of when one feels Dutch were much more cautious.

> Yes, we often heard about the Netherlands at our grandparents' home, about our Queen Wilhelmina, our princess. In our school, money was collected for the marriage of Princess Beatrix. So we have always been connected to the Netherlands, but if people ask how you feel, I am a Hindu, a Hindu of Surinamese descent. It depends on who asks and where.

Discussions regarding national citizenship were brief; they followed the tone set by the media and politicians, and were much less specific on experiences from daily life. The symbols and expressions that

underwrite Dutch identity tended to have little meaning for the new Dutch, and were often seen as exclusive. While the discussion on developing local loyalties drew on experiences from school, work, and home, there was no mention of practices for cultivating loyalty to the Netherlands.

Several patterns were evident in the new Dutch participants' responses to questions about connectedness and feeling at home in the Netherlands. One was the broad suggestion that citizenship need not be exclusive to any one country, that one can even feel a citizen of the world: home is where one feels comfortable. There was a palpable reluctance to label what the Netherlands and Dutch citizenship meant to them: because they genuinely did not want to choose between countries (as if this were an issue amenable to choice), because they wished to avoid controversy and public rejection, or because the national idea had little bearing on daily life.

5.5 Conclusion

In terms of crafting citizenship, culture plays a ambiguous role. On the surface of it, the native Dutch generally identify with the emotional, restorative culturalization of citizenship and the new Dutch generally feel excluded by it. This contrast is particularly marked at the national level. Locally, new Dutch have greater access to cultural citizenship through tangible practices, thus making it more constructive. One can identify with and take pride in the city or neighborhood where one was born, studies, works, or is otherwise socially active.

Many native Dutch, especially the elderly, spoke from the discourse of restorative, emotional citizenship, showing a gloomy desire for community. This contrasted with many new Dutch and young people from diverse backgrounds who appealed to a more practical, constructive discourse, demonstrating a more cautious desire for community. The gloomy longing of the native Dutch implies a desire for a more uniform world; for answers they turn to the past, to an abstract nation, to lofty ideals. They appeal to the restorative discourse not because they think it is best but because it is, for them, the most accessible. Even though these older natives have rather abstract notions of what allows them to feel at home, they often have much more concrete conceptions of what undermines their sense of

home in the Netherlands: the arrival of immigrants. They have high expectations of public institutions, and when these expectations are not met, their identification with the city and neighborhood crumble. This leaves the nation and its cherished ideals as the objects of emotional identification. Appeals to cultural citizenship elicit strong emotional responses from these people, not least because they are often less involved in the more practical aspects of citizenship; for them, feeling at home and feelings of nostalgia are almost inseparable (Duyvendak 2011).

While disappointment in their neighborhoods may seem bearable, disappointment in the course the country is taking is not. Pierre Bourdieu speaks of 'positional suffering' – not 'great suffering' such as hunger and poverty, but forms of marginalization that may now be more prevalent than ever (Bourdieu *et al*. 1999: 4). Such suffering is tangible in how people feel ignored in cultural matters – because they often cannot express accurately what they mean, and because they have to compete against people who can. This awkwardness renders them speechless. 'They should just let it be', ventured a native Dutch woman in one of our focus groups. She is a good, active citizen, yet icy anger grips her throat when she talks about policy-makers ready to negotiate away 'her' holidays. The fact that none of the other participants knew what Pentecost really stood for only heightened her sense of powerlessness – as did uncertainty over whether people in backrooms were actually working on a plan to exchange Christian holidays for Islamic ones.

Their representatives do not respect their wishes, which they are unable to promote themselves: the situation speaks of political powerlessness. The demands are no longer for eight-hour working days, the right to vote, or affordable housing, all of which could be expressed by militant spokespeople. It is precisely the requirements of debate that cause embarrassment, not only because they suspect their desires will not win support, but because they feel socially inadequate. The ordinariness of their demands – to be listened to, to be considered – makes them appear inept, as if their citizenship practices are insufficient. They know that a 'good citizen' should engage in dialog and treat everyone equally. But something else is brewing that makes them support ideas of citizenship that focus on decency, cleanliness, and imposing order. What provides comfort, what makes them feel at home, their own culture – these mean everything. That

this culture is democratic, or strives to be democratic, complicates matters.

The same pattern was evident in the other cases: the sense of being unable to articulate one's position persuasively, and of having to compete against people who could, but who did not share their concerns. The influx of yuppies into the city, the influence of large multinational companies, the gentrification of their neighborhoods, a government that meddles rather than 'really' listens – all were recurring concerns.

On the other side are those cautious citizens who, being less comfortable with abstract notions of citizenship, base their feelings of loyalty and belonging on personal experience. They draw primarily on the constructive discourse, again not because they think it is best, but because they find it difficult to access the discourse of restoration. Nevertheless, they hesitate to claim the constructive discourse as their own, perhaps out of fear that they will be challenged or rejected. This applies to immigrants, but to young people as well. And as the desires of elderly natives to feel at home are hard-pressed to find outlets other than melancholy, immigrants must often be content comparing their lives in the Netherlands to those in their countries of origin, and concluding that their new lives are not so bad after all. Young people often refer solely to their everyday lives, which rarely extend beyond the city limits.

These cautious citizens defend freedom of choice and want the issues to be kept private. And like the 'positional suffering' that we encountered among large groups who suspect that they are not well represented, here we see the suffering and frustration of people who feel they must hold their calm. Though hardly satisfying, they know that it is better not to make demands and to show gratitude. It is worth emphasizing here that this strategic behavior is not self-realization, but a difficult adjustment.

Loyalty cannot be forced. But it can be crafted through positive personal experiences of feeling welcome. For the wider national community, there are no comparable personal experiences; immigrants thus rely on secondhand experiences via the media and hearsay. Because these have become more negative over the years, not much loyalty is generated there. This does not mean that national citizenship is a totally empty structure for the new Dutch: national holidays like Queen's Day (when the whole country becomes a giant

flea market), popular TV shows like the Dutch version of *American Idol* and sports events generate a certain sense of community, while gaining a command of the Dutch language is considered logical by all.

But the feeling of powerlessness to influence how people see and understand the issues remains, the crafting that has to be done is far from self-evident. Knowing that claiming rights is not a popular strategy, newcomers want to stand out as little as possible. Behind the desire to blend in is the fear of being 'deleted' for wrong behavior. Whether the issue is attending post-work Friday drinks, instituting Eid as a public holiday, or their understanding of Dutch citizenship, responses remain cautious: it is sensible not to make any unnecessary claims and try to remain invisible, otherwise one could be regarded as an extremist or a traitor.

6

The Three Freedoms of the Dutch: The Culturalization of Citizenship in the Netherlands Put into an International Perspective

We need to empirically examine what has happened since the 1960s to properly understand the Dutch case. The Netherlands indeed emerged as one of the most progressive countries in the world – a fact that both Dutch politicians and citizens are proud of. In its early days, Dutch 'progressive monoculturalism' was relatively tolerant. But this changed over the course of the 1990s. However, it is not our claim that a multicultural model has been replaced by a 'monocultural' one: 'models' as such presuppose much more coherence over time and policy levels than the facts in our case warrant. Our claim, rather, is that the past decade has witnessed the rise of a discourse that perceives Dutch citizenship primarily in cultural terms. This chapter examines the defining aspects of this culturalist framing of Dutch citizenship in comparison to definitions of citizenship in France and the UK.

We analyzed opinion articles addressing three themes in the period 2000 to 2009, based on the LexisNexis Database. For each country, we selected three national newspapers characterized as respectively: (a) conservative, tending toward populism; (b) center and more intellectual; and (c) left-wing, neither intellectual nor populist. For France these were: (a) *Le Figaro*, (b) *Le Monde*, and (c) *Libération*. For the UK: (a) the *Sun*, (b) the *Guardian*, and (c) the *Independent*, and for the Netherlands: (a) *de Telegraaf*, (b) *NRC-Handelsblad*, and (c) *de Volkskrant*.

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We do not have the ambition to analyze the culturalization of citizenship in other West European countries (which would be a research project in itself). Instead, we selected three themes that have been most extensively discussed in the Netherlands – ex-Muslims/apostasy, homosexuality, and domestic violence – and examine how debates on these issues have been framed in the UK and France. We thus focus on similarities and differences between the three countries to get a more precise picture of the Dutch case. Can we grasp the culturalization of citizenship in the Netherlands better by comparing it to debates on the same topics in other Western European countries?

6.1 Ex-Muslims

We found 'ex-Muslims' to be an issue in all three countries, though in different ways. The Dutch debate focused on the right to 'exit Islam' and was triggered in September 2002 when ex-Muslim and publicist Ayaan Hirsi Ali (who later that year became member of parliament) reported to the police that she had been threatened by Muslims (a few months after the assassination of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn). The question of apostasy exploded on the headlines when the formation of a committee for ex-Muslims was announced in May 2007, with the ex-Muslim local Labor politician Ehsan Jami as one of its founders. Intense debate on apostasy within Islam as well as the role of the Labor party and its members in supporting or criticizing Jami ensued, and came to a head when Jami reported being intimidated by Muslims. To support ex-Muslims in their struggle, a new committee was formed on 14 August 2007, mainly consisting of native Dutch public figures. On 10 September 2007, a declaration of support for ex-Muslims was published, signed by 75 Dutch and a few Flemish public personalities.

In France, two events focused public attention on ex-Muslims. The first was philosopher Robert Redeker's criticism, published in *Le Figaro*, of the closed nature of Islam and its lack of humanism. The article provoked intense debate in France, also concerning Islam's prohibition of apostasy. The second revolved around Magdi Allam, an Egyptian-born Italian journalist who publicly criticized Islamic extremism and defended the Judeo-Christian roots of Europe and the West. Allam had converted from Islam to Roman Catholicism in 2006.

In the UK, three events focused attention on ex-Muslims: the bestowal of a knighthood on author Salman Rushdie in 2007 (against whom Ayatollah Khomeini had issued a fatwa in 1989), the founding of the Council for Ex-Muslims that same year, and the Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams's 2008 statement that the adoption of the Sharia in the UK was inevitable. These events led to discussions on freedom of religion and speech in all three countries. But these discussions took markedly different directions.

The above incidents notwithstanding, 'ex-Muslims' are hardly a cause for serious public debate in France and the UK, where attention mainly focuses on individual cases of conversion. These tend to be human interest stories that do not generate public, let alone political, debate. In France in particular, much attention is devoted to Christians converting to Islam, much more than on Muslims converting to Christianity. In the period we studied, we found 134 articles describing the personal stories of Christians converting to Islam. But we had to wait until 2004 for an article about a Muslim converting to Christianity to appear in *Le Figaro*. This was the story of Lucille O., a French-Moroccan woman who had converted to Christianity after years of oppression and fear. Ostracized by her family, she went on to start a foundation supporting Christians in the Middle East. Former Muslims like Lucilla were portrayed as tragic figures.

Nor did the theme of apostasy provoke much public debate in the UK, but remained a marginal topic within the large number of articles addressing Islam and freedom of speech, extremism, and fear of the religion. As in France, mention of ex-Muslims did not focus on the UK itself, but on events around the world, including ex-Muslims in the Middle East and efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity in Afghanistan. The human interest stories so prominent in France were not found in the UK press. The UK press did, however, cover events in the Netherlands, not only the murder of Theo van Gogh but controversies surrounding the ex-Muslim politician Hirsi Ali and an 'over-radical Islam in an over-tolerant Holland' (*Guardian Weekly*, 12 November 2004). Nevertheless, the debate around Hirsi Ali was not about ex-Muslims, but focused on the freedom of women in Islam, the limits of multiculturalism, and so on.

Media coverage of ex-Muslims in the Netherlands differed markedly from the UK and France. The Dutch debate was much more heated; it was not about Islam versus Christianity, or conversion,

but about religion versus secularism. That people should be free to abandon their religion was taken for granted. It was expected that ex-Muslims would become atheists, replicating the process of secularization that many native Dutch had undergone since the 1970s. All this was self-evident in the framing of the debate. Another difference was that Dutch ex-Muslims were not presented as tragic figures with personal problems, but as brave heroes with strong personalities, disregarding taboos, making their own choices in the face of danger and even threats to their lives.

The Dutch debate focused not so much on the content ('Why do people reject Islam?') but on the debate's tone and style, and on the freedom of Muslims to renounce their faith. The discussion in the newspapers mostly concerned the tone of the debate itself, particularly the issue of provocation. Was it morally legitimate to say, for example, that Islam is a backward religion or to argue that Islam oppresses women, as the murdered film-maker Theo van Gogh, the late populist Pim Fortuyn, politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and ex-Muslim Ehsan Jami had done? Should Muslims be protected from such generalizing insults? Did such criticisms prompt Muslims to reflect on their religion or encourage them to turn inwards and react defensively?

Some argued in favor of provocation per se: 'The freedom to say whatever you want is more important than to believe whatever you want' (*NRC-Handelsblad*, 11 November 2006). Freedom of speech was contrasted with the betrayal of democracy, not with politeness or manners: 'Provocateurs should not be forced into silence, which would be a betrayal of the fundamental foundations of democracy and capitulation of the West to radical Islam' (*NRC-Handelsblad*, 3 March 2008). Others argued that while provocation was a fundamental right, making use of it was counter-productive. In the words of columnist Anet Bleich: 'In a democracy everyone should be entitled to express one's opinion unreservedly and the rule of law is utterly dependent on the willingness to protect this right. However, the hysterical and polarizing attitude of "Camp Hirsi Ali" is counter-productive and impedes open debate' (*de Volkskrant*, 2 October 2002). This line of argument returned constantly, in the same repetitive manner as new provocative arguments were put forward.

What do these differences in the framing of the issue of 'ex-Muslims' tell us? First, that the Dutch debate is in some ways unique. Secularism, not Christianity, is presented as the alternative

to Islam. The issue is also more heatedly debated in the Netherlands, with many native Dutch not being afraid to strongly express their opinions in public.

6.2 Domestic violence

Domestic violence was intensely debated in all three countries over the period 2000–2009. In all countries, articles portrayed domestic violence as a taboo in need of public airing, particularly between 2000 and 2003. Most of the attention was directed toward the victims of domestic violence. Again, however, there were significant differences in how problems were framed and understood. The emphasis on 'culture' – particularly the 'culture' of Muslim immigrants – was prominent in the Netherlands, while it played only a minor role in France and the UK.

In France, domestic violence was largely framed as a general problem existing in all social circles. Attention focused on its nature and prevalence, with many articles focusing on the stories of its victims – not their backgrounds, but their personal tragedies. It can happen to anyone, was the main message. This image of domestic violence was so dominant, in fact, that efforts by young women from immigrant backgrounds to focus attention on their cultural heritage have had limited success. Sexual violence, as the group *Ni putains, ni soumises* argues, is what happens to women and girls who try to liberate themselves from their repressive traditions to live their own lives. While the movement has become well-known, its aim to place culturally specific aspects of sexual violence on the agenda was not taken up within the French public debate over the period we researched.

In the UK, domestic violence was also seen as a general social problem. But in contrast to France, media coverage tended to highlight the gendered nature of the problem. The issue was more politicized than in France. Much attention was paid to policy measures, with many articles covering topics such as the role of the police and the legal system to combat and prevent domestic violence.

In the Netherlands, domestic violence was largely framed as a cultural and ethnic – and particularly Muslim – problem, with much of the public debate focusing on the cultural causes of domestic violence. Hirsi Ali, in blaming the Koran and Muslims for preaching and practicing violence against women, played a prominent role in

the 'culturalization' of the topic. She was, however, not alone. Other groups of immigrant women, such as the Turkish-Dutch organization Kezban, have sought to focus attention on the cultural component within sexual violence. The Dutch debate associates domestic violence with 'crimes of honor', contributing to the cultural framing of the problem.

Comparing the three countries, we can conclude that the issue of domestic violence is not 'culturalized' in the UK and France as it is in the Netherlands. Interestingly, organized Muslim women (and ex-Muslim women) have been prominent actors in the culturalization of domestic violence in the Netherlands. This, however, is not a satisfactory explanation for the dominant culturalist framing of the issue since *Ni putains, ni soumises* made the same effort in France, but without success. The question then becomes why the culturalist framing of domestic violence resonates so strongly in the Netherlands.

6.3 Homosexuality

Here again, we witness significant differences in the framing of issues within public debate. In France, homosexuality is primarily discussed in the context of gay marriage and parenting as well as homophobia, and is seen against social and family cohesion on the one hand and individual rights on the other. Gay marriage and parenting are controversial; support for them is considered a left-wing position, though the left is far from unanimous in its support. French opinion articles frequently framed gay marriage and parenting as threats to national cohesion and family life. Most authors argued that homosexuality should at best be tolerated as an individual right, but should not be considered 'normal'. Legalizing gay marriage would be more than granting individual rights to freedom; it would allow homosexuality 'a place at the heart of society', thereby leading to its disintegration (GP 13, 13 May 2004). Some articles considered gay marriage a threat to marriage comparable to divorce (GP 4, 18 March 2005) as it questions the 'sanctity of heterosexuality'. Most authors argued that civil pacts of solidarity would suffice. Their opponents did not necessarily demand legalizing gay marriage; some argued that the whole institution of marriage was conformist and against the ideals of the sexual revolution (GP 24, 2 June 2004; GP 22, 16 June 2004; GP 9, 5 July

2004) – a line of argument we do not encounter in the Netherlands (anymore). More moderate proponents of gay marriage did, however, invoke equality, universal human rights, and the fight against discrimination (e.g. GP 46, 3 May 2004). Many gays may indeed not want to marry, but this was not the issue; they should be able to choose (GP 26, 14 April 2004). This, however, was a minority position in the French debate. Overall, conservative, Catholic-inspired notions of gender roles and heterosexuality dominated the French debate on homosexuality.

Events that focus on public manifestations of homosexuality were considered problematic in France as they threaten heterosexual normalcy. They were dismissed as 'communitarian' and responsible for 'isolating' gays and lesbians. The Gay Games were perceived as stigmatizing gays rather than liberating them (GP 3, 15 September 2005). Even a Parisian municipality giving its permission to create an archive and documentation center for homosexuals was condemned as a self-isolating act contributing to the marginalization of gays in a 'homosexual ghetto' (GP, 21 February 2002).

Homosexuality is also strongly medicalized in France and often framed in terms of poor mental health. Some authors linked homosexuality to unhealthy practices while others argued that it is related to higher suicide rates. Before 2005, many authors complained about the lack of data on homosexuality and suicide (GP 50, 25 May 2001; GP 41, 5 February 2003; GP 27, 1 March 2004). In 2005, a report was published on this correlation, revealing that young homosexual and bi-sexual males are 13 times as likely to commit suicide as their heterosexual counterparts. This study became an important reference work to underline the importance of suicide prevention programs for gay youths. The interventions, however, were not directed against the possible causes of homophobia – such as heteronormativity – but toward young gay males. In the dominant framing, it was a problem of 'these people', not of society at large.

The French newspapers that we analyzed devoted considerable attention to homophobia, in particular violence against gays and lesbians. Various authors claimed that making homosexuality a public issue would not help fight the violence. The best strategy, they claimed, was to emphasize the private nature of sexuality. Prevention of homophobia was nevertheless considered an important issue. In 2004, a law was passed criminalizing homophobic discourse.

Again, the main argument was that sexual orientation is a private issue and that people have the right to live their private lives the way they choose. Interestingly, in the debates about the causes of homophobia and those involved in the violence, no connection was made with religion or ethnicity (as it is in the Netherlands). Except for young males, no group was singled out as less tolerant toward homosexuality.

The picture in the UK differs. The period 2000–2009 witnessed a certain 'normalization' of homosexuality in the public debate, supported by all kinds of legislation (the coming into force of the Civil Unions Act in December 2005, the abolition of Clause 28, a policy measure taken by the Conservative government in the late 1980s to prohibit local authorities from promoting homosexuality, including discussion of homosexuality in state schools). Nevertheless, some authors still claimed that homophobia in the UK is 'deeply entrenched', 'more deeply than in any other Western European country' (*Independent*, 27 September 2002). This normalization of homosexuality, however, provoked discussion – particularly among gay men and lesbians – who wanted the gay movement to remain political. They wanted Gay Pride, for example, to remain a political statement, not a festival one attends for fun (*Independent,* 6 July 2002).

Homophobia and discrimination toward gays were prominent themes in UK newspapers, for which authors blamed many of the institutions of UK society: business, the media, the police, sports, and most of all, the churches. The three main Christian denominations in the UK – the Anglican Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the United Reformed Church – were often depicted as homophobic. Many authors pointed out that it was not so much church-goers, but clergy, who were responsible. As these denominations are generally considered to be conservative (whether that is correct is another matter), the issue divides left- and right-leaning people within public debate. As in France, support for gay rights in the UK is framed as a left–right issue – in contrast to the Netherlands where support for gay rights is framed in terms of a progressive moral majority versus a conservative cultural minority.

The link between Islam and homophobia, so prominently debated in the Netherlands, rarely emerges and is not the subject of public debate in the UK. We found only two articles directly linking

homophobia to Islam. The first was published in 2004 and criticized tabloids like the *Sun* for suddenly embracing women's and gay rights upon discovering that they are subject to discrimination in Islam – when, the author claimed, homophobia can be found among the white majority in any religion (*Guardian*, 13 July 2004). In 2007, we found one article arguing its opposite: that political Islam despises the UK way of life, including its acceptance of homosexuality (*Independent*, 4 July 2007).

Whereas homosexuality and homophobia polarize the UK and French debates along a left versus right axis, the Dutch debate witnesses a very different framing of the issues. Tolerance of homosexuality is a defining issue in the Netherlands, for both mainstream society and others. Muslim immigration is regarded as a threat to the Dutch progressive moral order, with gay rights and gender equality providing the language for criticizing both Islam and multiculturalism. The central aspects of this discourse – individualism versus the lack thereof, 'tolerance' versus 'fundamentalism' – frame an imagined modern self against an imagined traditional other. The power of the discourse of sexual progress to create a wedge between allegedly conservative Muslim and immigrant minorities and 'the progressive Dutch' became fully apparent in May 2001 when a conservative Moroccan imam in Rotterdam, Khalil El-Moumni, triggered outrage by commenting on the introduction of Dutch gay marriage laws. 'What Islam says about homosexuality,' the imam stated in a TV interview, 'is known among all Muslims. It is a sin.' El-Moumni was the center of media attention for weeks. The ensuing debate revealed a broad consensus on the incompatibility of the imam's views with Dutch society. *NRC-Handelsblad* asked: 'Homosexuality is tolerated in the Netherlands. Shouldn't the role of imams be to promote tolerance and acceptance?' (9 May 2001). A commentator in *de Telegraaf* argued that El-Moumni's views could only be found in 'the medieval deserts of North Africa' (8 May 2001).

In the wake of the El-Moumni affair, and more dramatically after 9/11 and the intensification of the war on terror, the populist politician Pim Fortuyn argued that his sexually expressive lifestyle and liberties as a gay man were threatened by conservative Muslims. Gender and sexual equality remained central in the framing of Muslims after Fortuyn's assassination in May 2002. Ayaan Hirsi Ali pointed out time and again that Islam violated the rights of women, children,

lesbians and gays, while Geert Wilders repeatedly evoked violent anti-gay incidents in Dutch cities to score points against Muslims, Dutch-Moroccan youths, and ethnic diversity. Our analysis of Dutch newspapers shows that it has become almost impossible to discuss lesbian and gay emancipation without reference to immigration and multiculturalism. Indeed, it has become 'common sense' to represent homophobia – even homophobic violence – as alien to Dutch culture and society and as uniquely Muslim. Though lesbian and gay rights have a short history in the Netherlands, they are nonetheless mobilized as exemplary of the Dutch 'tradition of tolerance'.

6.4 Conclusion

On the basis of these three case studies, we can understand better the dominant framing of what Dutch citizens are supposed to do, think, and feel. The culturalization of Dutch citizenship is built around three core issues:

(1) freedom from religion, or secularization;
(2) freedom of the body, or sexual liberation;
(3) freedom of speech, the right to publicly express whatever one thinks privately.

Of the liberties one can cherish, freedom of the body, freedom of speech, and freedom from religion are the most important. Without these, one cannot truly be free. When thinking about crafting citizenship, these connotations are crucial. They accompany the dialogs between citizens and they are tools citizens or prospective citizens have to work with in the interaction between government and citizens.

The dominant self-image of the Dutch in public debate is that of a secular nation. While in France and the UK, Islam is often compared to Christianity, in the Netherlands the alternative to Islam is almost always secularism. This is what leading ex-Muslim intellectuals stand for; the Dutch debate gives plenty of space to secularists who have freed themselves from religion – any religion. And it leaves little room for religious people, again regardless of religion. If the goal is to have competent citizens and to make them worthwhile members of the community, one has to ensure that the set of tools handed

out to them is tacitly limited beforehand, that some things are more legitimate to say than others. The culturalization of citizenship in the Netherlands asserts that citizenship and religiosity are uneasy bedfellows. To be a good Dutch citizen is to be secular. One may come from a religious background, but it is better to liberate oneself from it.

Sexual liberation and self-determination are considered important in all three countries. But while the dominant idea in the UK and France seems to be that these remain distant goals, the Dutch self-understanding is that most people have already attained it – except the Muslims. In the UK and France, the gay movement fights against 'native' enemies, particularly the churches but also many others, from the police to the media. Similarly, the struggle against domestic violence is mostly a 'native' struggle as domestic and sexual violence are predominantly seen as problems afflicting society as a whole. But in the Netherlands, Muslims are perceived as the sole enemies of gay liberation and women's sexual self-determination. 'If we didn't have Muslims, we wouldn't have a real problem'. Exceptional cases of backwardness may remain in some dark Christian corners of society, but these would hardly warrant public attention.

In Dutch public debate, there seems to be no meaningful difference between what one thinks and what one says. There is no idea of back and front stage: citizens are all on stage all of the time, while in France and the UK the differences between back and front stage seem to be more important and self-evident. The picture that emerges from this analysis, is that in the Netherlands, the ideal seems to be that everyone should have the opportunity to say anything, at any time, and in any manner everywhere. 'Muslims' are understood to be the antithesis of the liberated Dutch; the themes of ex-Muslims, homosexuality, and domestic violence recounted above are all well-suited to express this Dutchness. In this process, Muslims are spoken about, marginalized, and generally silenced in public debate.

This route not necessarily silences Muslims. It can also have an emancipatory function as its basic tenets can be invoked by (ex-) Muslims to focus attention on their problems, as actually happens with homosexuality, domestic violence, and apostasy. This puts Muslims in a rather complex situation. On the one hand, their ethnic group is the stigmatized 'other'. On the other hand, the dominant framing of issues creates discursive space for individuals to voice their views and criticize their own ethnic traditions. Examples abound

of such appropriation of the discourse by (ex-)Muslim politicians, writers, intellectuals, and artists. They are all 'typically Dutch' in that they embrace at least one, but often all three of these Dutch freedoms. In this way, they give credence to culturalized citizenship, a discourse that can include them as well as their struggles for reform.

To place the Dutch culturalization of citizenship in greater relief, we venture a final comparison with a country that (at least at first sight) looks very similar to the Netherlands, Denmark (Brouwers 2010). If we briefly compare the state of the 'three Dutch freedoms' in both countries, we witness interesting similarities and differences. The differences are most significant regarding 'freedom from religion'. Though Denmark is considered a highly secular country (WVS 2005), more than 80 percent of the population remain members of the national Lutheran Church. Danish public debate portrays Islam as the antithesis to modern, secular values as well as Danish Lutheranism, which is considered to be highly modern and in line with liberal democracy. Lutheranism is in fact often used to distinguish 'Danes' from 'others' (read Muslims) who allegedly oppose Danish virtues and liberal values. Whereas the latter opposition is identical to the one we see in the Dutch debate, the church is positioned differently – in Denmark the state church is part of the progressive national self-image. The Dutch appear unique in their compulsion to free themselves from religion as such, whereas the public debates in other countries distinguish between 'native' religions (Catholicism in France, Anglicanism in the UK, Lutheranism in Denmark) and 'foreign' ones (Islam).

Regarding 'freedom of the body' – abortion, euthanasia, and other issues of bodily autonomy – the Netherlands and Denmark have much in common. Interestingly, 'freedom of the body' in Denmark is more an issue of gender than of sexuality. Even though gays and lesbians won the right to marry relatively early on, gender equality attracts much more attention in public and political debate than freedom of sexual preference. It is this strength of the discourse on gender equality that explains its prominence in framing Danishness. Whereas ethnic Danish women are perceived as economically independent and sexually liberated, Muslim women are framed as their polar opposites (Siim 2007; Brouwers 2010). While gender issues are important in framing Muslims as 'others' in the Netherlands as well, they are less prominent (perhaps because native Dutch women and

men are, overall, less emancipated than their Danish counterparts?). On the other hand, homosexuality plays a more significant role in the Netherlands. While surveys show the Danes to be almost as gay-friendly as the Dutch (Duyvendak 2011), homosexuality has acquired a more pivotal role in the Dutch public debate than in any other country we know of.

Regarding freedom of speech, obvious parallels are evident first of all. Both countries have witnessed extensive public debate, ignited by the cartoon portrayal of the prophet Mohammad in Denmark and the assassination of the film-maker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands. But when we delve into the reasons why people defend the absolute right to free speech, we discover interesting differences that deserve further attention. In the Danish debate, the justification is framed more in terms of democratic deliberation and the public good. We get the impression that there should not be any limits to free speech because that would infringe upon democracy itself. In the Netherlands, limitless free speech is more about the absolute right to individual expression. It may be the case – to be researched more intensively – that in Denmark the boundary between private and public can remain, while in the Netherlands 'exclamativism' all boundaries must evaporate.

The culturalization of Dutch citizenship – built on the freedom of speech, freedom of the body, and freedom from religion – has parallels and similarities with developments in several other West European countries. But more importantly for our purposes here, it also seems to have rather unique features, not least of which are the collapsing of the private and public and the requirement that everyone should publicly reveal their most intimate feelings, thoughts and behaviors. One has to observe that the trajectory of citizenship is demanding: the stakes are high.

7
Crafting Citizenship

Citizenship, what is it good for? The notion of citizenship has quickly become prominent in public debate in countries like the Netherlands and the UK, where up until a decade ago it was merely an academic concept. Three different social trends can be distinguished in this rise of citizenship in the public debate. Citizens struggle with excessive individualism when they ask themselves: 'Whom do I help and who helps me?' Citizens try to relate to globalization processes when they ask themselves: 'Who belongs here? Do I belong here?' And third, citizens struggle with de-legitimation when they ask themselves: 'Whom do I believe and trust, and who believes and trusts me?'

In a range of policy strategies, 'more citizenship' is presented as answer to these urgent questions: citizenship should be promoted more, underwritten more, andpracticed more. The governmental response to citizen's struggle with individualization is 'responsabilization' (to make citizens more responsible for public affairs). It presumes that citizens collectively lack a sense of responsibility. We argued, however, that the problem rather seems to be a lack of direction of responsibility than a lack of responsibility as such. The governmental response to citizen's struggle with globalization and culturalization, implies stressing the need for citizens to be united through cultural unity. We argued that this has the paradoxical effect of driving them apart. And third, the governmental response to citizen's struggle with de-legitimation, 'popularization' (going out of its way to reach out to and satisfy citizens) seems to incite suspicion rather than trust.

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The policy responses share two core assumptions. The first is that more (legal, social, cultural) citizenship will bolster community. It will bring about more unity and less conflict, more public decency, greater use of the (Dutch) language, more national identity, and more dialog between people of different backgrounds. Therefore, as society grows more demanding, greater requirements must be placed on citizenship. Citizenship here is the glue that keeps people together. Whether cultural, social, or legal, it benefits the community. The second assumption is that spontaneous citizenship is best: citizens should take the initiative to solve their own problems without government prompting. Engagement should come from the heart, not from the state. The alternative would be expropriation of citizen initiatives in the public domain, feared by liberals and conservatives alike because liberals value citizen empowerment and conservatives want to discourage dependence on the state. Both suspect that government involvement will do more harm than good. Personal responsibility and empowerment are the slogans here; the underlying idea is that the public's slumbering sense of duty, once re-awakened, will allow true citizenship to blossom.

We have proposed a rival hypothesis: more citizenship may indeed promote more unity but it may also breed more antagonism. Conflicts among citizens will never disappear but issues will change. In their struggles with how to give shape to citizenship, our respondents could be divided in 'talkers', 'doers', and 'divers', according to their most prominent public activity. We estimate that talkers make up for 10 percent of society and doers and divers more or less evenly make up the rest.

7.1 Doers

Doers find contributing self-evident but not in the kind of activity they take part in. They prefer social to political activities and local to national causes. They understand their efforts as active citizens as a trade-off to a certain extent. They have to contribute to progress, to the improvement of their social position, or the prospects for their children. But 'individualization' for them is not the greatest obstacle; it is not difficult to obtain the support of small neighborhood groups, whether based on Third World issues, the distribution of hot meals for the elderly, or opposing neighborhood restructuring plans.

But it is considered legitimate to ask oneself whether one recognizes oneself in a particular community and its activities. Do I share their aims? Does it provide an opportunity for me to learn something? Will it welcome me? This type of 'parochial individualism' not necessarily descends into mere consumerism, but it shapes 'light' communities of active citizens, which tend to become more homogeneous, more stable, and more goal oriented over time.

Recognizing oneself in one's own group can and will at times engender mistrust in other citizens and in government. Hence doers struggle more overtly with the consequences of 'globalization' and 'de-legitimization': they have difficulties in coping with cultural differences and outside their own groups they feel underrepresented. Seeing their own culture threatened, or feeling badly treated by the government provokes anger. The amount of experienced agency is limited particularly in relation to migration. For doers, we did find a marked difference between shaping citizenship at the national as opposed to the local level. While the national level invokes mostly nostalgic images and practices, at the local level we found more of an orientation towards the future: of trying to give shape to citizenship by way of creating a new, local community on the basis of a diverse citizenry.

7.2 Divers

Divers shy away when it comes to societal tasks. They might feel at home at in their own or maybe in a larger imagined community, but not in the public domain. Some are too busy with work or family or both. Other divers do not see a meaningful way in which to contribute. They feel that others are better qualified, that participation is not for them, or they have had previous bad experiences. They reproduce a set of more or less similar stories on disconnection from the public domain.

A mere call on citizenship does not work for these people as their best-developed strategy is to withdraw when problems come to the fore. Divers try to look away and wait until the problem has died down, but, if that does not happen, they see few ways of discussing peacefully what they could not evade. Then they can easily be noisy and loud. There is ineptness in the many demands they place on their co-residents, or the high expectations they have from civil servants

or newcomers. When they queue at a counter or when they hear minority opinions they do not feel comfortable with, they can react by raising their voices, utter insults, or be unwilling to listen to the other side of the story. They may be rude towards public servants and repeat that behavior when it is criticized by politicians.

At the same time, there is also a certain craftsmanship in diving. Divers tend to be well trained in passive tolerance. This may be because they lack the skills to proceed into active tolerance. But nevertheless: even passive tolerance or just looking away is very useful under conditions of plurality. To be able to persevere with one's own thing and let other people be, is a skill in itself.

Divers can also talk at length about duties, also their own duties – sometimes even more elaborately than about their rights. The criticism of earlier decades of the welfare state has made them suspicious of other people misusing or taking advantage of their rights. They are also suspicious that other people do not fulfill their duties and take advantage. They can become anxious about the response of an angry neighbor. This helps to understand their (lack of) agency. It is not so much that divers are egocentric or egoistic. Excessive individualism is not so much their problem but one of society. What keeps them from taking social action is (also) the fear that other people lack a sense of duty and responsibility. They seem to experience regularly the 'prisoner's dilemma'. They want to do well, but cannot trust others to do the same. And if they do not, there is very little they can do to change that.

7.3 Talkers

Talkers might be active as well in the neighborhood, but will prefer meetings to street activities. They are vigilant and will speak their mind freely. Talkers stress the meaning of dialog above other activities. They may be active as well in the neighborhood, but in the first place they are vigilant. More than among the other two types, education makes the difference here; talkers have experienced higher education. Conversation as an art is a product of the classroom and the confidence needed to discuss one's own views with strangers requires practice. Talkers are well aware of the different problems society is facing and might even make a living from facing these problems. When they think action is needed, they are willing to take

initiative. 'Globalization' is the least worry for these people; they can recognize and name differences between different types of citizens and love to analyze them with other talkers.

But when looking at their individualism or the distance they keep from government, talkers might be less good citizens. They regularly withdraw from public. At times they have little patience with the actual practice of citizenship, with some disdain for doers or divers. When they think other people fail to take responsibility, when according to their judgment other citizens are not sufficiently civil and open minded, they consider the exit option defensible. This is also the case when they think the government does not take them seriously. Talkers are very well aware that some types of neighborhood deliberation merely function as legitimization of decisions already made by local politicians or public servants. Whether or not the different types of interaction between citizens and government were outdated or predictable, was a recurring concern. Talkers then keep some distance, as they tend to see participation in these events as naive or unsophisticated.

7.4 Interaction at risk

The repetitive element in these three styles of citizenship is the uncertainty about and the vulnerability of the interaction, both with different citizens as well as with institutions such as government or civil society organizations. There is a clear pool of every day talents citizens have: organizing, getting together, talking, even keeping up a sense of duty without necessarily actually acting upon in. Citizens think about citizenship in terms of caring for others or in terms of showing decent behavior. This social idea of citizenship is also deeply embedded in policy documents, political statements, public debate, and educational programs. Citizenship as a mode of behavior towards citizens in need or neighborhoods has become embedded in our political culture. In that sense, the call for local community that is strong in neo-communitarian movements such as the Red Tories or Blue Labour has something redundant in it: the people that want and can do something for society most probably already do so. People get involved because they are asked, and chances to be asked increase with education and with knowing the people who make the invitation.

But this thriving social citizenship is accompanied by a feeble political citizenship: citizenship at present is more about 'getting things done' than about 'getting things right' –we estimated that only 10 percent of the citizens are talkers; the others are doers or divers. Although (talkers') voices are very audible when they participate in demonstrations or nimby ('not in my back yard') activities compared to the social practices of doers, their numbers are limited. It is in this perspective that our finding that current citizenship works very divisively in *cultural* terms becomes relevant. This social citizenship is not too well equipped for a diversity of opinions. More political meanings of citizenship – citizenship as a predominantly peaceful but permanent struggle between members of a community to select and sack authorities – are seldom voiced. The cumbersome process in which highly incompatible members of society participate as a means of enriching their own beliefs is seldom found. Against a backdrop of rising populism and deteriorating faith in institutions, this is no minor issue.

We found three overlapping reasons why citizens are discouraged from involving themseelve in the more political practices of citizenship, why they, in the words of American political scientists Theiss Hibbing and Morse, 'lack the motivation to engage in public life in general and politics especially' (Theiss Morse & Hibbing 2005: 244). These reasons include not feeling welcome, feeling that they cannot make a difference, and dislike of conflict. 'Not feeling welcome' is a prominent issue. Just as positive experiences with co-citizens, civil servants, or professionals encourage or keep people active, negative experiences discourage them. One negative experience may be enough, such as one councilor not answering the phone at the agreed time, membership of a local civil society blocked, one condescending remark made by the chair at a first meeting (who has been active for decades already). People conclude that participation is not nor them. Somehow, the process of people getting together for a reason other than a hobby is quickly spoiled when inexperienced citizens are turned down. They are all the same. Passive citizens will then say that professionals or active citizens talk the talk but not walk the walk. Although these citizens individually may be right, one cannot escape the impression that they put the stakes for interaction high, as if friction-free get-togethers should be the norm.

This feeling of not being welcome can also prevent people from becoming active in the first place. The argument that this is just something for other people is especially prominent among the divers. Divers feel they do not speak the language of meetings, do not possess the dexterity needed to negotiate with public servants, with computers, or simply with other people. They stay at home, because they are already busy with work or family or because they do not want to leave home. In their mind, they do not belong in the conference hall or on strangers' doorsteps. The public domain is not their place. Helping is something for others and their opinion will most probably be ignored anyway. Younger citizens from an immigrant background argued that it was not so much that the possibility of a cultural clash that discouraged them from participation, but the highly likely outcome of the clash, that someone else will tell them 'how things are done in this country'.

These points to the second reason why citizens stay away from the more contentious or just political or administrative elements of citizenship: because they think they cannot make a difference. And without results of their efforts, citizens feel less loyal towards the smaller or larger community. This was a very deep motive among our respondents: people want to see results, want to have the feeling that they do what has to be done, that they do something useful, that other people appreciate what they are doing, that they are recognized. It might very well be that 'just staying busy' is in the back of the mind of some volunteers but this is not what they express. The language of citizenship is embedded in self-deployment and social progress. One helps someone, changes something, or learns something and if not, one stays at home. Here, the vulnerability of modern government is highly visible. The idea that government will actually act on the views of average people is not very strongly developed, just as the belief that politicians really care, does not carry much weight. It does not pay off to speak out, citizens will say, because the powers that be are not interested in them.

A third reason people get involved in the more social aspects of practicing citizenship or refrain from it at all is the dislike of conflict. To a substantial degree, avoiding conflict is a logical or at least human reaction. In particular, talking politics with strangers or even with distant family members one does not know well is often considered a

recipe for disaster. But when commitment is solely framed as solving everyday problems and outspokenness is not rewarded, social efforts do seldom result in political efforts. Maybe even on the contrary, a knitting club or even a support group for a village in Africa might prevent further public participation as we saw among many doers in our research. When asked about identities to claim, citizens from an immigrant background repeatedly indicated that they did not want to cause trouble, but were simply Amsterdammers or Arnhemmers rather than Dutch, as claiming Dutchness would certainly not be to their advantage.

Hence citizens steer their good will towards things that can be done and gnaw away their irritation because of larger injustice. But when citizenship is only understood in terms of either belonging to a state (with a bureaucracy that cares) or belonging to a smaller community (with families or neighborhoods that care) citizens are disempowered, as public spirited dialog is a crucial element of a successful repertoire. Nina Eliasoph showed how the American citizens she talked to refrained from making their worries political. Rather than debate, for instance, the threat and waste from nearby nuclear plant, they devoted their energy in a club concerned with the protection of whales, because animals 'feel closer to home' (Eliasoph 1988: 2). The political process is seen as something troublesome, connected with foul play by self-interested bureaucratic professionals rather than with collective action. Raising larger issues is regarded as complaining or being arrogant rather than getting something done, and since optimism is valued highly, people are careful to avoid this position.

7.5 Crafting

Engaging with the wider public is not a self-evident action in a culture that values highly people to speak for themselves, as individuals, and that steers away from issues of power, whether between workers and employers, people with different levels of education, town and country, or between immigrants and native inhabitants. Individually, citizens take the collective responsibility seriously, but their experiences and feelings now tell them to keep a distance from it. The other citizens are easily perceived as egoists. Hence citizens' agency has to be freed without suggesting that more individual rights are the solution.

To make it viable, it is not sufficient to frame citizenship just as a historically rooted set of rights and duties or a mere social problem-solving mechanism. It is not only the nation state defined by law or culture in which citizens practice citizenship. It is also not just a public domain in which people meet as equals. These theoretical areas inspire average citizens only to a certain degree with rights and duties. Inadequate knowledge of law and history is not just a product of ineffective education. Raising the intellectual stakes will not necessarily make people more confident at coping with co-citizens. People make and remake their engagement in local communities rather than in abstract spheres. It is also unhelpful to see citizenship in the utilitarian fashion of policymakers: 'there is social tension; let's have more citizenship'. Bringing citizenship down to an efficient way to resolve misunderstandings between government and the diverse inhabitants of a country denies the rootedness of belonging.

It is not only at the polling station, but also in the workplace, in schools, at the market, and at the dinner table that they make up their mind about who is in and who is out. And it is not a permanent idea that they develop, but a meandering concept of what it takes to let other citizens be part of their communities. There are elements of cosmopolitan aspiration in virtually all citizens' reasoning, 'all humans share so much common traits that we should all be brothers and sisters', as several of our respondents would argue. But inequality in terms of money or power is also always present. People feel ineffective, if not helpless, against large commercial or governmental bureaucracies, that tell them when to work and when to take holidays, how to be happy and how to complain and they feel threatened. These bureaucracies are often referred to as 'they' in colloquial speech, an unidentified mass of power consisting of smug elites and fast business executives. And there is also always an idea of culture in the back of their minds when they think about engagement. It felt like stating something obvious yet dangerous for respondents that Christianity has to prevail in the public domain. All in all, the private and public dialogs on these topics are only a minor issue in daily life. But what matters is that it makes little sense to make them the subject of large-scale interventions. Skills are required to make public-spirited dialog out of musings at the kitchen table or among a homogenous sports team. These skills are best summarized in terms of craftsmanship. One thinks, for instance, of patience, flexibility,

and dealing with resistance in a flexible manner, but also tolerance, respect, and good judgment.

Richard Sennett describes craftsmanship as 'an enduring, basic human impulse to do a job well for its own sake. [...] The craftsman represents the special human condition of being engaged' (Sennett 2008: 9–20). Dedication and engagement, both mental and material, are at the heart of craftsmanship. Being a craftsman demands patience. It also requires a willingness to repeat elements aimed at improving one's skills, learning to work well, by repetitive, concrete, hands-on training, commitment to fine detail, working slowly to enable reflection. It also demands self-governance and experimentation. And it requires flexibility, not in the shallow (usual) sense of being unattached and disloyal, belonging nowhere, always ready to move on, but in the sense of moving with resistance, accepting contingency and material restraints, coping with what cannot be controlled.

The current communitarian call to arms by policy makers and politicians is hardly the incentive to produce happier citizens. After all, being summoned to a meeting is less attractive than being invited. The common policy answers tend to discipline rather than liberate citizens, substituting anxieties rather than equipping citizens with a richer democratic imagination. Similarly, bringing a deeper sense of politics into citizenship cannot be done by just asking people to debate more with friends, listen more attentively to neighbors, spend more time with strangers, speak one's mind, or stay up late watching news programs. To act as a citizen has to sound commonsensical to other citizens: one has to feel welcome, see how one can make a difference, and not be afraid of conflicts. The perspective of crafting citizenship opens an alternative here. It makes clear that there is a very political side to citizenship, at least in three senses.

First, a good society is really about citizens interacting. It is not about friends or family members but about inhabitants of a 'community of fate', people who have not chosen to live together but have to find ways to live with one another. They have to come to terms with each other and when friendliness and ignoring are both ineffective, dialog as a means to temporarily overcome differences has to take their place, not aimed at control but rather at managing what cannot be controlled. 'Citizen action [...] concerns people who are on the

road somewhere between slavery and freedom, [busy] transforming disruptive differences into livable relations' (Van Gunsteren 1998: 27–28). Conditions and citizens are never ideal. 'Imperfect citizens get going on the road towards citizenship [...]. What counts most, then, is not the arrival at a final destination, but the movement, the direction in which it takes place' (ibid.).

Citizens of different hues can be mobilized in their own town or neighborhood without too much effort. These formal and informal meetings and shared identities in the context of urban citizenship (Van der Welle 2011) not necessarily make for 'better' citizens, but they add a more productive 'association', next to the heated debates on national citizenship or identity. This stands in stark contrast to the tension caused by invoking the (often hard to define) national community. Although it is inevitable to every now and then reassess the collective image of the nation, for citizenship as craftsmanship it would make sense to invest in local identity and local citizenship. Welcoming can be done by way of citizenship ceremonies in the case of immigrants, but also by demanding average citizens to join in decision-making processes because they are needed.

To argue for invitations, is contrary to the common assumption – mentioned above – that spontaneous citizenship is best. Liberals and conservatives alike promote the idea that citizens should take the initiative to solve their own problems without prompting from professionals. Crafting citizenship is in this respect a sidestep from the argument that local civil society is a school for democracy as Alexis de Tocqueville would have it or that social capital is maintained by local civil society organizations, as is popularized by the American political scientist Robert Putnam. It is not likely that by merely joining an organization people become better citizens (Theiss Morse & Hibbing 2005). There is no one-way causality in good citizenship, but it is embedded in the way we (can) discuss engagement, and in the way we perform it. Hence, the onus is not on all citizens to join in but on the well-equipped citizens to make sure the association has rules that make participation fruitful and thus likely.

Education can make a difference. Schools should not only teach how to be a *decent* citizen but also, how to be a capable citizen. Self-confidence to live in a plural, complex society is not embedded in knowledge of a set of laws, a national anthem, or even the telephone numbers of the social security services, but in an instinct that

helps dealing with unexpected opinions and unexpected behavior. It means that pupils should be trained not for adaptive citizenship but for democratic citizenship. Citizenship curricula in schools have only been introduced recently. Research indicates that they reinforce the dominant social citizenship rather than transforming it (Leeman & Reid 2006; Veugeler 2007). It may be too early to judge the results. Pippa Norris found education to be the single explanatory factor that can account for a widening of the so-called democratic deficit, for a growing feeling that government, parliament, and political parties are not living up to the ideal of democracy (Norris 2011: 141). It indicates that the more educated people are, their expectations rise faster than government can deliver. Hence the argument can be made that citizenship education should focus on crafting, that toleration of frustration should be part of the program, just as norms and values should. Schools have to teach that membership of the community allows many privileges that can only be made productive when one is aware of the duties that come with them. The story one is part of, as a citizen, is one of democratic progress, an uncomfortable but obligatory process. Pupils have to learn how to handle disagreement about duties, rights, honor, and shame on the one hand, but also learn that 'society' can sometimes be stubborn and hard, and at other times flexible or even unpredictable. It is not just a matter of learning which side of the road to drive on or why parliament was founded, but it also requires the ability to form an opinion or idea and communicate it, enter dialog about objections to it, and have the patience to see the idea through.

Diving can be a part of the craft, deliberately giving in to a resistance that is currently too forceful and wait patiently but attentively for a new opportunity. Citizenship as craftsmanship is knowing when one needs to move from diving to doing or talking, or vice versa, and having the skills and courage to do so. It is about knowing when to practice passive tolerance and when to start doing or talking, and to make that transition smoothly. One needs to be able to make a transition from passive tolerance to inquiry and possibly active tolerance – continuing to tolerate something, after the dialog to bridge differences fails and diving is temporarily the best option. In craftsman-style, disagreement about duties, rights, honor, or shame can be recognized and dealt with respecting the stubbornness and hardness of the material involved, by giving way to

resistance and trying again, by patience, by moving with the material and at the same time trying to mold it. This can be summed up in one phrase, operating with elasticity.

Third, crafting citizenship is dependent on politicians and policy makers taking 'the political' seriously. If politicians pretend that politics is just a dirty game and policymakers silently ridicule deliberative processes, citizens will protect themselves from the process. They want to be intelligent rather than stupid and will stay away from politics, fearing that they will make a fool of themselves. If anything, our research shows that people want to create community. But when they cannot or even do not want to do this politically – because they have learned to avoid political ideas or even political mechanisms – they stay in Eliasoph's words 'close to home' and refrain from engaging with the wider public. It is necessary to be outspoken about the function of politics, as the peaceful means to make differences of opinion tolerable. This helps to empower people with a clearer message that politics matters, not just to solve budget problems or to argue about illegally used expense accounts, but about more fundamental issues as well such as discussing the future and the power to change people's lives.

As citizens, policy makers and politicians appear to share a feeling that unchecked liberalism has had its own way for too long, one could also ponder upon norms that contribute to this idea of citizenship. In line with compulsory education, one can consider voting (in local and parliamentary elections, and in elections for the European parliament) an activity that forces one to think. Mandatory voting would reconstruct the republic by giving a clear signal on citizenship, that it is not just about paying taxes, but also about taking part in the public domain, whether one likes it or not. It is only a minor point but one loaded with symbolism: when the association says 'you have to vote', it shows a not only a clear minimum standard of participation, but also less energy has to be expended reminding people of the correct form of behavior. As a spin off, it would bring underrepresented groups such as the relatively poor, the overtly angry, and the distrusting citizens to the ballot box.

Citizenship does not depend on citizens' good will or on a currently dormant sense of duty but on their opportunities to act; citizens' circumstances determine their efforts. As argued, there is no such thing as authentic or 'real' citizenship. Nor are there, or

have ever been, 'real' communities. There are only the inevitably ill-defined relationships between members or future members of communities, where conceptions of rights and duties can be used just as easily to exclude others as to forge new communities. Organizing this process in a democratic way is the craft of citizenship.

Appendix

Our argument is based on four data sets: a quantitative survey of citizens' initiatives conducted in 2006, a series of focus groups held among diverse groups of citizens in 2007, a study of Dutch daily newspapers in 2007, a study of European newspapers in 2009 and a qualitative study conducted in The Hague in 2009 (see Hurenkamp et al. 2006, 2011; Hurenkamp & Duyvendak 2008, 2009; Hurenkamp & Tonkens 2007, 2008; Hurenkamp & Rooduijn 2009; Duyvendak et al. 2010). We also made use of several other studies that we (partly) implemented and/or guided: two studies of residents' funds (Tonkens & Kroese 2009; Van Ankeren et al. 2010), a study of civic participation in Deventer, Amsterdam, and Utrecht (Ridderhof de Wilde) and a survey of good citizenship practices (Hilhorst 2010).

We chose to focus on areas that research on citizenship has largely ignored. There is a surfeit of social-scientific and philosophical treatises that attempt, on the basis of a specific understanding of justice or fairness, to determine the conditions for preferring certain types of citizenship. Here one constructs out of theory as well as the rights and duties demanded by society a scheme that optimally approaches a certain ideal. Other studies have addressed citizens' behavior, seeking to identify the conditions under which people can best fulfill a pre-designated form of good citizenship. To grasp the full meaning of citizenship in countries like the Netherlands, we propose to drop such rather normative and theory-driven approaches. We advocate a micro-sociological exploration of citizenship practices. How do citizens actually understand and practice citizenship? To what extent do they reproduce views of the good life that usually come under the big banner of citizenship philosophies such as communitarianism, liberalism, and republicanism? Do they support or criticize policy initiatives? What meaningful distinctions can be drawn between people who are actively involved in society and those who are not? The next step then is to examine what explains the differences in how citizenship (both normatively and practically) is understood, and how citizens practice their solidarity. In this explanation of micro-sociological differences, broader societal developments obviously play an important role.

A.1 Print media

Here we employ concepts and methods from both discourse analysis (Gomart and Hajer 2003: 43–44; Broer 2008: 93–117) and the literature on political opportunity structures (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Broer and Duyvendak 2009). We view the newspaper as an imagined community where readers are connected by more or less simultaneously reading more or less the same subjects (Anderson 1991: 32–35).

By analyzing newspaper articles, we can answer questions such as: what role is played by macro-sociological developments such as globalization, individualization, and the delegitimation of political authority in the discourse on citizenship? Do authors invoke citizenship to create coalitions, or enemies? Which storylines are the most prominent? Are issues of loyalty, exit, and voice, to use Hirschman's expressions, employed so that a particular vision of citizenship comes to the fore? What does citizenship mean in the public domain today? To venture an answer, we examined how the concept has been employed over the course of 17 years in several Dutch mass circulation dailies. Who uses the term? How, when, and for what purposes? We searched for references to 'citizenship' (or in the Dutch case 'burgerschap') in LexisNexis, an online archive of newspaper articles.

Our search did find many published articles mentioning 'citizenship' over the specified period. But not all: some items were not archived; others could not be included in the database due to copyright; some newspaper archives were accessible from 1990 (*Trouw*), others only from 1999 (*De Telegraaf*). In the intervening period, the readerships of these newspapers have changed – as have the ways in which people read the newspaper. Inevitably there is bias in the use of such data. Newspapers are not designed as sources for research. First there is the selection bias. What newspapers eventually publish has gone through several filters, including those of the reporter and the editor in chief. Items that report on events that are deemed larger, more exciting, or sensational are often included. There is, furthermore, the question of how a given item is portrayed, how the facts and sources are handled and read. This can be called a prescription bias. Groups at the margins of society are more easily dismissed as radicals – this is especially true for groups that attack the ruling elite.

Seeing the appearance of the word citizenship as an 'event' (Schafraad and Scheepers 2006: 455–467) does not obviate such objections. While citizenship is seen as more politically neutral than, for example, protest, its 'bourgeois' character introduces a different standard for inclusion: if it is deemed stale or uninteresting, newspapers may not report on an item.

Nevertheless, newspaper articles on citizenship provide a tangible context for interpreting citizens' views on the subject. It brings into focus how different vocabularies of citizenship are used by different groups, which understandings are prominent and which are not. We do not let the results 'speak for themselves' but use them to understand better what inspires people when they talk about citizenship. While this may not allow us to enumerate exhaustively upon citizenship as a social phenomenon, it does provide a clear window on the broader discourse.

By way of control, we look at the frequency of references to 'citizenship' in parliamentary minutes and documents. We can reasonably expect a degree of interaction between politics and the press. Who is leading this interaction is not our prime concern here. Popular notions such as 'media democracy' and 'media logic' (RMO 2003) suggest that the media lead political deliberation. However, the treatment of international conflicts such as the Iraq

War, where most media companies followed political guidelines, questions the assumption that the press always leads in social change (Alterman 2003).

We arranged the articles by subject, type of author, and by interpretation of citizenship. Were citizenship's topics related to issues of globalization, the atomization of society, the delegitimation of political authority or something else? Was citizenship invoked by a politician, an opinion-maker, or a journalist? Was the angle liberal, communitarian, or republican? Finally, what possibilities did the prevailing conception of citizenship offer to citizens for changing society? Which perceived injustices did it address?

The divisions may appear crude. Many opinion leaders are directly or indirectly tied to political parties and thus speak more or less as politicians. Politicians may drop references to 'citizenship' in speeches that otherwise concern the management of green spaces or the increasing costs of social security. Among academics, the division between 'communitarian', 'republican', and 'liberal' will ruffle feathers: the concepts overlap and individual authors rarely wish to be thus pigeon-holed. Determining which issue is being raised may not be straightforward. An author, for example, may wish to bolster citizenship in schools because he or she is especially concerned about multiculturalism. While we want to do justice to authors' intentions, our primary aim is to sketch the spheres in which citizenship is discussed. For this purpose, it suffices that the design provides a format that can clearly show how notions of citizenship change over time among different groups of people. The goal is to see how the newspaper, as an imagined community, brings citizenship to the people.

As for the analysis of the specificity of the culturalization of Dutch citizenship (see Chapter 6). we also used newspapers as our main source. We analyzed opinion articles addressing three themes in the period 2000 to 2009, once again based on the LexisNexis Database. For each country, we selected three national newspapers characterized as conservative, tending toward populism; central and more intellectual; and left-wing, neither intellectual nor populist:

Country	Conservative	Center	Left-wing
France	*Le Figaro*	*Le Monde*	*Libération*
the UK	the *Sun*	the *Guardian*	the *Independent*
the Netherlands	*de Telegraaf*	*NRC-Handelsblad*	*de Volkskrant*

We do not have the ambition to analyze the culturalization of citizenship in other Western European countries (which would be a research project in itself). Instead, we selected three themes that have been most extensively discussed in the Netherlands – ex-Muslims/apostasy, homosexuality, and domestic violence – and examine how debates on these issues have been been framed in the UK and France. We thus focus on similarities and differences between the three countries to get a more accurate picture of the

Dutch case. Can we understand better the culturalization of citizenship in the Netherlands by comparing it to debates on the same topics in other Western European countries?

A.2 Citizen initiatives

We collected data on informal small-scale citizen initiatives or 'light communities' in the Netherlands in the first half of 2006 (Hurenkamp et al. 2006). To find our respondents, we used three different databases of larger civil society initiatives in the Netherlands as well as addresses provided by the city of Utrecht and two larger national civil society support organizations. We omitted associations with more than 20 members or volunteers, as well as those with formal ties to institutions. We explicitly sought to include urban (city of Utrecht) and rural (village of Smilde) initiatives, as well as geographical spread across the country (based on the files of Civiq and www.zestienmiljoenmensen.nl). We then spoke to the formal or informal spokespersons of these groups, whose goals ranged from fighting senseless violence to assisting asylum seekers, to explaining what it is like to be blind. We focused on small, recent initiatives. This was not always easy as they were at times hard to detect, formal structures often being absent. We furthermore ignored informal settings such as cafés and singular events such as demonstrations. While such 'everyday encounters' are undoubtedly significant in any search for new forms of civil society, they are beyond the scope of this study.

We then asked our respondents about their goals, motives, contacts, complaints, ideas about citizenship, ties to civil society, the time they invested in their initiative, and whether or not they had contemplated leaving the group. We did this over the phone, using a semi-structured list of questions. All in all, we talked to 386 representatives of citizen's initiatives over six weeks. In addition, we visited and interviewed 20 respondents and talked to them for one to two hours about the ambitions and frustrations of their informal clubs.

Based on the 70 small informal initiatives we found that using the snowball method in an average Dutch village (Smilde in the province of Drenthe), we could estimate the total number of such initiatives in the Netherlands to between 200,000 and 300,000. This in itself suggests that fears about the decline of citizenship in the Netherlands are unfounded (Chanan 1992; Verhoeven 2006). The numbers are available in our report 'What Inspires Citizens' (Hurenkamp et al. 2006, www.actiefburgerschap.nl).

We gathered data on respondents' educational levels: purpose of the initiative and whether it was primarily social (focused on social gatherings, caring), or overtly political (focused on changing society); the reasons for the founding of the initiative (one's own experience, the experience of others, media coverage); how they thought the group could function more effectively; whether and how they had difficulty recruiting new members; whether they had considering ending their participation and when; the amount of face-to-face,

telephone and online contact between members; and their ties to other clubs and organizations.

A.3 Focus groups

We held a series of focus groups with active and inactive citizens in 2007. While focus groups are not widely used in citizenship research, American and UK studies have shown the method to be useful in revealing everyday meanings of citizenship's. Pamela Johnston Conover and colleagues asked American and UK citizens in a focus group a series of normative questions about their rights and obligations, and found that the opposition between 'liberals' and 'communitarians' – so prominent in the literature – was not a fruitful one (Conover-Johnson et al. 1991: 800–832). The contrast between the strictly 'rights-oriented' citizen central to liberalism and the merely 'duties-oriented' citizen central to communitarianism could not be found.

Perhaps predictably, the UK respondents appeared more committed to social rights (as expressed in the welfare state) than the American respondents. Nevertheless, UK citizens expressed this commitment in a liberal language, more focused on opportunities for self-development than protecting the weak. The most liberal Americans – emphasizing the rights that protect them from government such as freedom of assembly, religion, expression, and voting rights – sharply distinguished between their desire for freedom at the national level and their duties at the local level.

In a longitudinal study of UK youths, Ruth Lister et al. found their views on citizenship to be heavily influenced by their environment (Lister et al. 2003: 235–253). But unlike Conover et al., Lister and her colleagues found the greatest influence was not so much broader historical circumstance but direct public discourse – for example, the growing emphasis on the obligation to work and behave properly. Good citizens, UK youths responded, are people who are responsible and independent; they work and contribute to the community.

Focus group research can show that where theories of citizenship employ relatively fixed ideas about what citizenship entails, citizens are malleable in their views; focus groups can also reveal discrepancies within citizens' beliefs that do not fit abstract models. By analyzing participants' discussions around a chosen subject or dilemma, the meanings they attach to a concept or set of concepts can be reconstructed (Morgan 1997). The unit of measurement is thus not the individual, but the conversation (Kitzinger 1994). The main advantage of focus groups is that their participants respond differently from how they would respond in one-to-one interviews, relating not only to the interviewer but to the other participants. This produces a type of conversation that is closer to reality as experienced by people.

Our focus groups were largely made up of 'peer groups': participants were generally selected so that their worldviews and their social or professional status were reasonably similar and participants feel as free as possible to speak. Otherwise there is the risk, among both lay people and experts, that

'subordinates' will not express dissenting opinions. Focus groups also harbor the danger of groupthink – particularly of the group holding to truths that its individual members would not support. By bringing together people from diverse backgrounds to focus on a single subject, variety is revealed. Whether this approach can withstand the demands of reproducibility of the experiment remains an open question. Nevertheless, for our purpose this approach suffices: we seek a specific kind of knowledge, an understanding of everyday life; how people give meaning to citizenship, how they negotiate its meanings in their own words.

The conversations were case studies on such issues such as juvenile delinquents in the neighborhood, neighbors who visibly neglect themselves, the consumption of alcohol during Friday afternoon drinks at work, or accommodating immigrant public holidays. We formulated two or three sentences on controversial issues that people were familiar with, either from the media or from their own lives. We of course influenced the ensuing conversation through our 'framing' of the issues, emphasizing urban social problems that – in the eyes of researchers, policy makers and politicians – are important for citizenship. We partly overcame this problem by beginning with relatively open questions such as: 'What is a good citizen?'

We organized a total of ten meetings among five different kinds of citizens (the participants were paid a small fee to try to avoid selection bias toward people overly interested in discussing society and willing to take part in such meetings without compensation (Gamson 1992: 16)):

- *Religious immigrants* (RI): immigrants or 'new Dutch' who are active in immigrant organizations based on religious principles;
- *Socially active immigrants* (SAI): immigrants or 'new Dutch' who are active in immigrant organizations based on non-religious principles;
- *Socially active* (SA): native Dutch who are active in social organizations;
- *Socially inactive* (SI): immigrants and native Dutch who are not active in any organizations. (Due to their seeming lack of social commitment, members of this group are often objects of concern. Respondents were recruited on the street outside a post office where they were presented with a list of questions and asked whether they wanted to participate in a discussion for which they would be remunerated. The sole selection criterion was that they were not members of a social organization.)
- *Policy makers* (PM) in local government and social organizations and institutions who deal with citizenship issues at the local level. As policy makers are increasingly involved in the shaping of citizenship, we wished to isolate them in separate focus groups. We focused on senior and middle managers of local policy where social participation is often one of the major goals.

We held the meetings in rented rooms. 'Unnaturalness' of setting is the leading criticism of this type of research; it allegedly does not induce people to

talk openly about politics and society, especially when researchers are present (Morgan 1997: 16). But as Gamson notes, this is not the point, as the situation still allows observers to see norms in action (Gamson 1992: 18–19).

The conversations were written down and the dialogs analyzed to find citizens' implicit organizing ideas, the 'frames' of their social consciousness (Gamson 1992: 6–7). A frame is composed of different recurring elements, including references to events and institutions. In analyzing the participants' framing of citizenship, we looked at both form (whether they spoke for a short or extended period, angrily or hesitantly) and content (whether they saw injustices or opportunities, whether they identified with the subject). This revealed the fixity or fluidity of given issues and whether people drew from the well of their own experience or from the media. This gave us insight into the meanings people bestow on citizenship, as well as on how they arrive at their opinions. Focus groups reveal how people talk about their commitments, their justifications for participation or standing on the sideline, and the (unintentional) ways in which one group of citizens can exclude others.

We registered the recurrent frames in terms of motives for action or inaction. How were these motives understood? When did people become angry or upset? When did they shrug their shoulders? Whom did they see as allies or adversaries in their indignation? When did they see opportunities for change?

This is the set of questions we worked with.

1. It is often said that citizens have duties. What do you think these are?
2. It is often said that citizens have rights. What do you think these are?
3. Do you know people you consider a good citizen, from the neighborhood or from TV?
4. Do you feel an Amsterdammer/Arnhemmer? [If yes: When? During what occasions? Did you ever feel less Amsterdammer/Arnhemmer? If no: Why not?]
5. Do you feel Dutch? [If yes: Why? During what occasions? If no: why not?]
6. Suppose that your neighbor, whom you do not know, appears to be neglecting himself. He smells unwashed, is never visited, and rarely goes out. He is not bothering anybody. Would you offer to help him? [If yes: How would you handle it? Would you ring his doorbell or talk to him when you see him? What would you say? If no: Why not? Because you are unsure how to approach him? Would you contact social services? What would you do if social sevices replied that they were too busy?]
7. Suppose that a group of boys hanging around in your neighborhood are constantly harassing the girls passing by. In the bus you see an invitation from the municipality to a meeting to discuss the problem. Will you attend? [If yes: Why? It doesn't concern you, right? Do you think that everyone who receives such an invitation must attend? If no: Why? Who do you think should go to the meeting? What would you do if it happens in front of your door?]

8. Alcohol is always served during the Friday afternoon drinks at work. As a result, some of your Muslim colleagues are never present. Do you do anything about it? [If yes: What would you do? Would you act on your own, or jointly with your colleagues? Would you approach your Muslim colleagues, the colleagues who always attend, or the event's organizers? Would you try to find a solution? If no: Why not? Don't these drinking sessions have a social function? Do you find it difficult to raise the issue, or is it merely not important enough?]
9. The government proposes to establish the Islamic Eid as a national holiday. This will come at the expense of another national holiday. Could you support such a proposal? If yes: Why? Which existing public holiday would you be willing to give up? What advantages do you see for yourself, for those around you, for society? Is it the government's duty to ensure a holiday for Muslims? If no: Why not? There are now approximately 1e million Muslims living in the Netherlands, don't they have a right to a national holiday alongside all the other predominantly Christian holidays? Shouldn't holidays consider all inhabitants?

A.4 Feeling at home in The Hague

Who feels at home in the Netherlands and why? We pursued this question among residents of the city of The Hague through 160 short interviews. We approached people in the town hall, waiting to obtain or renew their passports or driving licenses. We had good reason to suspect our respondents were representative of the population: sooner or later, everyone must come to the town hall to deal with their paperwork.

In total, we interviewed 160 residents of The Hague, 52 percent of whom were female. All were 18 years or older. Slightly fewer than half (42.5 percent) were native Dutch; the rest were first or second generation immigrants. Some 42 percent of respondents had non-European origins, the largest groups being Hindu and Creole Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans. Some 60 percent of respondents had lived in The Hague for more than ten years; only 6 percent had lived there for less than one year. The sample's composition and the high response rate are fairly representative of residents of The Hague.

We held semi-structured interviews. Where possible, respondents' answers were categorized while answers which could not be categorized were placed under 'other'. We kept asking respondents why certain issues increased or decreased their sense of feeling at home – important since the motivation of immigrants and native Dutch to raise issues sometimes differs. Respondents invariably found it difficult to say anything about their sense of belonging in the Netherlands. Perhaps the question was too confrontational. But it might also be the case that differentiating between feeling at home in

their neighborhood, The Hague. or the Netherlands is difficult, since feeling at home (somewhere) in the Netherlands may include, or even mean, feeling at home in The Hague or in a specific neighborhood (see Duyvendak 2011 for this). As Chapter 7 shows, these questions elicited a range of responses.

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